Concept
The Defamation Claim
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Defamation Prima Facie Case
The Defamation Claim
Defamation protects a person's standing in the eyes of other people. Harm to reputation exists only in the minds of those who hear or read what was said, so the tort is built around communications and their effect on an audience.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 turns that idea into a checklist of four requirements, and liability exists only when all four are present.1 A defendant who defeats any one of them defeats the claim, which makes the checklist the natural frame for working a fact pattern step by step. The plaintiff carries the burden of proving the matters on which liability depends once the issue is properly raised.2
The Restatement framework is only half the picture. Constitutional rules modify several of the requirements, and how they apply depends on who the plaintiff is and whether the statement addresses a matter of public concern. This chapter introduces each constitutional rule at the requirement it changes, so the common-law framework and its constitutional overlay appear together.
This opening section does three jobs: it fixes what the tort protects and separates libel from slander, sets out the § 558 checklist, and assigns the burden of proof.
Reputation, Libel, and Slander
A defamation claim begins with an audience. The § 558 checklist requires an unprivileged publication to a third party,3 and the requirement follows from what the tort protects: a person's good name, meaning the standing the person holds with others.4 The injury is relational. A statement that reaches no one but the plaintiff changes no one's opinion of the plaintiff, so it is not actionable defamation, although it could possibly support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 Later sections take up what counts as publication and which occasions are privileged. The point here is that someone other than the plaintiff must receive the statement before the tort has anything to redress.
The same focus on reputation marks the boundary of the tort. A statement is defamatory when its content harms reputation or would cause a person to be shunned; a statement harmful only in some other way is not.6 Courts generally ask whether the statement tends to harm the plaintiff's reputation by lowering her in the esteem of a substantial and respectable minority in the community, or by deterring people from associating or dealing with her.7 A false report that the plaintiff has died, which costs her customers or clients, shows where the line falls: nothing in it lowers anyone's opinion of her, so there is no defamation action, and the remedy, if any, is injurious falsehood.8 A statement that offends or distresses the plaintiff without harming her reputation might support a claim for infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy instead.9
A narrow exception qualifies the rule that a statement made only to the plaintiff is not published. When the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the statement along, the defendant is treated as a publisher; a defendant who hands a written defamation to an unsighted person, for example, can expect the recipient to have others read it.10 The Restatement (Second) adds that the defendant is a publisher in such cases only because the plaintiff was unaware of the defamatory character of what she transmitted,11 which is why the landlord's letter, whose accusation the tenant fully understands, fits no exception. A few courts have extended the idea to a discharged employee who must explain the discharge to later employers, but the large majority reject it in employment cases where the plaintiff knows what was said. They reason that the employer is not a publisher at all, and the policies they invoke arguably support a privilege instead.12
Once a statement has reached a third person, its form decides whether the claim is libel or slander. Defamation law encompasses both torts: libel is in general a written defamatory communication, and slander an oral one.15 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568 refines the division. Libel covers written or printed words, physical embodiment, and any other communication with the potentially harmful qualities of writing; slander covers spoken words, transitory gestures, and every other form of communication.16 Subsection (3) directs courts to weigh the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of the publication, and the persistence of the defamation in deciding whether a publication is libel.17 Those factors explain why writing draws the harsher treatment: a writing lasts, can travel far from its author, and usually reflects deliberate composition, all of which make injury to reputation likelier.
Classification depends on form, not audience size. A defamatory oral statement to a large crowd is slander, while a defamatory letter sent to one person is libel.18 Spoken delivery can still publish a libel: reading a defamatory writing aloud does, and so does dictating defamatory words to a stenographer who is expected to write them down, and does, as in Ostrowe v. Lee.19 Transitory acts stay on the slander side. In Bennett v. Norban, a storekeeper who publicly stopped a woman and searched her shopping bag committed a slander by gesture.20 The dictation was meant to become a durable record; the search left only the memory of those who watched.
Newer media strain the form test. A live radio broadcast is purely oral, and audience size is usually irrelevant to the classification, so by form alone a broadcast could be slander.21 Restatement (Second) § 568A nonetheless treats a broadcast as libel, and whether defamatory oral communication sent over the Internet should be treated as a broadcast, even to a small audience, remains an open question.22
Written online content is the easier case. In Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, the defendants argued that Internet messages resemble a speech on the village green and so deserve the greater protection traditionally given to slander. The court held instead that written defamatory communications published over the Internet are libel.23 It reasoned that the argument confuses two analyses. The balance between free speech and reputation is struck by weighing factors such as the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure and the subject of the speech, while the libel-or-slander label is an arbitrary and, some would say, archaic distinction that in California has little to do with the constitutional analysis.24
The label matters because it controls proof of harm. A plaintiff suing for slander must plead and prove special damage unless the statement falls within one of four per se categories,25 while a plaintiff suing for libel could traditionally rely on a presumption of damage from the publication itself, subject to the constitutional limits discussed below.26 The harm sections develop those rules.
