Concept
What the Jury Compares
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
What the Jury Compares
Under the contributory negligence bar, a plaintiff's own lapse ended the case even when the defendant was plainly at fault: “One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself.”1 The bar held even against a defendant whose negligence consisted of violating a statute, unless the statute placed the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.2 Comparative negligence keeps the plaintiff's carelessness in the case but replaces the all-or-nothing verdict with a division. The jury assigns each negligent actor a percentage of the fault, and the percentages total 100.
The plaintiff's percentage does two jobs. It reduces the award: under Washington's pure-form statute, the claimant's contributory fault “diminishes proportionately the amount awarded” but “does not bar recovery.”3 In a modified jurisdiction it also meets a threshold. About twenty jurisdictions allow recovery only if the plaintiff's fault is “not greater than” the defendant's, and they bar the plaintiff completely if it is greater.4 A few points of fault can therefore decide between a reduced award and nothing.
Three decisions fix that percentage before the jury votes. The law must say what is measured, negligence or causation. It must say against whom the plaintiff's share is tested when there are several defendants. And it must say whose fault goes on the verdict form when other actors contributed without being sued, or acted intentionally. Each decision changes the size of the plaintiff's slice, and each is taken up below in that order.
Fault, Not Causation
The jury divides fault. Washington's statute reduces the award for “an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault,”5 and in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. the Supreme Court held that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to a maritime collision, liability is allocated among them “proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault.” Liability is allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when fair measurement is impossible.6 The measure suits the law it serves. Judges have not generally made compensation the governing principle or imposed strict liability across the board, and fault remains the most common basis of tort liability.7
Causation cannot supply the percentages, because several negligent actors who produce one injury each caused all of it. If each defendant's negligence was a but-for cause of a single, indivisible harm, no one caused a fraction of the damages that a percentage could describe. What the jury finds is how faulty each defendant was in causing that harm. A finding of 15 percent against one defendant and 85 percent against another means the first was considerably less negligent than the second, even though each was a but-for cause of all the plaintiff's damages.8 When the harm is divisible, a different rule governs: each defendant is separately liable only for the harm that defendant caused.9
Comparing causal contributions would also resist any formula. Assume a 30-mile-per-hour limit and a collision between a plaintiff driving 60 and a defendant driving 90. The defendant exceeded the limit by twice as much as the plaintiff did, but measured by total speed the split is 60 to 40 percent (9/15ths and 6/15ths).10 Both methods ignore other factors behind the actual damage, such as the weight of each vehicle.11 The rule asks instead how negligent each driver was. A plaintiff at 60 was driving at a speed at which control was difficult. At 90, though, the defendant probably had much less ability to control the car and much less experience at that speed, so the defendant may have been more than twice as negligent as the plaintiff.12
Negligence still carries a causal flavor. A jury deciding how negligent a party was should consider the probability that the party's conduct would cause harm, although the amount of causal contribution in the particular case is not relevant. One party can be slightly negligent and cause a great deal of harm; another can be very negligent and cause little. The comparison therefore reflects each party's average potential causal contribution under the circumstances, not the contribution that happened to occur.13 A driver who runs a red light creates a far higher probability of harm than one who drifts over a lane line on an empty road, and that difference feeds into each driver's percentage.
Courts do not all word the comparison alike. Some ask whose conduct was worse, some ask whose conduct came closer to causing the injury, and some combine the two. An Ohio court in Sanders v. Frank looked to the relative degree to which each party's conduct proximately caused the injuries, rather than to the comparative reasonableness of the conduct, and the Tennessee decision in Eaton v. McLain catalogues the approaches of other jurisdictions.14 Admiralty shows the same split. Reliable Transfer is generally read to require apportionment by relative culpability alone, while the 1910 Convention weighs both relative culpability and the relative causative effect of each party's acts, which one account calls the better rule.15 Absent contrary instruction, default to fault with the probability of harm built in, and follow any causal language in the jurisdiction's statute or cases.
Causation still decides who is in the comparison. A party's negligence counts only if it was a cause of the injury: Washington reduces the award only for “an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault,” so carelessness unconnected to the harm reduces nothing.16 A percentage is a share of the responsibility for this harm, and carelessness that played no part in producing the harm has no share. Causation decides whether a party's negligence enters the comparison; fault decides how large that party's share is once it does.
The same logic governs how courts fold related defenses into the scale. A court applying Arkansas law reasoned that it would be anomalous to let a plaintiff who acted unreasonably recover part of his damages while barring a plaintiff who acted reasonably. It concluded that Type 3 assumption of risk, which it treated as reasonable assumption of risk, is no longer a defense once comparative fault arrives, while unreasonable assumption of risk is factored in as only a partial defense.17 The later section on assumption of risk returns to the point.
