Concept
Gravity of the Harm
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Gravity of the Harm
The harm side of the Section 826 balance has five named parts. Section 827 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists them as the factors that matter in determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land: the extent of the harm, the character of the harm, the social value the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded, the suitability of that use or enjoyment to the character of the locality, and the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.1 The section calls the factors "important," so they guide the weighing. They are not elements that a plaintiff must each prove. A factor can add weight in one dispute and subtract it in another, and the trier of fact decides how much each one counts on the evidence.
Courts that apply the Restatement balance treat this list as working vocabulary. In Prah v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted Section 827 in full and set the utility factors of Section 828 beside it.2 The New Mexico Court of Appeals recited the same factors in a footnote in Padilla v. Lawrence, where it grouped extent and character into a single suggested consideration.3 A student who knows the five factors can follow the harm analysis in opinions from different states and can organize an exam answer the way a court would.
All five factors view the invasion from the plaintiff's side of the fence. Two describe the injury: how much harm there is, and what kind. Two describe the interest invaded: how much the law values that type of use, and how well it fits the neighborhood. The last asks what the person harmed could have done to avoid the injury. The split is necessary because a bare claim of annoyance cannot be weighed against anything. A trier of fact who asks how severe, how lasting, what kind, how valued, how well situated, and how avoidable the harm is can put a plaintiff's complaint on the scale in a form that evidence can support or contradict. Extent comes first.
Extent of the Harm
The first factor in Section 827 is the extent of the harm, and it asks how much: how much of the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the land the invasion takes away, and for how long.4 Courts describe it mainly in terms of degree and duration.5 The kind of harm is a separate factor, so extent confines itself to the quantity lost.
Living beside other people means putting up with some interference, because nearly every use of land sends something across the boundary. A court that asked only whether an interference exists would answer yes in almost every dispute and would sort nothing. Asking how much use the owner actually loses does the sorting. An occasional or trivial interference leaves the owner nearly all of the enjoyment of the property, while a continuous or intense one leaves very little, and the harm side grows heavier as the enjoyment that remains shrinks.
A cement factory in a rural, uninhabited area regularly releases large quantities of dust, and no available technology prevents it. A buyer purchases the adjoining tract, builds a home, plants a flower garden, and finds that the dust stunts one variety of flower. The extent of that harm is minor, because the owner can grow other flowers and keeps almost all of the use and enjoyment of the property.6 The dust arrives regularly, so frequency alone does not make the factor heavy. What is lost must also be substantial, and one replaceable crop variety is not. Minor extent does not decide the balance, since the utility of cement production and the other factors still count, but it puts very little on the harm side of the scale.
The factor weighs far more when an invasion reaches the ordinary life of a household. In Woods v. Khan, the court held that odors and flies from the defendants' business were sufficiently bothersome to justify injunctive relief. It reached that result by weighing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiffs against the utility of the business and the suitability of its location, and it began by asking whether the defendants were engaged in a useful enterprise.7 Persistent odors and swarming flies are the kind of invasion that takes the ordinary use of a house and yard. The gardener lost one crop variety and kept the rest of the property, and the difference between the two situations is the amount of enjoyment taken.
Neighborhood norms do not erase duration and frequency. A use that fits the kind of activity the area is dedicated to can still become a nuisance because of its magnitude, frequency, or duration.8 Pigs belong in farm country, but an excessive concentration of them in a small area with inadequate drainage and ventilation can produce a stench that is unreasonable even there. An occasional invasion may fall within neighborhood norms, while continuous, repeated, or frequent invasions may not. Extent should therefore stay separate from the locality factors discussed below. A farm district tells you what kinds of use belong there, and extent tells you whether this use, at this volume and on this schedule, takes more from the neighbor than the district's ordinary activity would.
Because extent turns on degree, frequency, and duration, a party has to prove it, and a court cannot supply it by assumption. In Prah v. Maretti the plaintiff claimed that a neighbor's proposed house would block sunlight from his solar heating system. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held summary judgment inappropriate, because too little was known about matters such as the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, and the circuit court would have to weigh evidence not yet presented at trial.9 A plaintiff who wants the factor to count should therefore show how often the invasion occurs, how long it lasts, and how much of the use of the land it removes. A defendant who wants it discounted will aim at the same facts.
