Concept
Public Figures
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Public Figures
The Sullivan rule was written for officeholders, but a plaintiff does not need a government post to command public attention or to shape public debate. A retired general, a university athletic director, and a nationally known broadcaster all speak in the same arena that officials do. This unit asks how far the actual malice requirement reaches beyond government: which plaintiffs it covers, how a court decides who is a public figure, and which statements about that person it governs.
The answer matters because the Court sorts defamation cases by two variables, the plaintiff's identity and the subject of the speech. Since New York Times, that sorting has produced four situations: a public official or candidate; a public figure; a private figure on a matter of public concern; and a private figure on a matter that is not of public concern.1 Gertz compressed the pattern into two forces. When the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is an official or a figure, the Constitution requires the plaintiff to clear a much higher barrier than the common law raises before recovering damages from a media defendant.2
The common-law baseline shows how high that barrier is. The trial judge in Sullivan told the jury that the statements were libelous per se, so that “the law . . . implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” “falsity and malice are presumed,” “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and punitive damages could be awarded even though no actual damages were found or shown.3 A public figure cannot rely on presumed malice. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded the truth.4
The public-figure category is the second of the four situations. One treatise summarizes it this way: a public official or public figure must prove that the defendant published a knowing or reckless falsehood, though states remain free to permit recovery of presumed damages.5 A private person suing over a matter of public concern must prove falsity, some fault on the defendant's part (usually negligence), and actual injury.6 Gertz held that a private figure's showing of simple fault suffices for actual damages but that actual malice is required for presumed or punitive damages.7 The private-plaintiff units treat those rules in full. The three subsections below stay with the second box: the extension of Sullivan to public figures, the two kinds of public figure, and the limit that a statement must concern the plaintiff's public role.
Extending Sullivan to Public Figures
Sullivan decided how an official may recover: a public official cannot recover for a defamatory falsehood about official conduct unless the official proves actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false.8 The official must also prove falsity, and must do so by clear and convincing evidence.9 Whether the same rule governs a plaintiff with no government post was the question in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, decided together in 1967.
The Court extended the rule. Butts and Walker carried the actual malice test of New York Times from public officials to public figures, so a public figure, like an official, must show that the defendant published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.10 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A states the rule in the same words for both. A publisher of a false and defamatory communication about a public official or public figure, in regard to that person's conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity, is subject to liability if, but only if, the publisher knows the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.11
The plaintiffs were prominent, and the stories about them were serious. Wally Butts, a former football coach at the University of Georgia and then its director of athletics, was accused in the Saturday Evening Post of conspiring to fix a 1962 Georgia-Alabama game by giving Alabama's coach, Paul Bryant, crucial information about Georgia's offensive strategy. The article concluded: “The chances are that Wally Butts will never help any football team again.”12 A jury awarded Butts $60,000 in general damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages, and the trial court cut the total to $460,000 by remittitur. Soon after the verdict the Court decided Sullivan, and the publisher promptly raised it in a motion for a new trial.13 Walker, the plaintiff in the companion case, had assumed a prominent role in the controversy over federal action to enforce desegregation in the South.14
The Justices agreed on the premise and divided on the standard. All agreed that the First Amendment requires some limits on state libel law for public figures as well as public officials, and the seven who reached the question agreed that both plaintiffs were public figures.15 Justice Harlan would have allowed a public figure to recover on “a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”16 He reasoned that Sullivan arose close to seditious libel, where history dictated extreme caution, and involved an official whose position gave the public an independent interest in his qualifications and performance.17 A plaintiff outside government, on that view, called for a less demanding test.
Chief Justice Warren looked instead at how power operates. Policy determinations once channeled through formal political institutions now originate in boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with government, and many people who hold no office are intimately involved in important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events of concern to society at large.18 On that account a plaintiff with such influence should meet the same standard as an official. Five Justices rejected Harlan's position, which would have let a public figure overcome the constitutional defense by showing in essence the gross negligence of the defendant; Black and Douglas adopted the Warren position for this purpose.19 Behind that result lies the balance between protecting reputation and safeguarding expression, which tort liability can chill.20
The same rule produced different results in the two cases. Warren concluded that the judgment for Walker was in clear conflict with Sullivan, noted that the constitutional defenses had been properly raised and preserved, and said it must be reversed.21 In Butts he stressed that the defendants had failed to raise any First Amendment defense at trial, that the Post had refused to investigate further after Butts and his daughter said the story was absolutely untrue, and that its decision to “change its image” to boost sagging sales supported the damage award. He was satisfied that the evidence disclosed “that degree of reckless disregard for the truth of which we spoke in New York Times and Garrison,” and he added that freedom of the press “does not include absolute license to destroy lives or careers.”22 The refusal to look into a story after its subject called it false thus figured directly in the finding of reckless disregard.
Harlan's formula is easy to mistake for the holding, but five Justices rejected it. A public figure who proves only that a magazine's investigation was highly unreasonable has not carried the burden; the plaintiff must prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.23
The Court's later decisions add a second variable to the plaintiff's status: whether the speech is of public concern.24 Public concern alone has not been made decisive. A plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. would have applied the Sullivan privilege to private plaintiffs whenever the subject was a matter of public or general interest, and the Court's later cases did not adopt that view.
