Concept
Intentional Torts and Consent
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Intentional Torts and Consent
The reckless-disregard rules ended on a bar: a plaintiff who assumes the risk arising from the defendant's reckless disregard of his safety cannot recover for that harm.1 Throughout that matrix the defendant's culpability stayed fixed at recklessness, and only the plaintiff's conduct moved, from careless to reckless to knowing acceptance of the danger. This unit moves the defendant to the far end of the scale, where the defendant acted in order to bring about a harmful contact or some other invasion of the plaintiff's legally protected interests. The sorting changes there. The plaintiff's carelessness and the plaintiff's assumption of risk stop working as defenses, and only the plaintiff's actual consent still does real work.
Consent survives because of what it is aimed at. Carelessness and assumption of risk both leave the defendant's act alone and ask what the plaintiff did about the danger it created, whether the plaintiff failed to guard against it or knowingly faced it. Consent goes to the act itself: it is the plaintiff's willingness that the defendant do what the defendant did.2 The law has no interest in compensating a plaintiff who validly, knowingly, and freely agreed in advance to the invasion.3 A plaintiff who merely failed to watch for an attack, or who knew one was possible, agreed to nothing.
Three subsections follow. The first explains why a plaintiff's fault, whether carelessness or assumption of risk, leaves an intentional tort claim intact. The second takes up consent, the plaintiff-side defense that does bar recovery. The third addresses a limit on damages, and it differs in kind from the first two: the Restatement withholds liability for emotional distress that is the only consequence of an intended invasion, whatever the plaintiff did.4 It belongs here because a student who has just learned that the plaintiff's fault leaves an intentional tort claim intact should also know that the harm recoverable on that claim can still be confined.
Plaintiff Fault and Intentional Torts
The court in Janelsins v. Button began with assumption of risk and stated the result flatly: the doctrine does not bar recovery for intentional torts.5 It drew on Ordway v. Superior Court for the history. Assumption of risk has traditionally been a defense only to actions for negligence, and it has little or no application when the defendant's conduct is intentional or reckless.6 The reason lies in what participation can show. A person who joins a dangerous activity is held to consent to the injury-causing events that are known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking part, but participants do not consent to acts by others that are reckless or intentional.7
The phrase “little or no application” reaches reckless conduct, and the reckless-disregard rules above still bar the plaintiff who actually assumed the risk of a reckless danger.8 For intentional torts the court states the bar without qualification. A football player shows why. A player who steps onto the field consents to ordinary tackles, and the resulting privilege reaches only the conduct consented to or acts substantially similar to it.9 A deliberate attack lies outside it.
Contributory negligence yields to intentional wrongdoing for two reasons. The first is culpability. Intentional wrongdoing is a graver wrong than negligence, both in its social consequences and in the resentment it arouses, so the felt need to deter and punish it outweighs whatever social benefit the contributory negligence rule offers.10 The second is the freedom to act. Contributory negligence asks the plaintiff to use reasonable care for his own safety, and applying it to a battery would require ordinary people to arrange their attention and movements around the chance of a deliberate attack. As a matter of legal policy, a person almost always should have the freedom to act without being charged with negligence for risking an intentional tort.11 The result is the hornbook rule that a defendant cannot defend a battery by arguing that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to duck. Almost every jurisdiction has extended the rule to “wanton and willful” or reckless conduct, which is said to differ from negligence in kind as well as in degree.12
The court applied the rule to three kinds of plaintiff lapse, and none gives the defendant a defense.13
- The plaintiff failed to watch his surroundings and so missed the aggressive act in time to avoid its consequences.
- The plaintiff failed to use reasonable care after discovering the aggressive act and the danger it posed.
- The plaintiff knew the defendant meant to act aggressively and did nothing to deprive the defendant of the chance to carry out the plan.
The third lapse marks the boundary with the next heading. Knowing that an attack is coming differs from being willing that it happen, and only willingness defeats the claim.
What should an exam answer do with a plaintiff who was distracted when the contact occurred? The answer turns on what the defendant was doing.