Character of the Harm
Section 827(b) makes the character of the harm the second factor in measuring how grave an intentional invasion is.11 Extent asked how much of the plaintiff's use and enjoyment was lost and for how long. Character asks what kind of harm the plaintiff suffered. The kinds run along a range, from physical damage to land or crops at one end to personal discomfort at the other.12 Harm near the physical end puts more weight on the harm side of the scale, and harm near the other end puts less.
The kinds of harm are ranked because they differ in how reliably a court can establish them and how fairly an owner can be told to absorb them. A dead crop or a damaged building can be photographed, counted, and priced, and the owner cannot make a lost harvest disappear by adjusting expectations. An illness caused by fumes is likewise demonstrable. Aesthetic displeasure depends on the viewer's preferences, which vary widely from neighbor to neighbor. A rule that gave such displeasure heavy weight would invite suits over what neighbors like to look at, and the most fastidious owner on the street would set the standard for everyone else. Courts accordingly view aesthetic harms as less serious than health or safety concerns.13
Most nuisance harm falls between those poles. Nuisances typically work through the physical senses, by smoke, dust, odor, noise, light, or heat that interferes with a normal person's use of the property.14 Those effects reach the body and the household directly even when nothing on the land is broken, so a neighbor who cannot open the windows because of an odor has lost something concrete without suffering any physical damage to the property. Such discomfort is a genuine harm and it counts, but on the character scale it sits below crop destruction or injury to health.
Physical character does not decide the balance by itself, because the factors interact. In the cement dust example above, the harm was physical damage, yet a single stunted variety of flower in a home garden was almost trivial in character, and the gardener kept nearly all use and enjoyment of the property.15 A student who assumes that any physical harm outweighs any non-physical harm skips the question of how much was really lost.
The visual-only case marks the low pole. An activity that is merely visually offensive is generally not an actionable nuisance, because it does not touch the senses in the way smoke, noise, or odor does.16 Activities that provoke fear, such as a funeral parlor, or moral indignation, such as a brothel, may be treated differently. That possibility belongs to the standards-of-decency route later in this chapter and should not be folded into the ordinary character analysis here. For the balancing test, ask where the plaintiff's harm falls on the range from physical damage and health impairment, through sensory discomfort, to aesthetic displeasure.
Social Value of the Invaded Use
The third harm factor in Section 827 asks about the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment that was invaded.18 Extent and character describe the injury, and this factor describes the thing injured. Two plaintiffs can lose the same evenings to the same odor, yet the harm does not weigh the same if one loses ordinary family life at home and the other loses a pastime the law values less. The question belongs on the harm side because the Section 826 balance compares values, and a comparison that treated every invaded use as equally precious would give a family's sleep the same weight as a convenience society would readily trade away.
Home life sits at the heavy end of the range. Quiet enjoyment of one's home and the comfort and safety of family life are among the interests that the Restatement approach treats as especially important to protect, so even an economically beneficial activity can lose the balance when it cuts into them.19 The reason is that the defendant's benefit shows up as output, jobs, and goods, while the plaintiff's loss reaches the place where people sleep, eat, and bring up children. The interest is also drawn broadly. In Prah v. Maretti the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's account of private nuisance, which counts the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment a person ordinarily derives from occupying land as part of the interest in use and enjoyment, and treats freedom from discomfort and annoyance as often as important as freedom from physical interruption.20 Odors and noise that keep a family from sleeping, from using its home, or from spending time in its yard therefore strike core residential uses and add real weight to the harm side. That weight is only one input. A high-value use does not make every interference grave, because extent and character must still show that a substantial part of the enjoyment was taken.
