Concept
Priority and Compensated Injunctions
Remedies: damages and injunction
Priority and Compensated Injunctions
An activity that was already running when a newcomer arrived raises two questions once it becomes a nuisance. The first is whether its priority in time defeats the newcomer's claim, which is the doctrine of coming to the nuisance. The second is who pays when the court enjoins the activity anyway, a question one famous decision answered in an unusual way.
Coming to the Nuisance
A plaintiff who moves next to an activity already under way has “come to the nuisance,” and the question is what that arrival is worth. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. poses the question in its hardest form. A cattle feedlot was operating in western Maricopa County when the developer of Sun City began building homes nearby. The court said that had the developer been the only party injured, the doctrine would have barred the injunction it sought; it granted the injunction anyway, because of the damage to the people who had been encouraged to buy homes in Sun City.1 The court's reasoning pairs an objection with an exception, and the pair states the modern position. Arrival after the nuisance began is a relevant factor in the balance of equities. It can weigh heavily, but it does not by itself defeat the claim.2
Older cases sometimes treated the plaintiff's arrival as an absolute defense. The modern tendency treats it as one factor in judging the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, which is the approach of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D.3 The majority rule accordingly holds that a plaintiff who buys property next to a public or private nuisance is not barred from recovery by that fact alone.4 In Chase v. Eldred Borough, a hail of baseballs fell from an outfield twenty feet away. The plaintiff had bought the house knowing the field had operated for fifty years, and the court still enjoined play until the town built a protective fence.5
Two objections explain why courts do not simply award the field to whoever got there first. The first concerns incentives. A rule that the first party to make an active use of property may continue without fear of nuisance liability would encourage a race to make active use of land, even when the use is premature, and that “development race” is undesirable.6
The second objection goes to what counts as first. When a factory opens beside undeveloped land, the first use of the area is not the factory's operation but the neighbor's maintenance of the nearby property in its unimproved condition.7 The same is true when the plaintiff buys after the factory is running, because the seller's land would lose market value if the buyer could not sue, and the seller's rights would shrink with it.8 An automatic bar would thus let one neighbor's use fix the value of another's unimproved land.
Priority also erodes as the area around the defendant fills in. Once the entire area around a factory is developed with single-family homes, particulate emissions are certain to be a substantial and unreasonable interference with the neighbors' use and enjoyment of their land, even though the owner is not necessarily behaving unreasonably. The interference is simply greater than they should have to tolerate.9 Spur draws the same line for a business that a growing city overtakes. Had the feedlot stood at the outskirts of a city that then grew toward it, the court said, the feedlot would have borne the cost of abating the nuisance as to the people who settled within the growth pattern of the expanding city.10 But nothing indicated, when Spur and its predecessors located in western Maricopa County, that a new city would spring up full-blown beside the operation.11 What separates the two settings is foreseeability. Gradual growth toward an edge-of-town business is the expected course of events, and a whole town raised beside a remote agricultural use is not.
Locality also shapes the weight. Coming to the nuisance is much more likely to count where the defendant's activity suits the area and the plaintiff's own use is out of step with it.12 A feedlot in farm country meets the first condition, and a subdivision rising in the midst of that country meets the second. The Spur court, quoting an earlier decision, observed that people who build homes beyond the reach of city zoning, whether to avoid city taxes and assessments or to escape congestion and smoke, “must be prepared to take the disadvantages.”13 The same is true of the zoning of the area and of its common use for the activity in question, which bear on the weight in much the same way.14 Because both fairness and efficiency concerns have shaped the doctrine, working out its role in a particular case can be complicated from either point of view.15
Where the other equities are close, the plaintiff's arrival can decide the case. In East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. Portland the plaintiff had bought its property twenty years earlier, when the city was already polluting the slough, and the condition gradually worsened with the growth of the community. The health of Portland depended in large measure on that sewage disposal, and there was no other way to dispose of it, so the plaintiff received neither an injunction nor damages.16 The plaintiff in Chase also came to the nuisance, but the order there let play resume once the town built a fence, so relief did not require closing the field. In Portland, priority combined with a public need that had no substitute. In Chase, it met a remedy that left the defendant's activity in place. Spur shows a third result, in which the plaintiff's arrival counts against relief and the public still needs protection: the injunction issued, and the developer who brought the residents to the feedlot was made to pay for the move. An answer that stops at the observation that the plaintiff moved in after the nuisance began skips the weighing the modern rule requires.
