Concept
Elements of a Section 402A Claim
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Elements of a Section 402A Claim
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts turns liability without fault into a claim a plaintiff can plead and prove. Subsection (1) makes one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, or to the user’s property, liable for the physical harm the product causes to the ultimate user or consumer or to that person’s property.1 Two further conditions narrow the rule. The seller must be engaged in the business of selling such a product,2 and the product must be expected to reach the user or consumer, and must in fact reach that person, without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.3
The American Law Institute approved this text relying only on Greenman and a New York warranty case, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.4 The Reporter for the Second Restatement, Dean Prosser, was an advocate of strict products liability.5 In the 1990s the ALI began a five-year project to restate the subject again, with Professors Aaron Twerski and James Henderson as Reporters and an advisory committee of judges, professors, and practicing lawyers.6 The product of that project is the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which this chapter cites alongside the Second.
Courts convert the text into a list of facts the plaintiff must prove, and the lists differ mostly in how they group the same parts. In Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., the plaintiff had to prove that the product was defective, that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, that the defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries, that the seller was engaged in the business of selling such a product (put negatively, that the sale was not an isolated or infrequent transaction unrelated to the seller’s principal business), and that the product reached the user without substantial change.7 Other courts compress the list into two core elements that imply a third: the defendant sold a defective product, the defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s physical harm, and the product contained the defect when sold.8 Combined, the plaintiff’s burden runs as follows:
- The defendant sold a product.
- The defendant was engaged in the business of selling products of that kind.
- The product was expected to reach the user or consumer without substantial change, and it did.
- The product was defective when sold.
- The defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.
- The harm was physical harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property.
The statutory phrase defective condition unreasonably dangerous reads like two requirements, but most modern courts treat it as asking one question: whether the product is more dangerous than it properly should be. They express that question in the single word defective, and the list above counts it once.9 The plaintiff carries the burden on that element and must produce evidence that the product was defective when it left the particular seller’s hands.10 The tests for defect receive extended treatment in the next part of this chapter.
Do not confuse this checklist with the other liability without fault in the Second Restatement. For abnormally dangerous activities, the Second Restatement dropped the rigid elements of the First Restatement and substituted factors, so that strict liability becomes more likely as, for example, the defendant’s activity creates a higher risk.11 A §402A claim, by contrast, proceeds element by element.
Subsection (2) shortens what the plaintiff must prove. The rule applies although the seller exercised all possible care in preparing and selling the product,12 and although the user did not buy from or contract with the seller.13 The second point follows from the basis of the rule. Liability does not rest on contractual obligation; it rests on the wrong of delivering an article that is not safe for its ordinary use because it lacks qualities the manufacturer represented, a lack the consumer cannot readily detect.14 Even so, the seller is not an insurer of its product’s safety, and the elements are what keep liability without fault from becoming insurance.15
The subsections below take the elements in the order a claim meets them: what counts as a product, what counts as physical harm, who counts as a seller, who falls outside that term, and when the defect must have existed. Each element echoes a rationale for strict liability. The business-of-selling requirement points to the seller that can spread losses and press manufacturers toward safety, and the timing requirement ties liability to a condition the seller created or controlled. A defendant’s best arguments therefore often attack one of these elements, and a claim is only as strong as its weakest.
What Counts as a Product
The plaintiff’s first task is to show that the thing that caused the harm was a product. The Third Restatement defines a product as tangible personal property distributed commercially,16 a definition that covers most movable personal property and excludes services, blood, and human tissue.17 The definition tracks the reasons for strict liability. The rule was built for goods that reach consumers who cannot inspect them, from sellers who control quality and can spread the cost of accidents. Where the defendant instead sold its own skill and judgment, the plaintiff’s complaint is about conduct, and negligence measures conduct more directly than a rule that ignores care.