Multiple Defendants
With one defendant, a modified threshold compares two numbers. With several, the law must say which numbers. Wisconsin's statute measures the plaintiff's negligence “separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent,” so the plaintiff must clear the threshold defendant by defendant.19 Some states take that harder line. They bar the plaintiff from recovering from any defendant who was less negligent, while allowing recovery from those who were more negligent. Most modified states instead compare the plaintiff's negligence with the combined negligence of the defendants.20 Massachusetts took the majority course in Graci v. Damon, where the Appeals Court concluded, and the Supreme Judicial Court agreed, that the comparison is with the defendants combined rather than with each individually.21 West Virginia states the combined rule as a bar that applies only when the plaintiff's fault equals or exceeds the combined fault of the other parties involved in the accident. See Bowman v. Barnes; Landis v. Hearthmark, LLC.
The choice has work to do only where a threshold exists. A pure form never bars the plaintiff, so the award shrinks by the plaintiff's own percentage and no comparison rule can change whether the plaintiff recovers.22
The standard illustration shows how much turns on the choice. Rousseau's car collides with Locke's, and Rousseau suffers $100,000 in damages. He sues Locke for negligent driving and the City of Paris for leaving a pothole that contributed to the accident. The jury finds Rousseau 45 percent at fault, Locke 15 percent, and the city 40 percent. If his fault is compared with each defendant separately, Rousseau loses, because 45 percent exceeds both 15 and 40. If it is compared with the defendants together, he recovers, because 45 percent is less than their combined 55 percent, and his damages are reduced by his own 45 percent, leaving $55,000.23 The jury's findings are identical in both cases. The denominator alone decides between $55,000 and nothing.
Most states choose combined comparison because of why they left the bar. Two logics compete. If a modified system exists so that no defendant pays unless at least as responsible as the plaintiff, Rousseau should recover nothing from Locke. But the move from contributory to comparative negligence has been driven more by the bar's unfairness to plaintiffs than by a wish to plug a loophole in defendants' liability, and most states have preferred the answer that lets the plaintiff recover.24
Combined comparison costs the least-blamed defendant the most. Locke was 15 percent to blame and Rousseau's fault was three times greater, yet Locke is liable for $55,000, a result that looks like pure comparative negligence because a party more at fault recovers from one less at fault.25 The approach lets more plaintiffs recover, since their negligence is less likely to exceed that of all defendants together. It also brings more defendants into the judgment, which is then likely to be spread among them through contribution.26
Individual comparison produces its own odd results, and they fall hardest on plaintiffs with a small share. Suppose Rousseau is 35 percent at fault, the city 40 percent, and Locke 25 percent. The city, which is more negligent than he, owes 65 percent of his damages. Locke owes nothing, because his negligence is less than Rousseau's, so Rousseau loses against Locke although his fault is well under 50 percent. The rule also leaves defendants found more negligent than the plaintiff holding the bag for others who contributed to the accident but were less negligent than the plaintiff.27
Descartes's case shows what that costs a defendant. Descartes is 25 percent at fault and suffers $100,000 in damages. Newton is 40 percent at fault, and Mill and Calkins share the remaining 35 percent, each less negligent than Descartes. If each defendant is compared with Descartes individually, only Newton is more negligent than he, so Mill and Calkins are not liable at all. Descartes recovers $75,000 from Newton, his damages reduced by his own percentage, and Newton must pay it without contribution from Mill and Calkins, even though their negligence also contributed to the accident.28 If Descartes is compared with the defendants combined (25 percent against 75), he obtains a judgment for $75,000 against each of the three defendants.29
Threshold wording matters most when fault is tied. Suppose a plaintiff and two defendants are each one-third at fault on $60,000 in damages. Measured against the defendants together, the plaintiff's 33⅓ percent is far below their 66⅔ percent, and the plaintiff recovers $40,000 under either modified wording. Measured against each defendant separately, the plaintiff's fault equals each defendant's. Under a not-as-great-as statute the plaintiff then loses entirely.30 Under a not-greater-than statute, the wording used in about twenty jurisdictions, the plaintiff's fault is not greater than either defendant's, and recovery survives.31 South Dakota alone asks whether the plaintiff's negligence was “slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant,” a standard that defies precise definition and resists any arbitrary mathematical ratio.32
The comparison decides who recovers; a separate rule decides who pays. Kansas, for instance, makes each liable party answer for the portion of the award that its causal negligence bears to the causal negligence of all parties against whom recovery is allowed,33 and Wisconsin limits the liability of any defendant under 51 percent to that defendant's own percentage.34 Locke's liability for $55,000 on a 15 percent share shows the opposite result. The later section on joint and several liability covers these rules, and American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court is a leading California decision on how comparative fault interacts with joint liability among several defendants.
On an exam, first ask whether the jurisdiction has a modified bar at all, since a pure form makes the choice irrelevant. Then read the threshold. Language that measures the plaintiff “separately” against each defendant signals individual comparison, and language about the combined or total negligence of the defendants signals the majority rule. When the facts name no state, apply combined comparison as the majority approach, and mention the alternative whenever the plaintiff's percentage exceeds some defendant's share but falls below the defendants' total, since only then do the answers differ. The common slip is to test the plaintiff against the single most negligent defendant in a state that uses the combined measure.