Entities can be defamed as well as individuals. A business or non-profit entity that sues typically alleges that the defendant imputed fraud or deceit, other dishonesty, reprehensible conduct in its operations, or insolvency or poor creditworthiness. The recurring question is whether the statement carried a defamatory meaning or merely criticized the entity's methods, products, or services in a non-defamatory way.28 In Cohn v. Am-Law, a libel of a lawyer in a professional capacity was also a libel of the lawyer's firm.29 Public entities, by contrast, may be denied standing to sue.30
The plaintiff must also be living when the defamatory matter is published. There is no cause of action for defaming a deceased person, and the defamer is not liable to the decedent's estate or family members.31 A relative has an action only when the statement also carries a defamatory meaning about the relative, and then the claim rests on the relative's own good name.32 The rule follows from the interest at stake: the tort protects a plaintiff's own standing with others, and a relative's grief over an attack on the dead is not damage to the relative's reputation. A different question arises when the plaintiff was alive at publication and later dies, because whether that action survives depends on the local survival statute.33
The Section 558 Elements
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 requires four things for liability: a false and defamatory statement concerning another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.36 The four divide the work. The first ties the words to the plaintiff and tests their content, the second ties them to an audience whose opinion of the plaintiff can change, the third protects publishers who took reasonable care, and the fourth asks whether the statement is actionable without proof of special harm or, failing that, whether special harm exists. Because all four are required, a defendant who defeats any one defeats the claim.
The first requirement bundles several inquiries: whether the words are defamatory, how their meaning is fixed, whether they refer to this plaintiff, whether they assert fact rather than opinion, and whether they are false. The second carries a limit in its own wording. The word unprivileged means that a defamatory statement can reach a third person and still create no liability, because some speakers and some occasions are protected.
The four-part list is longer than the claim the common law began with. In libel, once the plaintiff showed that the defendant had published defamatory material of and concerning the plaintiff to a third person, courts could presume that the publication was malicious, that the words were false, and that the plaintiff was damaged, and those presumptions supported a substantial recovery.41 The plaintiff did not have to prove the defendant's fault, so the traditional claim was one of prima facie strict liability: the opening showing won unless the defendant raised an affirmative defense and proved it.42 Section 558 writes falsity into the first requirement, adds fault as a separate requirement, and keeps in the fourth the traditional line between written and spoken defamation.
Constitutional decisions supplied the additions. Beginning in 1964, the Supreme Court has reshaped the common-law case under the First Amendment's free-speech guarantee, reversing the old presumptions of fault, falsity, and damages in a substantial number of cases.43 Courts began listing fault, falsity, and actual damage as requirements as they worked those rulings into the common law of libel, and the Restatement (Second) reflected the development when it added them in 1977.44 A later Supreme Court decision suggests that the Constitution itself does not demand the additions when the defendant defames a purely private person on a matter not of public concern, yet states apparently continue to require them in every case.45
Which constitutional rule governs a given claim depends on who the plaintiff is and what the statement is about. A public official or public figure must prove that the defendant published a knowing or reckless falsehood. A private person suing over a matter of public concern must prove falsity, some fault, and actual injury.46 The later sections place each rule at the requirement it changes, and the last section assembles them into one decision sequence.
A single missing requirement ends the claim even when the accusation is just as false and just as damaging.
Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
The plaintiff must prove the matters on which liability depends, when the issue is properly raised. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 613(1) says so,49 and its clauses list the matters:
- (a) the defamatory character of the communication;50
- (b) its publication by the defendant;51
- (c) its application to the plaintiff;52
- (d) the recipient's understanding of its defamatory meaning;53
- (e) the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff;54
- (f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication;55
- (g) the defendant's negligence, reckless disregard, or knowledge regarding the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication; and56
- (h) the abuse of a conditional privilege.57
Each lettered matter corresponds to a requirement or sub-issue that a later part of this chapter develops, so those parts teach them alongside the elements they match. What needs settling here is who carries the burden.
The qualifier when the issue is properly raised ties each burden to a live dispute. A matter becomes something the plaintiff must prove once the case puts it in contention. Conditional privilege shows how this works: it protects a good-faith communication that serves a legitimate interest, and it enters a case only when the defendant invokes it. At that point clause (h) makes the plaintiff, not the defendant, responsible for proving that the privilege was abused.58
Falsity is the matter on which the allocation has moved. At common law the law presumed that every defamatory statement was false, so truth was an affirmative defense that the defendant had to raise and prove.59 The same traditional claim let courts presume malice and damage as well, which is why it is described as prima facie strict liability.60 Constitutional decisions cast doubt on the falsity allocation, and in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, held that in an action against a media defendant for speech of public concern the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity.61 A plaintiff who sues a newspaper over an article on a matter of public concern must therefore prove that the statements were false as well as defamatory.
Fault has moved in the same direction. As courts worked the constitutional rules into the common law of libel, they began listing fault, falsity, and actual damage among the things a plaintiff must prove,62 and clause (g) already places the defendant's negligence, reckless disregard, or knowledge among the matters the plaintiff proves.63 The later sections on falsity, fault, and damages work out which showing each kind of plaintiff must make.
Who must prove falsity therefore depends on the setting. Under the common-law baseline, falsity is presumed and a defendant who relies on truth must prove it; where a media defendant speaks on a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must prove falsity. A rule stated flatly as 'truth is an affirmative defense' is incomplete, and so is one stated flatly as 'the plaintiff must prove falsity.' A sound answer states the baseline, identifies which constitutional rule the facts trigger, and says where the burden lands.