Concept
Why Express Assumption Survives Comparative Fault
General rule and express assumption of risk
Why Express Assumption Survives Comparative Fault
A valid release still bars a claim after a state adopts comparative negligence, while implied assumption of risk, in most such states, shrinks to a percentage of fault. The difference comes from what each one is. Comparative negligence reduces a plaintiff's damages in proportion to the plaintiff's share of fault instead of defeating recovery outright. At common law, assumption of risk in every form was a complete bar. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A denies recovery to a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct,1 and § 496B does the same for a plaintiff who expressly agrees to accept that risk, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.2 Once a state apportions fault, the question becomes which of those complete bars survives.
Implied assumption gives way first, because it describes the same conduct as contributory negligence. A plaintiff who knowingly and unreasonably confronts a risk that the defendant's negligence created has failed to act as a prudent person would, and that failure is what contributory negligence means. Under the all-or-nothing rule, the choice of label cost nothing, since either one ended the case. Under comparative negligence, the labels carry different consequences: contributory negligence reduces damages, and assumption of risk would eliminate them. Most comparative negligence jurisdictions resolve the conflict by treating secondary unreasonable assumption of risk as a form of negligence. The jury assigns a percentage of negligence to the plaintiff's unreasonable choice, and recovery shrinks by that percentage. Some comparative negligence statutes require this result expressly, and other states have reached it by judicial interpretation.3 The treatment fits a criticism of the older doctrine: courts tended to equate confronting a known risk with manifesting consent to it.4
California reached the same place by decision. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the court replaced contributory negligence with a system of pure comparative negligence, whose purpose is to assign liability in direct proportion to each party's negligence, and it abolished assumption of risk “to the extent that it is merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence.”5 The qualification does real work. The court's description of the doctrine separates two kinds of situation. In one, the plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by the defendant's negligence, which is in reality a form of contributory negligence. In the other, the plaintiff is held to agree to relieve the defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct. That second situation “would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.”6 Only the first kind merges into the apportionment of fault.
Express assumption survives because comparative negligence has nothing to measure once the plaintiff has agreed away the duty. The system compares the plaintiff's fault with the defendant's, and a valid release does not turn on the plaintiff's fault at all. It reduces the defendant's duty for the covered risk, so negligence within that risk breaches nothing, and the bar holds whether the plaintiff later behaved carefully or carelessly. A release also records an allocation of loss made by contract before any injury. A clause in a contract of sale between two large corporations, for example, is enforceable because parties with equal bargaining power can allocate the risk of loss as they choose.7 A consumer release faces the additional limits of public policy discussed above, but the logic is the same: the parties allocated the loss in advance, so a statute that apportions fault among negligent parties has nothing to act on. Comparative negligence therefore reaches the implied form without displacing the express one (see Gilson v. Drees Bros.). The compact statement is that assumption of risk remains a complete bar only if and to the extent that it is not merely another form of contributory negligence.8
The implied side appears in a standard drunk-driving example. Tanaka chooses to ride with Quentin, who is driving while intoxicated, and is hurt by Quentin's negligent driving. Under the traditional rule, Tanaka's deliberate choice would have barred his claim. In a state that treats the choice as comparative negligence, a jury might find Tanaka 30 percent at fault for riding and Quentin 70 percent at fault for driving drunk, and Tanaka recovers 70 percent of his damages.9 The knowledge that once ended his case now only trims it.
The release is the only difference between the two versions, since the customer's conduct is identical in both. A percentage of fault is computed only when the plaintiff's conduct is the thing being judged, and a valid release removes that inquiry from the case. The release must actually reach the risk, however. In a ski-facility case, Killey's signed form listed the natural risks of skiing, and he had assumed those, but it said nothing about negligent maintenance of the facility. Because the language did not clearly include that risk, he had not assumed it, and the form's enumeration of natural risks tended to confirm that other risks fell outside the clause.10 The same reasoning would leave negligent tank filling outside a dive release that named only the natural hazards of diving. When the release fails on clarity or scope, the claim proceeds as an ordinary negligence claim, and any unreasonable conduct by the customer is weighed as comparative fault.
A plaintiff cannot defeat a valid release by pointing out that the jurisdiction has abolished assumption of risk. A comparative fault provision that addresses assumption of risk is most naturally read as making the plaintiff's choice to encounter a negligently created risk a damage-reducing factor instead of a complete bar. In other words, it treats secondary implied assumption like negligence by the plaintiff.11 A release is a different thing from a choice measured for reasonableness. It remains subject to the tests of clarity, scope, and public policy, but it is not apportioned.12 A defendant's argument that it did not breach the duty of due care also falls outside the abolition, because that argument is not a defense at all. It challenges an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.13
The merger of implied assumption into comparative fault is not universal. A few states that otherwise apply comparative negligence still treat conscious assumption of risk as a separate and complete defense, as Rhode Island does in Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. The position is clearly a minority one, but not every state has abolished the separate defense.14 Jurisdictions that keep contributory negligence may likewise retain secondary implied assumption as a complete defense; Morgan State University v. Walker (Md. 2007) is an example.15