Processing before sale is not required. Comment e to §402A expects the rule to apply mostly to articles that have been processed, because little in the way of consumer products reaches the consumer without processing, but it adds that the rule is not so limited: a supplier of poisonous mushrooms that are neither cooked, canned, packaged, nor otherwise treated is subject to liability.18 The mushrooms show that a dangerous quality need not originate in a factory. The rule looks to the delivery of an unsafe article whose lack of represented qualities the consumer could not readily detect, and not to how the article was made.19
The best-known stretch of that reasoning reached something nobody manufactured. In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, an Illinois court held a hospital strictly liable for supplying hepatitis-infected whole blood, although the hospital could neither detect nor prevent the virus.20 The court conceded that whole blood is human tissue and not a manufactured article of commerce. It nonetheless treated blood as a product in much the same way as other articles wholly unchanged from their natural state that are distributed for human consumption, and it relied on comment e’s mushrooms.21
Cunningham did not become the national rule. It drew wide criticism for discouraging the collection and sale of blood, a commodity vital to public health. Today every state exempts blood suppliers from strict liability in both warranty and tort, almost all through blood shield statutes that classify the supply of blood as a service and not a sale, or that bar liability unless the supplier was at fault.22 The Third Restatement likewise excludes blood and human tissue from its definition of product.23 A patient hurt by contaminated blood can still sue, but must prove fault.
Services stand on the other side of the line. Services, even when provided commercially, are not products, and that rule extends to services that inspect, repair, and maintain machinery. A replacement part is a product, but the work of installing it is not.24 The Third Restatement’s own illustration of a service is a doctor’s implantation of a defective pacemaker.25 Attempts to impose strict liability on health care providers whose patients were hurt by a breast implant, hip prosthesis, hypodermic needle, spinal rod, or similar device have almost all failed.26
A complaint that arises from faulty installation is a complaint about a service, and §402A creates a remedy for dangerously defective products, not for the faulty rendition of services.27 Many transactions mix goods and labor, and courts resolve them by asking which side predominates. In Stafford v. International Harvester Co., repair of a truck’s steering mechanism was predominantly a service transaction, so strict liability was refused. In O’Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., strict liability applied because installing a furnace was a service incidental to the sale of the furnace.28
Real estate raises a different boundary question. Most courts do not apply strict products liability to defects in land, houses, and other structures attached to the land, and because Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code covers only goods, it does not govern real estate sales either.29 A number of products liability reform statutes say expressly that real estate is not a covered product. The Third Restatement limits itself to tangible personal property, but it reaches real property when its distribution and use are sufficiently analogous to those of tangible personal property.30 The courts that have treated a mass builder of homes like a manufacturer, as Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. did, are the exception.
Intangibles test the tangible-property definition most sharply. When a person strikes a high-voltage transmission line with a crane boom, a boat mast, or a ladder, courts agree that negligence alone governs. The electricity is still under the supplier’s ownership and control, it has not yet entered the stream of commerce, and it is not sold until it passes through a customer’s meter.31
Information is treated differently from electricity. When a plaintiff complains of what a publication says, the grievance is with the information and not with the book that delivers it, and courts worry that strict liability for false information would significantly impinge on free speech.32 Courts therefore treat the delivery of information as a service not subject to strict products liability, unlike the transmission of electricity or the publication of aeronautical charts.33 Charts are the exception because pilots rely totally on their accuracy and the very purpose of a chart is to portray precise physical phenomena and not ideas. Such claims may fit more comfortably in misrepresentation and express warranty, but there is little practical harm in allowing them under the conventional product defect umbrella.34
Games and recordings fall on the information side. No decision allows a products liability claim against the distributor of a game, recording, movie, video game, or internet game. In a suit over a player’s suicide, the court upheld the First Amendment defense of the publishers of Dungeons and Dragons and ruled that they had no duty to warn mentally fragile players of the game’s possible consequences.35 A federal court likewise concluded that a virtual reality game was not a product.36
Physical Harm Requirement
Section 402A makes the seller liable only for physical harm caused by the defective product to the ultimate user or consumer or to the user’s property.40 That phrase fixes the kind of loss strict tort liability compensates: bodily injury and death on one side, property damage on the other. The Third Restatement reads the property half to mean property other than the defective product itself.41 The previous subsection asked what the defendant supplied. This one asks what the product did, and the answer excludes the product that merely fails to work or destroys only itself.