Uses that public policy encourages also weigh more when they are invaded. Prah arose when a neighbor's proposed house threatened to cut off sunlight from the plaintiff's solar heating system. The majority treated that access as falling within the broad definition of use and enjoyment of land, and it noted that state and federal governments were encouraging solar energy and that the Wisconsin legislature had granted tax benefits for it.21 A legislature that grants tax benefits for a use has announced that the use is worth having, and a court that gave the same use little weight in a nuisance balance would undercut that announcement. Prah went only as far as recognizing the interest as one that nuisance law can protect. As the discussion of extent showed, the case went back for a fuller record before anyone could say whose interest should prevail, so the factor added weight to the plaintiff's side of the scale without deciding the dispute.
The plaintiff's own use can also lower the weight of the harm. Nuisance protects against invasions that would substantially and unreasonably affect normal persons and normal land uses, and an owner cannot make a nuisance out of otherwise harmless conduct by devoting land to an unusually sensitive use.22 The Restatement illustrates the point with a racetrack whose floodlights, aimed downward, reflect light about equal to that of the full moon. That light would be harmless to anyone making a normal use of the adjoining land, but an open-air movie theater next door finds its screen washed out and loses customers, and the illustration concludes that the theater cannot recover for private nuisance.23 Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows presents the same scenario.24 The yardstick of the normal person works in both directions. A companion illustration lets a neighbor with no sense of smell recover from a slaughterhouse whose odors would make life unendurable for any normal person.25
The reason for measuring against normal uses is a matter of who can anticipate and avoid the harm. If a fragile use counted at full weight, any owner could raise the stakes for neighbors by choosing a use that ordinary activity can disturb, and a neighbor running a normal operation could neither foresee the effect nor cheaply avoid it. The owner who chose the fragile use is usually the one best placed to protect it. In Prah the dissent would have classed the solar heating system as an unusually sensitive use and denied the claim on that ground.26 The label is therefore contestable, since the same collector can be described as a use that public policy favors or as one that ordinary construction can disturb, and the description a court adopts decides how much weight the invaded use carries.
Because the harm factors are weighed together, a use of high social value raises the weight of the plaintiff's side and a sensitive use lowers it, and neither result ends the analysis. The next factor asks how the plaintiff's use fits the neighborhood around it.
Suitability of the Invaded Use
The fourth harm factor in Section 827 asks whether the plaintiff's own use fits the locality: the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality.28 The first three factors measured the injury and the weight of the interest in the abstract, and this one places the plaintiff's use on the map. A family home fits a residential neighborhood and does not fit a district given over to heavy industry or open farming. The inquiry looks only at the plaintiff's use. Its counterpart for the defendant's conduct is a utility factor in the next section, and the two are mirror images that students should keep apart.
Locality matters because neighborhoods settle into patterns of use, and owners buy, build, and plan in reliance on them. Courts therefore almost always look at the character, custom, and culture of the area in deciding whether an invasion is unreasonable.29 An owner whose use matches the pattern can fairly expect neighboring activity to remain compatible with it, so an interference that upsets that expectation weighs heavily on the harm side. An owner who plants an out-of-step use chose the location and could see what activity already surrounded it, so the law gives the resulting harm less weight. The mismatch lowers the weight of the harm without removing it, since the other four harm factors and the whole utility side still count.
A nuisance may be the right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.30 The image usually describes the defendant's use, and that version belongs to the next section. Section 827(d) supplies the mirror image, in which the plaintiff has put a parlor in the barnyard.
Two piggery cases show how location facts drive results. In Mitchell v. Hines the court enjoined a piggery operating near residential owners. In Clark v. Wambold the plaintiff failed to enjoin a piggery on a traditional farm in a rural area, where the odors crossing the property line were held not to be an actionable nuisance.31 Clark turned chiefly on how well the piggery fit its farm setting, which is the defendant-side question, so the pair shows that location decides outcomes without isolating the plaintiff's side of the ledger.
The low pole on the plaintiff's side appears in the cement dust illustration. The area around the factory appears unsuited to a residential flower garden, and the owner might do better growing that variety indoors or in a small greenhouse, so the mismatch between the plaintiff's use and the locality lowers the gravity of the harm.32 The mismatch is only one input, because the extent of the harm was minor, the physical damage was almost trivial in character, and the owner kept nearly all use and enjoyment of the property. Set beside a home among other residences, the garden beside a cement factory shows the difference the suitability factor registers.