The plaintiff's inattention is identical in both scenes, so the defendant's state of mind decides whether it matters. Classify the defendant's conduct first, and weigh the plaintiff's fault only if that conduct was negligent.
Comparative fault has not disturbed this result. The traditional rule for an intentional tort is that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is no defense, and it would seem that in most if not all such cases it should not reduce damages either. On whether the comparative negligence rule now reduces recovery against an intentional tortfeasor, the Restatement takes no position, so an answer should state the traditional rule and note the silence.14 Assumption of risk is gone as a defense to an intentional tort, but its close relative remains, and consent is the subject of the next heading.
Consent as the Defense
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(1) supplies the plaintiff-side defense that survives a deliberate defendant: one who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.19 The preceding heading showed that a plaintiff's inattention, failure to avoid an attack, and even knowledge that an attack might come leave an intentional tort claim intact. Consent works differently because it answers the defendant's act itself. Outside the intentional torts the same idea has another name. In negligence and strict liability, consent goes by the name assumption of risk, and the older doctrine rested on the notion that a plaintiff's deliberate choice to proceed in the face of clear knowledge of the danger was a kind of consent to the risk, even one the defendant had created negligently.20 Some cases treat consent, like most privileges, as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise and prove, so calling it a defense is a convenience, and the burden of proof depends on how the jurisdiction allocates it.21
Consent comes in four categories: actual, apparent, presumed, and emergency consent.22 Actual consent exists when the plaintiff is in fact willing for the conduct to occur. It is a matter of the plaintiff's subjective state of mind, so a secret consent the plaintiff never communicated is no less valid, assuming it can be proved.23 Apparent consent exists when the plaintiff's words, gestures, or conduct reasonably manifest consent. The defendant is then privileged to make the contact even though the plaintiff was not actually willing.24 Presumed and emergency consent complete the classification, and the medical cases show the emergency idea at work: consent to surgery on one ear does not authorize surgery on the other “absent an unforeseen emergency.”25
Apparent consent protects a defendant who can act only on what others say and do. In the classic case, O'Brien, the plaintiff stood in a line of 200 women waiting to be vaccinated, watched those ahead of her receive their shots, and held up her arm. She later testified that she had been unwilling. The court held the doctor “justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been,” because in deciding whether she consented he “could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings.”26 The test looks at what the plaintiff's conduct reasonably manifested to the defendant, and the plaintiff's private wishes drop out.
Consent reaches only as far as the plaintiff's decision did. By inviting Marshall to the party, Paredes does not acquiesce to her staying for a week, even if she claims she is still celebrating, because consent may be limited in time. It may also be limited to certain areas of the owner's property: a store owner who invites customers to visit his showroom does not consent to their coming upstairs to his apartment and watching TV.27 The plaintiff may revoke consent at any time by communicating the revocation to the defendant.28
The same boundaries govern consent to bodily contact. One who plays football consents to ordinary tackles even if one of them leaves the player quadriplegic. Consent to surgery on the right ear gives no authority to operate on the left, and consent to an operation creates no privilege to perform it negligently, because the defendant's privilege is limited to the conduct consented to or acts substantially similar.29 Sports apply the limit to a whole activity. Participants consent to the physical contacts consistent with the understood rules of the game, and perhaps even to contacts resulting from rule violations during play, but consent ordinarily does not extend to intentional harm that is not incidental to the play, such as a blow struck after the whistle has blown. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. is the case cited for that point.30
Two further defects can undo consent that looked real. The first is lack of capacity. Infancy, intoxication, or mental incapacity, known or obvious to the defendant, ordinarily vitiates effective consent, and where consent is required, as for medical treatment, it must first be obtained from someone empowered to give it on the plaintiff's behalf, such as next of kin.31 The second is fraud about the essential character of the contact. A doctor who obtains consent to an examination by calling it treatment while seeking sexual gratification obtains no valid consent, and neither does a defendant who obtains consent to intercourse without revealing a communicable venereal disease. In both cases the plaintiff, because of the misrepresentation or the concealment, did not appreciate the true nature of the intended contact and so did not meaningfully consent.32 The mistake must go to the essential character of the act or its consequences, however, and not to some collateral inducement. A plaintiff who agrees to a punch for fifty dollars has still consented when the money turns out to be counterfeit, though the defendant may face a deceit or contract claim, but consent is lost if the defendant secretly wears brass knuckles.33
Consent to a particular contact must be kept apart from an advance agreement to disclaim liability. The parties cannot agree to disclaim a defendant's liability for intentional torts or for willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, so a general disclaimer does not do the work that consent to the contact itself does.34
The instinct on an exam is to treat a plaintiff who saw the danger coming as having accepted it, and the rule gives that instinct no support, because consent measures willingness and nothing else.