A defect that produces only commercial loss falls outside the phrase. Everyone agrees that disappointed expectations about product performance lie outside §402A, as when a truck stalls repeatedly and makes its owner late on deliveries.42 Courts have moved strongly toward leaving such pure economic loss to contract law, and the Third Restatement follows that majority position. It allows recovery for personal injury, consortium losses, property damage, and the economic loss that flows from them, but not for pure economic loss.43 Its standard example of pure economic loss is the lost profits a defective industrial machine causes.44
A great majority of courts now apply an economic loss rule to these cases and deny recovery in strict products liability or negligence for pure economic loss. The Supreme Court’s decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. spearheaded the trend.45 The leading state decision is Seely v. White Motor Co., in which Chief Justice Traynor confined a buyer whose loss was purely economic to contract and warranty remedies. He explained, however, that an express warranty, including a relevant misrepresentation about the product’s quality, could support a tort action. A majority of courts, including New Jersey, which at first rejected the decision, have followed it.46
The rule rests on contract. When buyer and seller are in a contractual relationship, the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort of economic losses such as lost profits and limits the plaintiff to the remedies in the contract.47 The cost objection to liability for pure economic loss that applies outside contracts does not carry over to this setting, because the seller’s liability costs reach the buyer through the price. In product cases the rule instead rests on a contracting rationale.48
What remains for the buyer is warranty and contract, including the seller’s express warranties. A seller need not use formal words such as warrant or guarantee to create an express warranty, but statements of opinion, affirmations of the value of the goods, and sales puffing do not create one.49 Limited warranties, such as a two-year express warranty or an automotive warranty for the lesser of three years or 36,000 miles, define the coverage. In LTL Acres, a ten-year limited warranty that cladding would not lose its bond and would resist fading and water explicitly extended the warranty to future performance.50
Lost profits are the standard illustration of what tort does not reach. A buyer whose defective truck cannot make deliveries cannot recover the lost profit on those sales in tort and must sue on the contract.51 A business owner whose machine fails to perform and who loses business as a result stands in the same position, because the loss is commercial and flows from goods that did not meet contractual expectations.52 A remote buyer with no contract poses a harder question. In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., a golf-course operator that bought defective golf carts sued the manufacturer, with which it had no contract, and a Michigan court allowed the claim for the lost bargain and repair costs under warranty.
Damage to the defective product itself falls on the same side of the line, although the text of §402A makes that less obvious. A truck destroyed by a defect in it looks like physical harm to the user’s property. Most courts applying §402A nevertheless hold that when a defect injures only the product itself, the owner is limited to contractual remedies, and the Third Restatement takes the same position.53 The category is set by what was damaged, not by how dramatically the product failed. In Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., an alleged defect in a cruise control switch started a fire that damaged only the truck, and the economic loss rule barred tort liability.54 In Dobrovolny v. Ford Motor Co., a pickup caught fire, and the court denied recovery in negligence and strict liability for the truck’s value, following the Third Restatement and East River.55 The court treated it as immaterial whether the damage came gradually or in an abrupt, accident-like event, so long as the loss was purely economic.56
A minority of courts relax the rule for hazardous defects, and the two common versions look at different things. Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., a class action for the cost of repairing cars with dangerously defective seat backs, recognized an exception for products that create a clear danger of death or personal injury.57 That exception asks how dangerous the condition is before anything happens. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc. asked instead how the product failed, and permitted compensation for the defective product itself when it fails in a sudden and calamitous manner. Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp. refused that exception where a fire in a bus engine damaged only the bus, and joined the majority.58
What decides the claim is whether anything beyond the product was damaged. Section 402A covers damage to property as well as to persons, and most courts agree with that extension of strict liability beyond personal injury. In Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., a defective stove set fire to a house.59 The prevailing view allows recovery for property damage alone, with no personal injury required.60 One decision can contain both answers. In Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc., homeowners could not recover the cost of replacing defective synthetic stucco, which fell under the economic loss rule, but could recover for the damage the stucco caused to their homes. Where the defective item is a component of a larger product, courts must decide what counts as the product itself. In CHMM, LLC v. Freeman Marine Equipment, Inc., an admiralty case, the Ninth Circuit treated items the owner added to a yacht’s interior before delivery as other property.