Nonparty and Intentional Tortfeasors
The statute defines the total that the jury divides. Massachusetts directs that the plaintiff's negligence be “compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought,” and that the plaintiff's negligence together with all of the defendants' negligence “shall equal one hundred per cent.”36 Anyone the text leaves out of that sum receives no share, and the remaining shares must still reach 100. The last subsection assumed every negligent actor was a defendant. Often some are not. One may have settled before trial, one may be immune from suit, and one may be a “phantom party” whose involvement is merely suggested to the jury.37
Descartes's accident shows the stakes. With all four actors counted, Descartes is 25 percent at fault and the defendants together 75. Now suppose Descartes sues only Mill. If the jury compares only the parties before it, it must make Descartes's negligence and Mill's total 100 percent, and it might well assign Descartes more than 50 percent. He then loses under a modified bar, even though his share would fall below 50 percent if every actor received a percentage.38 The fault of Newton and Calkins does not vanish from the case. It lands on the two people left on the verdict form, and Descartes is one of them.
Massachusetts uses the parties-only approach. In Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, the jury did not consider a tortfeasor who had settled, and the court held that the statute's plain language supports that result. The statute does not direct the jury to apportion negligence among all tortfeasors who may have caused the injury, only those against whom recovery “is” sought.39 The court acknowledged that omitting a settling tortfeasor can work against a plaintiff, as it did there. It held that the omission does not violate the principles of joint and several liability, contribution, or comparative negligence and is consistent with them.40
Other jurisdictions count absent actors, and the pattern tracks how defendants pay. Where each defendant pays only its own percentage of fault, courts are more likely to include at least some absent tortfeasors in the negligence calculus, and Florida's Fabre line is the usual illustration.41 See Allied Signal Inc. v. Fox. Arizona abolished joint and several liability in 1987. Its statute directs the jury to allocate each actor's responsibility “in direct proportion to that person's percentage of fault” and lets the trier of fact consider the conduct of nonparties as well as parties, apportioning relative degrees of fault “as a whole at one time.”42 Counting every contributor keeps the plaintiff's percentage from rising just because contributors are missing from the case, as Descartes's example shows. The price is that the jury must weigh the fault of people who are not before the court.
A defendant who wants an absent actor counted must support the request with proof. In Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., applying Kansas law, the court required an established theory of legal liability that would allow recovery against the absent party had it been sued or were it not immune, and evidence sufficient to warrant including that party in the calculations.43 If the evidence would be insufficient to hold a phantom in the case had it been sued, the jury may not consider its contribution. The court found enough evidence of products liability fault to submit one absent manufacturer, Manitowoc Engineering, but none on a necessary element as to another, Lummus, because nothing showed that Lummus could have foreseen the possible use of the jack apart from the crane.44 The Kansas statute ties each liable party's payment to its proportion of the causal negligence attributed to all parties against whom recovery is allowed.45
A second question arises when the other actor acted intentionally, as a burglar or an assailant does, while the negligent defendant is the one whose carelessness made the wrong easier. Whether one defendant's negligence can be compared with another's intentional tort depends on the comparative fault statute, and where no statute controls, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability permits the comparison.47 Courts divide on the underlying premise. One view treats negligent and intentional conduct as different in kind. The other treats tortious conduct from negligent to intentional as points along a fault continuum, different in degree. In Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona court noted that legal scholars and at least one state supreme court hold the second view.48
Recklessness is the easier case. In many jurisdictions today, comparative fault applies to some or all cases involving willful and wanton conduct, which is the position of Restatement (Third) §§ 1 and 7; see, e.g., South Carolina's decision in Berberich v. Jack.49 It has been persuasively argued that applying comparative fault to willful and wanton misconduct would sacrifice little deterrence, and that a comprehensive system should apportion damages in all cases of misconduct short of intentional. Punitive damages remain a separate question.50
The stakes are practical. Where liability is several, each tortfeasor pays according to its percentage of fault.51 If the jury may compare, the intentional actor's share comes off what the negligent defendant owes, and the plaintiff absorbs it when the wrongdoer cannot pay. If the jury may not compare, the negligent defendant is the only wrongdoer on the form and owes more. The Restatement softens the first outcome. A defendant who is negligent because of a failure to take precautions against the specific risk the intentional tortfeasor created is jointly and severally liable for that tortfeasor's share as well as its own.52
The comparison also runs the other way, because a plaintiff's own carelessness may meet a defendant's deliberate wrong. Courts rarely permit a plaintiff's contributory negligence to reduce recovery from an intentional tortfeasor.53 One reason is the policy that a person almost always should be free to act without being charged with negligence for risking an intentional tort, although whether that rule is available depends on each comparative negligence jurisdiction's law, particularly its statute.54
Steps 1 and 3 are where jurisdictions differ, so a problem that names no state calls for the result under each approach. The usual slip is to divide 100 percent among the parties named in the facts without asking who else contributed to the harm.