Knowing that an attack may come differs from being willing that it happen, and only willingness defeats the claim. That is the line the preceding heading drew when it listed the plaintiff who knew the defendant meant to act aggressively and did nothing to stop it. The same logic links consent to the reckless-disregard rules. A plaintiff who accepts the specific danger a reckless defendant creates is barred, because deliberately proceeding in the face of clear knowledge amounts to a kind of consent to the risk.35 Against a defendant who intended the invasion, the consent must reach the defendant's act itself, which is why joining an activity supports consent only to its ordinary contacts.
Emotional Distress as Sole Harm
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 47 limits what an intentional tort can add to a plaintiff's recovery. Except as stated in §§ 21-34 and in § 46, conduct that is tortious because it was intended to result in bodily harm to another or in the invasion of any other of his legally protected interests does not make the actor liable for emotional distress that is the only legal consequence of the conduct.42 The earlier headings asked what the plaintiff did: failed to look, faced a known danger, or agreed to the contact. This rule never asks. It marks off a kind of injury, and a plaintiff who proves every element of an intentional tort, and who was entirely blameless, still meets the limit if upset is all the defendant's act left behind.
The limit exists because distress is easy to allege and hard to check. Courts that restrict recovery for stand-alone emotional harm give three reasons: judges and juries have special difficulty separating valid, important claims from invalid or trivial ones; liability could become unlimited and unpredictable; and the courts could be flooded with comparatively unimportant claims.43 The first reason is about proof. A broken arm or a damaged fence can be observed by someone other than the plaintiff, while the only witness to fright is the person claiming it. The older impact rule showed the same restraint in negligence cases. Emotional distress damages were “parasitic,” available when the plaintiff also suffered physical injury and unable to sustain an action on their own.44 Section 47 applies a comparable caution to intended invasions.
The limit withholds only the distress and leaves the tort claim in place. Trespass to land shows this. Damage to the property is not an element, and the unauthorized entrant is liable “irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other,” so a court may award at least nominal damages to vindicate the owner's right to sole possession.45 The section's wording confines it to distress that is the only legal consequence of the conduct, so it addresses the case where upset is all the act produced.
Two exceptions keep the limit from swallowing claims in which distress is the point. Section 46 recognizes intentional infliction of emotional distress, which reaches extreme and outrageous conduct committed with the intent to cause the plaintiff distress.46 Those two requirements screen out ordinary slights and trivial claims, which answers the concerns behind the general limit. Sections 21-34 preserve recovery for assault, where the plaintiff's apprehension is itself the injury the tort addresses.47 An exam stem that pairs an intentional tort with a plaintiff whose only complaint is how upset she is calls for sorting the conduct into one of those categories.
Dutton and Ostrander both entered Marguerite's lot, so the label of the underlying tort does not decide the answer. What moves the result is whether the conduct belongs to a category the exceptions name. Dutton's entry carried no threat aimed at Marguerite's mind, and Ostrander's did. Because the limit applies only after an intentional tort is established and only to one kind of harm, it works best as a filter on the damages claimed.
The second step carries most of the weight, because the rule looks at the consequence of the conduct and the plaintiff's own behavior never enters. A plaintiff who was inattentive, who knew an attack might come, or who was entirely careful meets the same limit when distress is all the act produced. A plaintiff who consented has no claim at all, so consent defeats the claim itself while § 47 narrows recovery on a claim that otherwise stands.