The locality factor also explains how courts treat an owner who buys or builds next to an interference that is already under way. Modern courts treat having come to the nuisance as one factor in judging reasonableness, and it does not bar relief on its own.33 Arrival still counts for something, because it bears on whether the plaintiff's use fits the area and because the purchase price may already have reflected the nuisance.34 How much it counts depends on fit. The argument is much stronger when the defendant's activity suits the area and the plaintiff's own use is out of step with it, and it remains one factor and never a determinative one.35
In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., a developer built the Sun City community next to a cattle feedlot already operating in a rural area. The court treated the developer as having come to the nuisance, and had the developer's interests alone been at stake, no injunction would have issued. Because the residents of Sun City were innocent third parties who were also affected, the court enjoined the feedlot, but it required the developer to indemnify the feedlot for the cost of moving.36 The developer's arrival cost it something, and the residents' harm still counted.
Zoning plays a supporting role. A classification helps show what an area is dedicated to, for the plaintiff's use as well as the defendant's, but it is one factor and not the answer.37 Zoning law itself reflects the gap between a classification and a nuisance, since it typically lets uses already in place continue as legal nonconforming uses while requiring particularly noxious activities, such as junkyards, to end quickly.38 The same classification matters again in the next section, where the question becomes whether the defendant's conduct fits the locality.
Burden of Avoiding Harm
The fifth and last harm factor in Section 827 looks at the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.40 The first four factors described the injury and the interest it struck. This one asks what the plaintiff could have done about the invasion and what doing so would cost. The factor sits on the harm side because the gravity of an invasion is its net effect on the plaintiff's enjoyment of the land. When a cheap and effective precaution removes most of the injury, the plaintiff's real loss is the price of that precaution, and treating the invasion as a heavy burden overstates it. When no practical precaution works, the whole interference falls on the plaintiff and the harm weighs at its heaviest.
In Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, noise from an air-conditioning unit serving an apartment complex bothered the neighboring plaintiffs, who said they could not carry on a normal conversation in their home with all the doors and windows closed.41 That detail carries the avoidance factor. Closing up the house is the ordinary precaution against noise from next door, and the plaintiffs had already taken it without relief, so the ordinary precaution had been exhausted. The court affirmed the injunction in the neighbors' favor.42
The factor cuts the other way too, and Prah v. Maretti shows how far. The solar-collector plaintiff there was told, in effect, that he might have protected himself. A footnote in the dissent observed that he could have avoided the litigation by building his house in the center of his lot instead of only ten feet from the neighbor's line, or by buying the adjoining lot.43 The majority held summary judgment inappropriate and said that a plaintiff's ability to avoid the harm is a relevant but not a conclusive factor.44 Both opinions agree that the avoidance argument counts, and they part over whether it can end the case. The majority noted that too little was known about matters such as the extent of the harm and the costs to the defendant of avoiding it.45
The factor stays a factor, and does not become a defense, because of what a rule making it decisive would do. Almost any invasion can be avoided in theory by someone willing to rearrange their life: move the bedroom, keep every window sealed, build elsewhere on the lot, or sell and leave. If that theoretical possibility ended the inquiry, the plaintiff would bear the full cost of every precaution and the defendant would face no pressure to bear any of it. The weighing therefore asks how heavy the burden of avoidance would be and how fair it is to place that burden on the plaintiff. Courts consider the ability of either party to avoid the conflict and the practicability and fairness of making that party do so.46 Section 827(e) captures the plaintiff's half of that comparison. The defendant's half, meaning how impracticable it would be for the defendant to prevent the invasion, belongs to the utility factors of Section 828 and to the avoidable-harm discussion later in this chapter. A student who reads this factor as asking what the defendant could have done has filed it in the wrong place.
Avoidance that works only by giving up a protected use is therefore no discount at all, because the use the plaintiff would sacrifice is the very interest that Sections 826 and 827 exist to protect. A cheap fix lowers the weight of the harm, and the absence of one raises it. In neither case does the factor decide the dispute, since extent, character, the social value and suitability of the invaded use, and the whole utility side of the balance must still be weighed with it.