All-Purpose and Limited-Purpose Figures
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court explained that public-figure status can rest on either of two alternative bases. A person may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, a person voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case the person assumes special prominence in the resolution of public questions.26 Later cases call the first group all-purpose or pervasive public figures and the second group limited-purpose public figures.27
The label sets the fault standard. A plaintiff in either group must prove actual malice, while a private plaintiff may recover on a showing of negligence.28 As one treatise puts it, a public figure must prove a knowing or reckless falsehood.29 Two considerations explain why these plaintiffs are treated differently. Those who attain the status have assumed roles of especial prominence or thrust themselves to the forefront of particular controversies to influence the issues, and in either event they invite attention and comment; some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are public figures for all purposes.30 They also tend to have access to the media or other channels of effective communication for rebutting a defamatory attack, a factor that carries some weight.31 The Court allowed that someone might become a public figure through no purposeful action, but it called truly involuntary public figures “exceedingly rare.”32 The inquiry therefore turns on the plaintiff's own voluntary, affirmative steps into the limelight.33
The all-purpose route sets a high bar. Courts have severely limited the pervasive public figure, requiring that a person's name almost be a household word before the person is open to media attention on every subject.34 The plaintiff in Gertz fell short. He had long been active in community and professional affairs, had served as an officer of civic groups and professional organizations, and had published several books and articles on legal subjects, so he was well known in some circles. Yet he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community, none of the prospective jurors had heard of him before the litigation, and the respondent offered no proof that their response was atypical. The Court would not “lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes.”35
The limited-purpose figure has proved harder to identify.36 Gertz again supplies the contrast. The lawyer there played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, his participation related solely to his representation of a private client, he took no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer Nuccio, and he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press. He “did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”37 Walker is the opposite case: he had assumed a prominent role in the controversy over federal enforcement of desegregation in the South, and that role made him a public figure for it.38 Lower courts have also found limited-purpose status where a plaintiff engaged in activity that predictably could embroil the plaintiff in a public controversy, and local prominence makes a person a public figure for a locally disseminated publication.39 A football player and his wife, a former movie star, were held to be limited public figures in one Fifth Circuit case.40
Two decisions mark the restrictive side. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the wife of “the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families” held a news conference during a sensational and messy divorce trial, and the Court still held her a private figure.41 She had not assumed “any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society,” and she had not thrust herself “to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it.”42 She also went to court because she needed judicial relief to leave her marriage, not because she freely chose to publicize it.43 In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Senator Proxmire ridiculed a research scientist's federal grant with his “Golden Fleece Award.” The Court held the scientist a private figure who “at no time assumed any role of public prominence,” because neither his grant applications nor his publications in professional journals invited the degree of public attention and comment that the public-figure level requires.44
These cases offer no clear definition of a public figure, but they take a restrictive view: a person must take voluntary, affirmative steps to thrust himself or herself into the limelight, and it is difficult for anyone to be found an involuntary public figure.45 Firestone also answers the most common error, which is to treat news value as public-figure status. A plaintiff whose divorce made headlines and who called a news conference was still private.
Lower courts apply the same restraint. A public high school girls' basketball coach whom parents accused of swearing at players, touching them inappropriately, and flirting with them was neither a public official nor a limited-purpose public figure.46 See also Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co. (high school athlete not a public figure); Wells v. Liddy (peripheral figure in the Watergate controversy remained private); Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC (business whose advertising invited public attention treated as a limited-purpose public figure).
What separates the two plaintiffs is where the prominence came from. The bookkeeper's visibility followed the publication, while the nurse built hers through the voluntary advocacy that Walker illustrates.
Public Figures and Private Matters
Restatement § 580A applies the actual malice requirement only to a false and defamatory communication about a public official or public figure “in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that capacity.”52 That phrase adds a second sorting question to the status inquiry: after asking who the plaintiff is, the court asks what the statement is about. Section 580B governs a communication about a private person, and one about an official or figure “in relation to a purely private matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity.” It permits liability if the publisher knows the statement is false and defamatory, acts in reckless disregard of those matters, or acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.53 One plaintiff can therefore face the actual malice standard for one statement and the negligence standard for another. The private-person categories in the treatise summary likewise ask for some fault, usually negligence.54
The division follows the reasons for holding public plaintiffs to the higher standard. Those who attain public-figure status have assumed roles of especial prominence or thrust themselves into particular controversies, and in either event they invite attention and comment.55 That reasoning reaches the role the plaintiff took on and no further. A falsehood about something unrelated to that role concerns a part of life the plaintiff never put in public view.
For an official, the private-matter exception is rarely available, because the public's interest extends to “anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office.” Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness than “dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation,” even though those traits may also affect private character.56 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy carries that logic to its limit. The Court held as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for office.57 An official who argues that the charge is old or personal will usually lose and stay under § 580A.
The link is tighter for a limited-purpose public figure, whose public capacity is confined to the controversy the plaintiff entered. The category holds out the possibility that someone known in connection with some issues or activities will avoid the actual malice requirement because the defamation was unrelated to them.58 In practice the possibility has seldom helped plaintiffs, because the decisions classify a plaintiff as a limited-purpose figure precisely when the plaintiff's public recognition is connected to the issues or activities that the defamation concerned.59
Both statements are false and damaging, both appeared in the same issue, and the plaintiff is the same person. What changes the standard is whether the statement concerns the role that made him public. The usual mistake is to stop after classifying the plaintiff and apply actual malice to every statement about a public figure. The opposite mistake gives an official the negligence standard because the alleged conduct is old or seems personal, although a charge touching honesty or competence reaches fitness for office.60
Classification fixes the fault standard but not every question about a defamation claim. Who must prove falsity is taken up separately: in Hepps, the trial court concluded that Pennsylvania's statute giving the defendant the burden of proving truth violated the Federal Constitution and instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity.62 Damages matter as well, because a loose definition of actual damages invites awards for embarrassment and humiliation and presumed damages made under the guise of compensation.63 Much of this doctrine is stated in terms of media defendants, and some Justices have indicated that they would draw no distinction between media defendants and other defendants.64 The words attributed to the plaintiff also count: a self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force than criticism by another, because people are assumed not to make damaging statements about themselves unless they are true.65