The requirement excludes dollars with no physical harm behind them. It does not exclude dollars as such. Lost wages and medical expenses that result from personal injury are recoverable in a strict liability action, along with the plaintiff’s other losses, and most jurisdictions also permit loss of consortium claims based on the injury.61 The Third Restatement collects these results in §21. It treats economic loss as harm to persons or property when the loss is caused by harm to the plaintiff’s person, by harm to another person that interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law, or by harm to the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.62 The question to ask of any claimed loss is what caused it. A loss that physical harm produced is recoverable, and lost profits produced only by the product’s failure to perform are not.
Emotional harm passes through the same gateway. Courts often allow emotional distress claims in strict tort, to direct victims and bystanders alike, under rules similar to those in negligence. Some allow limited recovery for fear of cancer, though claims for an increased risk of disease generally fail.63 For stand-alone emotional distress, the defective product must have put the plaintiff in danger of immediate bodily harm, and exposure to carcinogens or other toxic substances does not satisfy that condition.64
Sellers in the Business
Section 402A(1)(a) makes the defendant’s own role the first filter on a strict liability claim, because the rule applies only when the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product.66 The phrase carries two limits. The word business excludes the one-time seller, and the words such a product tie the business to the kind of goods that injured the plaintiff, so a company that sells shoes is not thereby in the business of selling ladders. Courts give the words their ordinary meaning. In Brown v. Glaxo-Smith Kline, LLC, which applied an Oregon statute, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a seller is engaged in the business of selling a product when it carries on commercial activity that includes, as part of that activity, transferring ownership of the product for valuable consideration. Nothing in the statute required that selling be the seller’s sole or primary business.67
Comment f supplies the working list. The rule applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption: any manufacturer, any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and the operator of a restaurant. The seller need not be engaged solely in selling such products, and the comment’s illustration is the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream.68 The breadth follows from what the rule protects. A theater that sells packaged popcorn deals with buyers who cannot inspect what is in the bag, and it can price the cost of an occasional bad batch as readily as a store that sells nothing else. What matters is the role the defendant plays in the sale, and the size of the sideline does not change that role.
Because liability under §402A does not turn on fault, it reaches every business in the chain of distribution. The Third Restatement applies to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and other commercial transferors of products for ultimate consumption, including commercial lessors and bailors.69 The common thread is delivery: each business that hands the unsafe article along in the course of its trade commits the wrong that strict liability addresses.70 The leading statement of why retailers belong in the chain comes from Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., where Justice Traynor held the retail dealer of a new car strictly liable in tort when the car’s brakes failed and the buyer crashed into a pole.71 The retailer, he reasoned, is an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise and should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.
Two practical links support that view. The retailer may be the only member of the enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and the retailer may be able to press the manufacturer toward safety, so retailer liability adds to the incentive to safety that manufacturer liability already creates. Liability on both also works no injustice, because manufacturer and retailer can adjust the cost of that protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship.72 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the same reasoning in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co. The Third Restatement again follows the Second, counting wholesalers and retailers as sellers even when they act as mere conduits that do nothing to make the product dangerous.73
The usual objection is that a retailer who never opened the box did nothing wrong. As a description that is often accurate. As a defense it fails, because strict liability asks only whether the retailer sold a defective product in the course of its business. The stakes can be large. In Marcon v. Kmart Corp., Kmart was held liable for some $8 million for failing to warn of a risk from a sled it had sold. Kmart could ordinarily have sought indemnification from the manufacturer, which was primarily responsible for providing adequate warnings, but the manufacturer was bankrupt.74
The law accepts those results because chain liability gives the plaintiff a defendant who can be sued, and indemnity then moves the loss toward the party responsible. In states that allow suit against the retailer, the retailer has a right of indemnification from the manufacturer if it is held strictly liable to the plaintiff.75 An insolvent manufacturer or upstream supplier can leave a downstream seller without recourse. That prospect gives sellers a reason to deal with financially sound suppliers that agree by contract to indemnify them, and to test products independently.76
Chain liability has a cost, and legislatures have responded to it. A plaintiff can sue every seller of the defective product, and the retailer must pay to defend even when the manufacturer ultimately bears the liability. Critics argue that adding the other defendants raises the cost of distribution, and with it the product price, without adding any safety benefit.77 The Uniform Product Liability Act would hold retailers and wholesalers liable only for their own negligence unless the manufacturer was out of business or unreachable through judicial process, and more than half of the state legislatures have enacted similar limits.78 Georgia, Minnesota, and Washington are among them.79 Statutes that follow the Model Uniform Product Liability Act relieve nonmanufacturing sellers of strict liability, except for breach of express warranty.80 A popular variant exempts a non-manufacturing supplier from strict liability if the manufacturer is solvent and subject to the court’s jurisdiction.81 Indiana, for example, confines claims to the manufacturer of the product or component unless the manufacturer is not subject to personal jurisdiction, and Delaware has a comparable provision. These statutes reflect the view that the manufacturer, which designs the product, fabricates it, and decides what warnings to give, should bear liability for the injuries it causes.82 Where no such statute applies, the common-law rule governs, so the first question about any downstream seller is whether the state has a shield statute.
