Concept
Roots in Rylands v. Fletcher
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Roots in Rylands v. Fletcher
The six factors of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 read like a modern checklist: degree of risk, likelihood of great harm, the limits of reasonable care, common usage, fit with the place, and value weighed against danger.1 Much of that vocabulary descends from an English lawsuit over a flooded coal mine.
In Rylands v. Fletcher, the defendant had a reservoir built on its property without knowing that the site lay above, or at least touched, a former coal mine. Water escaped through the mine and flooded the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff could not show any negligence for which the defendant was responsible, although the independent contractors who built the reservoir may have been negligent in failing to discover the danger.2 Yet the modern development of strict liability begins with this case.3 One feature of the facts has a modern echo: the Restatement retains vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors to perform work involving abnormally dangerous activities.4
The justification offered for liability was fairness. When one person, “in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer.”5 Read at its widest, though, the formulation was too broad to survive. Justice Blackburn’s language in an intermediate appellate court would have made a landowner liable for the escape of anything brought onto land that was “not naturally there.” Virtually all damage from land use comes from things that are not literally natural to the land, so that rule threatened to swallow the negligence rule for land use.6
English courts answered by clarifying “non-natural use”: a natural use is one that is ordinary or common in the area where it takes place.7 A more nuanced reading would call natural any use that the site’s essential character requires, so that mining minerals is natural because minerals can be removed only from where they lie.8
In the United States, many courts rejected Rylands by name. The court in Brown v. Collins held for the defendant on the ground that “[e]verything that a man can bring on his land is capable of escaping,” and that it is “impossible that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement.”9 That decision, together with Losee v. Buchanan and Marshall v. Welwood, involved customary, natural uses (a runaway horse and ordinary steam boilers) to which the English courts would not have applied the rule.10 In each case the attack was aimed at Blackburn’s broad statement in the intermediate court, and the House of Lords’ decision received little or no attention. Rylands was treated as holding the defendant absolutely liable whenever anything whatever escapes from his control and causes damage, so the rule was misstated and, as misstated, rejected in cases where it had no proper application in the first place.11
Rejecting Rylands by name did not end strict liability in this country. Even those courts began to create a series of specific exceptions, at first limited, to the rule that liability required negligence, and they called the doctrine behind some of them “absolute nuisance.” By the 1920s enough decisions followed a similar pattern to be recognized as imposing strict liability for conducting an “ultrahazardous activity.” Two factors decided the question: the degree of danger the activity posed and how common it was in the area. The more dangerous and the less common the activity, the more likely it was to qualify.12
The First Restatement turned that pattern into a definition. An activity was ultrahazardous if it “necessarily involves a risk of serious harm . . . which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care” and “is not a matter of common usage.”13 The common-usage element carries forward the English test of natural use as use that is ordinary or common in the area. Courts applied the definition more loosely than its words suggest: generally they did not require that the harm be unpreventable, that the risk necessarily be a serious one, or that the plaintiff prove the foreseeable probability of the harm.14
Changed conditions explain why American courts came to accept the principle. As Cities Service Co. v. State put it, a dangerous use of land in a frontier society was unlikely to damage a neighbor, but many areas are now overcrowded, and even a non-negligent use of land can cause extensive damage next door. Hazardous activities may remain socially desirable, yet “it now seems reasonable that they pay their own way,” because it is “too much to ask an innocent neighbor to bear the burden thrust upon him as a consequence of an abnormal use of the land next door.”15
One court quoted a summary of the cases that concludes that American decisions, like the English ones, “have applied the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher only to the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a ‘natural’ one where it is.”16 The same limit explains the refusals. Courts have denied strict liability for dangerous things that are ordinary where they are: water in household pipes, gasoline in a filling station, an ordinary steam boiler, an automobile, even a small quantity of dynamite kept for sale in a Texas hardware store.17
In 1964 the American Law Institute’s Tentative Draft No. 10 proposed substituting “abnormally dangerous” for “ultrahazardous” in §§ 519 and 520, and it listed the factors pertinent to the new standard.18 The drafters of the Second Restatement concluded that the new name was better because the emphasis falls more on the abnormal character of what the defendant does in relation to its surroundings than on the sheer degree of danger, and the Third Restatement kept the label.19 The Third Restatement also retains common usage as one of two requirements: the activity must create a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when all actors exercise reasonable care, and it must not be one of common usage.20
Two limits on the original rule do not appear in the Restatement test: that the activity be conducted on the defendant’s land, and that something escape onto the plaintiff’s land. The English cases show how binding those limits could be; in Read v. J. Lyons & Co., the House of Lords refused to apply Rylands to an explosion inside the defendant’s munitions plant because nothing had escaped. Section 519 imposes liability for “harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,” even though the defendant exercised the utmost care, and § 520 likewise speaks of harm to the person, land, or chattels of others.21 Neither requires that the activity take place on the defendant’s land or that anything escape from it.
A gasoline tank truck that overturns on an interstate and explodes, injuring a driver in the opposite roadway, shows the difference. No activity occurs on the trucking company’s land, and nothing escapes from it, so a rigid Rylands analysis would stop there; the Restatement test does not. The driver’s claim faces a different obstacle, the common-usage factor. Hauling gasoline by truck is a daily activity, and courts have shielded other dangerous but very common activities, such as distributing water, electricity, or natural gas, from strict liability.22 Gasoline in a filling station and an automobile also appear on the list of things courts have not treated as strictly liable.23
What survives, then, is the question beneath the two formal limits: is this activity unusual for its setting? A use that is natural in one region can be non-natural in another, because naturalness turned on whether the use was ordinary or common to the area.24 A reservoir out of place over English coal country, for example, can be ordinary in West Texas, as Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co. illustrates. The Second Restatement splits the idea into two factors: (d) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage,25 and (e) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on.26 On an exam, apply § 520 and treat Rylands as background; the history explains why the factors look as they do, but it does not replace them.