Concept
Publication Defined
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Publication and the Single Publication Rule
Publication Defined
Publication of defamatory matter is its communication, intentionally or by a negligent act, to one other than the person defamed.1 That one sentence holds three requirements: a communication, a recipient other than the plaintiff, and fault on the defendant's part. The first two subsections below take up the recipient and the fault; the third takes up the special case in which the plaintiff carries the matter to others.
'Publication' is a term of art. It does not require that the matter be published in any formal sense; it is merely the defendant's communication of defamatory matter to someone other than the plaintiff.2 The familiar picture is a newspaper running a story, as the defendant did in the English case reported at [1910] A.C. 20, when it ran its Paris correspondent's article about a man called Artemus Jones, apparently a church warden at Peckham, seen abroad with a woman who was not his wife.3 The law asks for far less than that. A single recipient is enough,4 and the definition limits neither the medium nor the size of the audience.
The recipient requirement follows from what defamation protects. Matter is defamatory when it tends so to harm a person's reputation as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.5 Both effects occur in other people's minds. Words that only the plaintiff hears may wound, but they leave his standing with everyone else where it was, and publication is the element that supplies the audience in whose minds the harm occurs.
Communication to a Third Person
The recipient may be anyone other than the person defamed. Georgia's libel statute states the rule in its plainest form: a libel is published as soon as it is communicated to any person other than the party libeled, and publication is essential to recovery.6 One such person is enough. In the employment setting, for example, proof that an employer or the employer's agent communicated a defamatory statement to a single other person is usually enough to establish publication.7 In most jurisdictions, communication to the defendant's own agent also counts as publication, though a privilege may excuse it.8
The corollary is that words reaching only the plaintiff are not published, because reputation lives in other people's opinions and the plaintiff is not one of the other people.
Reaching a recipient does not finish the inquiry if the recipient takes nothing away. Because defamatory matter is defined by its tendency to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of others or to deter them from dealing with him,9 a recipient who draws no defamatory meaning from the matter has received nothing that could do either. Courts have accordingly found no publication where the only listener could not understand the language, as in Economopoulos v. A.G. Pollard Co., or where the only listeners were children too young to follow the defamatory expression, as in Sullivan v. Sullivan.
Understanding is not belief, and the two should be kept apart. A recipient who cannot follow the matter has received no defamatory message, so there is no publication. A recipient who follows the charge and rejects it has received exactly what the defendant sent, so publication has occurred, and the recipient's doubt bears on how much harm followed. Marble v. Chapin treated disbelief that way, as a question of damages. Silverman v. Progressive Broadcasting, Inc. found no publication where the recipient knew the statement was false, which comes closer to treating disbelief like incomprehension, but the general view remains that disbelief goes to damages.
Communications inside an organization divide the courts. Jerolamon v. Fairleigh Dickinson University held that a report by university security guards to the Director of Campus Safety and the Provost was a publication.10 Perez v. Boatmen's National Bank reasoned the other way: communications between officers of the same corporation in the due and regular course of its business, or between its different offices, are not publications to third persons.11 In the employment setting, many courts likewise decline to treat communication from one person to another within the same employment relationship as publication where a clear need to know exists, as in Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores.12 A careful answer notes the split and asks whether the recipient had a business reason to receive the report.
Intentional or Negligent Communication
A defendant is not liable for an unintended or accidental publication. The communication must have been intentional or the result of the defendant's negligence,14 which is why the Restatement definition reads 'intentionally or by a negligent act.'15
Intent is the easy case: the defendant means a third person to read or hear the matter. The disputed cases are those in which the defendant aimed the matter at the plaintiff alone, or at no one, and a third person saw or heard it anyway. The question then becomes what the defendant knew or should have known about who would receive it, so identical words can be published in one setting and unpublished in another.
Mail shows the test at work. A letter addressed to the plaintiff is ordinarily read by the plaintiff, but there is liability if the defendant knows, or should know, that the plaintiff's spouse or secretary is in the habit of reading the plaintiff's mail, or in the circumstances would likely read it, and the words are in fact read by that person.16 Rumney v. Worthley and Roberts v. English Mfg. Co. found publication on those facts. Barnes v. Clayton House Motel found none where a sealed letter to the plaintiff was unexpectedly opened and read by a third person.
Spoken accusations follow the same logic, with volume and surroundings in place of the envelope. McNichol v. Grandy held a defendant who spoke so loudly that someone could be expected to overhear to have published the accusation. Where the defendant speaks to the plaintiff with no reason to suppose anyone can overhear, there is no publication even if a concealed listener hears, as in Hill v. Balkind. Smith v. Jones reached the same result where the defendant was unaware that the plaintiff's children were listening on another telephone line.17
Electronic records follow the same pattern. In Morrow v. II Morrow, Inc., an author deleted a defamatory file memo without realizing it had been saved on a network, and the defendants avoided liability because negligence could not be found.
The standard also runs against a careless defendant. One who intends to reach the plaintiff and mistakenly reaches someone else may have communicated by a negligent act, and negligence is enough.18
Publication by the Plaintiff
A defendant who communicates defamatory matter only to the plaintiff has ordinarily not published it.20 The definition asks for a recipient other than the person defamed, and the plaintiff is not one. It follows that the plaintiff's own repetition of the matter to others is ordinarily not the defendant's publication, because the defendant did not communicate it to them. Courts discuss the topic as self-publication or, in termination cases, as the compelled publication doctrine.21
The rule gives way when the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the matter on; the defendant is then himself a publisher. If a defendant hands a written defamation to an unsighted person, the defendant can expect the recipient to have others read it.22 The Restatement Second adds a limit that shows what carries the exception: the defendant is a publisher in these cases because the plaintiff was unaware of the defamatory character of the communication she transmitted to third persons.23 The unsighted plaintiff acts as a conduit for the defendant's words, unaware of what they say.
Some courts have expanded the self-publication doctrine beyond plaintiffs who do not know what they are carrying. A few cases hold that when the defendant can foresee publication by the plaintiff under compelling circumstances, as with a discharged employee seeking employment elsewhere, the defendant is subject to liability for defamation.24 Hedgpeth v. Coleman and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society are examples of this approach. The issue is critically important in termination cases,25 yet the large majority of cases reject the idea, at least in employment cases where the plaintiff is aware of the defamatory content, and hold that the defaming employer is simply not a publisher.26 The Texas Supreme Court is among the courts that refused to recognize the claim, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones.
The courts that reject the doctrine give three reasons: open and honest communication is important in the conduct of business, a culture of silence in the workplace would harm both employer and employee, and liability would undermine the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages.27 Those reasons support a privilege, not a no-publication rule.28 The difference matters: a privilege concedes that publication occurred and then excuses it, while a no-publication holding ends the claim at the threshold. On a discharge fact pattern, the default answer is that the employer did not publish through the employee's repetition, with the minority view noted and the policy concerns assigned to privilege.