Suppliers at the top of the chain are covered too, with a limit that comes from control. Raw material and component suppliers usually have little control over the final product, because the manufacturer-assembler controls its design and assembly. A car manufacturer that obtains sheet metal, glass, batteries, and tires from many suppliers makes most decisions bearing on the safety of the finished car.83 The Second Restatement left open whether its rule reaches the seller of a component part of a product to be assembled,84 and courts have had difficulty deciding when such a supplier should answer. The Third Restatement takes a commonsense approach. A supplier is liable if the component is itself defective, or if the supplier so substantially participates in integrating the component into the design of the product that it becomes in essence a co-designer of the final product.85 The assembler fares worse. A computer maker that buys a defective component and builds it into a finished machine is strictly liable when the machine catches fire, although it did nothing wrong, because the defective component made the finished product defective.86
Selling requires an actual role in the sale, so intermediaries that only help a sale happen stand outside the chain even though they are commercially involved. Auctioneers are not strictly liable in tort for products they auction, and the Texas Supreme Court has said in Amazon.com, Inc. v. McMillan that those who merely assist or facilitate sales, such as auctioneers, advertising agencies, newspapers, internet providers, and shipment companies, are not sellers.87 The same court had drawn that line earlier in New Texas Auto Auction Services, L.P. v. Hernandez: product-liability law requires those who place products in the stream of commerce to stand behind them, but it does not require everyone who facilitates that stream to do the same. An auctioneer may still face liability for fraudulent misrepresentation, or for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability if it regularly auctions merchandise of a particular type and holds itself out as an expert, particularly when it fails to reveal the identity of its principals.88
Online marketplaces raise the same question in modern form. Most courts so far have read the word sale narrowly, ruling that Amazon and other internet providers are not themselves true sellers and so are not subject to strict liability for third-party sales of defective products on their websites.89 The phrase thus sorts defendants by the role each plays in the sale. The manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and component supplier of a defective product are in the business, the seller with a sideline is in it too, and the intermediary that only facilitates a sale is not. Membership in the chain makes a business a proper defendant without establishing its liability, because the plaintiff must still prove a defect that existed when the product left that seller’s hands.90
Casual Sellers and Services
Section 402A(1)(a) excludes the defendant who is not in the business of selling the product.93 The previous subsection described the defendants inside that phrase. This one takes up the defendants outside it or at its edge: the person who sells once or only occasionally, the dealer in used goods, and the provider of services who supplies or uses a product along the way. The occasional seller is the clearest case. Comment f says the rule does not reach the occasional seller who is not engaged in selling as part of a business, such as a person who on one occasion sells a neighbor a jar of jam, or the owner of an automobile who on one occasion sells it to a neighbor or even to a used-car dealer known to plan a resale. Such an isolated seller answers to the buyer or to a third person only in negligence.94
Comment f grounds the exclusion in the reason for the rule. Strict liability rests on the special responsibility for public safety that a business takes on when it enters the trade of supplying people with products that can hurt them, and on the buyers’ forced reliance on that undertaking. An isolated sale involves neither.95 A company whose business is providing exercise facilities and that sells off one used exercise machine shows the point: its sale was an aberration and not its regular business, and §402A limits liability to sellers in the business of selling the product that caused the injury.96 The Green formulation puts the same idea negatively, as a sale that is isolated or infrequent and unrelated to the seller’s principal business.97
The test looks to how regularly the defendant sells that kind of product, so a large corporation can be a casual seller and a small shop can be in the business. In Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., a company that occasionally auctioned off machines it had bought new and used for years was not regularly engaged in selling such equipment. Regularity matters because a defendant that sells units in repeated, predictable numbers can price their risk, which is what the loss-spreading rationale presupposes.