Weighing of this kind presupposes that the court has a choice, and a statute can remove it. The most famous example is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Court determined that the Endangered Species Act required the district court to enjoin continued construction of a federal dam once the court found that the project threatened the habitat of a protected species, in direct violation of specified statutory protections.17 In such a case the statute, not a balance of the equities, fixes the remedy.
Compensated Injunction
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. ends in a decree with two parts. The court held that the developer was entitled to a permanent injunction against the lawful feedlot, and it ordered the developer to indemnify the feedlot's owner for a reasonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down.19 Damages in lieu of an injunction run the other way: the defendant pays the plaintiff and may keep operating.20 The Spur decree ends the activity and makes the plaintiff pay the defendant. Requiring indemnity was a new approach, the reverse of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., and it added to the court's repertoire of remedies.21
The feedlot was there first, and the court counted the hardships on both sides. If the feedlot continued, the residents of Sun City would go on being bothered by odors and flies, and if it closed, Spur would suffer a substantial loss.22 The developer had leapfrogged developable land near Phoenix to build on cheaper land farther out, and the court found that the residents should not have to suffer the health risk of living amid the flies and odor.23 The injunction therefore rests on the residents and not on any fault of the feedlot. Spur was required to move not because of any wrongdoing on its part but out of the court's proper and legitimate regard for the rights and interests of the public, and the developer won the injunction not because it was blameless but because of the damage to the people who had been encouraged to buy homes in Sun City.24
The court then asked who should absorb the cost of that protection. Entitlement to the injunction did not free the developer from liability to Spur if the developer had in fact caused Spur's loss. The court saw nothing harsh in requiring a developer who had taken advantage of lower land values and large rural tracts to build a new town to indemnify those forced to leave as a result.25 Having brought people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of Spur, the developer owed Spur a reasonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down.26
The allocation tracks who made the choices. The developer chose cheaper land farther out and captured the savings that choice offered.27 The operator had put a lawful business in farm country at a time when nothing indicated that a new city would spring up full-blown beside it.28 On the court's reasoning, putting the cost of moving on the feedlot would let the developer keep the savings and leave the cost of the conflict with the one party that did nothing to bring it about. The costs at stake, which are relocation, lost business, and inflated subdivision home prices, are also costs that a comprehensive land use plan and zoning law for the jurisdiction would have prevented.29
The opinion also contains a money award that the court reversed. The trial court had awarded the developer damages for the diminished value of property in Sun City, but the court held that this was error: the owners of that property were the individual residents, and the developer had no standing to recover for harm to land it did not own.30 Compensatory damages are measured by the injury to the plaintiff's own property interest, which is why the developer's claim failed.31 The developer therefore left the case with an injunction granted because of the residents' harm, no damages of its own, and a duty to indemnify the feedlot.
The indemnity does not attach to every injunction against an established business. The court limited it to a case in which a developer has, with foreseeability, brought into a previously agricultural or industrial area the population that makes an injunction against a lawful business necessary, and in which the business has no adequate relief otherwise.32 The same opinion marks the other side of the line. A feedlot placed near the outskirts of a city that later grows toward it bears the cost of abating the nuisance as to the people who settle within the growth pattern of the expanding city.33
Both versions end with the farm enjoined, so the injunction cannot be what separates them. What separates them is whether the plaintiff brought the population to the farm or a growing town came to surround the farm.