The dealer in used goods raises a harder question, because the dealer is in the business of selling such products and §402A(1) speaks of any product, not only a new one.98 Courts divide. Most decline to impose strict liability on sellers of used products, but not all do.99 Following the position taken in an early Illinois case, a majority holds that strict liability ordinarily does not apply to the sale of a used product unless the seller repaired or modified the product or otherwise caused the defect.100 Courts in the majority often rely on Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., an influential early case. Their reasoning counts the three principal policies behind strict liability, risk spreading, protecting a user’s expectations, and risk reduction, and finds that only risk spreading is served by holding sellers of used products strictly liable. Buyers ordinarily do not expect new-product quality from used products, and they can bargain for safety assurances if they wish.101
Two further points support the majority. The dealer in used goods generally has no direct relationship with manufacturers or distributors, so there is no ready channel through which dealer and manufacturer can exchange information about dangerous defects or liability claims.102 And the safety pressure that indemnity creates is diluted for used goods by statutes of limitation and by the growing difficulty, as time passes, of finding a manufacturer that still exists and is solvent.103
A fairly large minority of courts, following Turner v. International Harvester Co., apply strict liability to used-goods sales.104 Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co. answered the majority point by point. Buyers of used products do not expect unreasonably dangerous defects. Strict liability should encourage sellers of used products to maintain and inspect them before sale. Used-goods sellers are in the chain of distribution because they offer goods for sale and profit from them. And nothing justifies finding that used-goods dealers as a class cannot shift losses, distribute costs, or insure against losses.105
Between the two poles, some courts limit strict liability in the used-product setting to a seller that reconditioned or rebuilt the product, others to defects the seller knew about, and others require both reconditioning and an opportunity to discover the defect before sale. Even states that impose strict liability on sellers of used products require that the seller regularly deal in used goods, so a dealer who sells them only infrequently is not a seller of used goods.106 Age and condition still matter, because a court may ask whether an ordinary purchaser of the particular product, considering its age and condition, would regard it as unreasonably dangerous when sold.107
The Third Restatement takes roughly the majority position and makes consumer expectations the hinge. Retail sellers of used products are often far less able than manufacturers of new products to eliminate defects, especially defects in design, and buyers of used products usually do not expect the same level of safety as when the product was new. Section 8 therefore makes sellers of used products liable generally only for negligence. It carves out three exceptions: where consumers fairly expect the same degree of safety as a new product, such as the buyer of an automobile used for one week; where the product is sold as remanufactured; and where the injury is attributable to the seller’s violation of an applicable safety statute or regulation.108 Courts are split on whether a used-goods seller can avoid strict liability by selling the product as is or with all faults.109 A used-goods seller that escapes strict liability still answers in negligence, and Article 2 warranties may accompany a used-product sale in appropriate cases.110 Those who repair products are not sellers of them, so they are subject to liability for negligence but not for breach of sales warranties or in strict liability in tort.111
Providers of services make up the second group of outsiders, because they supply products while selling something else. Strict liability claims against hospitals and physicians whose patients were hurt by devices used in treatment have generally failed. The provider is characterized as a provider of medical services and not as one engaged in the business of selling.112 A California court, for example, held that Cedars-Sinai hospital was exempt from strict products liability.113 The court drew on Magrine, which declined to apply strict liability to a dentist whose drill, with a latent defect, broke while he was working on a patient. The essence of the transaction between a retail seller and a consumer relates to the article sold, and that article is what the seller is paid for. A dentist or physician is paid for professional services and skill, and that is the essence of the relationship with the patient.114
Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc. refused strict liability against a hospital and physician for an implant used in surgery, reasoning that the implant was ancillary to the medical services. The court distinguished comment f’s motion-picture theater. A movie audience may buy the popcorn or not, and the film goes on either way, whereas the implant, like the scalpel, is a necessary adjunct to the treatment itself.115 The Oregon Court of Appeals has broken with this tradition. In Brown, it held that a hospital may be a seller under the state’s products liability statute and reversed summary judgment for the hospital, leaving to a jury whether the hospital was engaged in the business of selling the drug. The Oregon Supreme Court has granted review.116
The line between services and products invites criticism. Courts that adhere to the product-or-service distinction may be forced into untenable distinctions, such as treating dentists as service providers but beauticians as product sellers.117 Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc. is the beautician example: a beauty parlor was treated as a retailer of the permanent-wave solution it applied. A California appellate court reached the opposite result for a cosmetologist’s application of permanent makeup pigment, because the transaction was predominantly a service.118 The result varies by jurisdiction, and the label does not itself explain why the dentist and the beautician differ. The critics’ point is that the policy concern behind comment k, taken up with unavoidably unsafe products later in this chapter, has nothing to do with the product-or-service distinction.119
Tradespeople who install products show the same line. A claim that arises from faulty installation does not arise from the sale of a defective product, and it sounds in contract or negligence.120
Defendants that supply products without selling them raise a neighboring question about the same phrase. Commercial lessors and bailors are treated as product sellers, so that a dealer who allows a test drive is held to the same rules as when he sells a car.121 Courts have long applied strict liability to commercial lessors, and Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, involving a rented truck, is an example. Warranty law followed. Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted in every state except Louisiana, explicitly applies to personal property lease transactions.122 It was amended in 1990 and revised again in 2002–2003, though industry opposed the later amendments.123 Financial lessors, who have little control over product safety, are not liable for injuries caused by defects in the products they finance, except in unusual cases where they actively participate in marketing the product.124 When a seller lets customers use an ancillary product without charge and merely as a convenience, such as a hotel bed, a grocery cart, or a bowling ball, most courts hold that strict liability does not apply, because the product has not entered the chain of distribution, especially if it must remain on the defendant’s premises.125
Defect at the Time of Sale
Section 402A(1)(b) adds a timing condition: the product must reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.128 Comment g carries that condition into the meaning of defect. The rule applies only when the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition the ultimate consumer does not contemplate and that is unreasonably dangerous. A seller that delivers a safe product is not liable when later mishandling or some other cause makes it harmful by the time it is consumed, and the injured plaintiff must show that the product was defective when it left that particular seller’s hands.129 The Third Restatement likewise requires that defect be determined at the time of sale or distribution.130 The previous subsections explained that membership in the chain makes a business a proper defendant without establishing its liability. This subsection supplies the missing link, which is the moment at which the defect must have existed.
The reason for fixing liability at the moment of sale lies in the wrong strict liability addresses: the original act of delivering an article that is not safe for its ordinary use because it lacks qualities the manufacturer represented, a lack the consumer cannot readily detect.131 The seller’s control over the product’s condition ends at delivery. A shipper that crushes a carton, a retailer whose stockroom lets pests into the goods, a repairer who replaces a part, and an owner who removes a guard all change the product where the seller can no longer inspect it, price the risk, or insure against it. Charging the seller for those changes would give it no precaution to take and would turn strict liability into insurance against every cause of product failure.
The timing rule breaks the plaintiff’s proof into linked parts. The product must have reached the user without substantial change, the defect must have existed when the product left the defendant’s control, and the defect must have caused the physical harm.132 The first two parts ask whether the product the plaintiff used was the product the seller sold, and whether that product was already dangerous. The causation part asks whether the defect, and not something else, produced the injury. In manufacturing defect cases the dispute usually turns on proof: whether the product contained a flaw, whether the flaw is attributable to the manufacturer, and whether it caused the harm. Those questions belong to the jury, and appellate courts usually uphold its answers.133
The second version of the facts shows that neither company needs to have been negligent. Each is in the business of selling computers, and each sold one that was defective and unreasonably dangerous, so the manufacturer and the retailer both answer when the defect was built in at assembly. When the defect arose later, whether in a stockroom or through shipping or weather damage after the product left the factory, the manufacturer is not strictly liable for it, and the seller whose sale delivered the product in that condition is.134 The fire and the chewed wires were the same across both versions. The only fact that moved the answer was the point in the chain at which the defect entered.
A manufacturer often contests the timing element by pointing to a later change in the product. If someone altered the product after it left the manufacturer’s hands, the product did not reach the user without substantial change, and the manufacturer is not strictly liable for a defect that the change introduced.135 Whether a later alteration cuts off the manufacturer’s liability is a superseding-cause question, and courts decide such questions chiefly by asking whether the intervening event was foreseeable.136 The foreseeability approach follows the control rationale. An alteration the manufacturer should have anticipated is a danger it could have designed against, while an unforeseeable one lies beyond anything it could have done.
Time also bears on the question, because a product that has worked for years and then fails raises the possibility that age, and not an original flaw, explains the failure. No matter how many years pass from the time a product is made and sold, the basic principle remains the same. If the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable and was probably caused by a defect that existed at the time of sale, the manufacturer is liable. If the defect is probably attributable to other causes, such as normal wear and tear, it is not.137 The line follows comment g’s description of a safe delivery, which includes the packaging and precautions the product needs to remain safe for a normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.138 A product that fails early under normal handling was not delivered in that condition, and one that fails after a long life of ordinary use usually was.
Plaintiffs often cannot say what went wrong inside the product, because the failure destroyed the evidence or the product malfunctioned and left no trace. Courts have retained strict liability in manufacturing defect cases, perhaps because a manufacturing defect affects only one unit and not the entire product line. When the plaintiff cannot prove the specific defect, as where the relevant part was destroyed in the accident, the plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence by analogy to res ipsa loquitur.139 Because res ipsa addresses the defendant’s conduct, most courts consider it technically inapplicable to strict liability and have developed a parallel doctrine, the malfunction theory, now a widely accepted way to prove that a failure was most likely attributable to a defect.140 Under it, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by proving circumstantially that the product failed in normal use under circumstances suggesting a defect probably caused the failure. The product malfunctioned, the malfunction occurred during proper use, and the product had not been altered or misused in a way that may plausibly have caused the malfunction.141
Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co. shows the gap the doctrine fills. A worker was injured when the fingers of the pilers he was using opened under circumstances in which they should have remained closed. He did not trace the malfunction to any component or offer a theory for it, so the question became whether the mere occurrence of a malfunction evidences a defective condition under §402A.142 The Third Restatement §3 permits the inference that harm was caused by a defect existing at the time of sale, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect and was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than such a defect.143 In a proper case, such as a new appliance that explodes or catches fire, it is hard to see how any jurisdiction could reject the inference.144
Two decisions show the steps at work. In Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiffs had to come forward with competent evidence excluding the stove as the origin of a fatal fire and so withstand summary judgment. They offered three expert opinions, from an electrical engineer, a fire investigator, and a former deputy chief of the New York City Fire Department, each concluding that the fire began in the refrigerator and not on the stove.145 Packaging history can narrow the field in the same way. A needle that arrived in a sealed individual packet, sat in a supply room, and was touched by no one until the moment of use, and that alone among the needles used that evening separated at the tip, points to a flaw present while the needle was still in the possession of the manufacturer and the clinic.146
The inference has limits that keep it from turning into liability for every accident. A malfunction case is won on probabilities. By its nature the doctrine often permits a prima facie case without expert testimony, but if the testimony of the parties and lay witnesses, together with common sense, does not remove the probability of other causes, the plaintiff may fairly be required to exclude them through an expert.147 The plaintiff must prove the defect by the probabilities and not just the possibilities, and where an equal probability points to causes other than a defect attributable to the defendant, the plaintiff’s case fails.148