Concept
Burden of Proving Falsity
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Burden of Proving Falsity
In principle, only a false statement can support liability for defamation, yet the common law never required the plaintiff to prove falsity.1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the actionable publication as a “false and defamatory communication,” whether the plaintiff is a public official or public figure (§ 580A) or a private person (§ 580B).2 The common law filled the gap with a presumption that a defamatory statement was false, which made truth an affirmative defense that the defendant had to raise and prove.3
Constitutional decisions since 1964 have reversed all three common-law presumptions (fault, falsity, and damages) in a substantial number of cases.4 On falsity, the decision that matters most is Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, which puts the burden of proving falsity on a private-figure plaintiff who sues a media defendant over speech of public concern.
The first subsection follows Hepps from its facts through its reasoning to its limits. The second turns to the defense of truth and asks how closely a statement must match the facts to count as true.
Hepps and the Falsity Burden
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps holds that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false.5 In that setting the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false “cannot stand.”6 The presumption was the common law’s answer: the plaintiff customarily alleged falsity, the law presumed it, and the defendant bore the burden of proving truth.7 Public-figure plaintiffs had already lost that advantage, because they must show the falsity of the statements to prevail.8 Hepps extended the same allocation to a private figure on two conditions: the speech must be of public concern, and the defendant must be a media defendant.
Pennsylvania’s statute gave the defendant the burden of proving the truth of the statements, and the trial in Hepps put that statute to the test. The plaintiff was a private figure, and the newspaper articles concerned a matter of public concern.9 He testified at length that the statements were false and cross-examined the author of the stories about their accuracy. After all the evidence was in, the trial court concluded that the statute violated the Federal Constitution and instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity.10 On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that placing the burden of showing truth on the defendant did not unconstitutionally inhibit free debate, and it remanded for a new trial.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Court placed the case on a map drawn from its earlier decisions. Two forces, it said, may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment: whether the plaintiff is a public official or public figure or instead a private figure, and whether the speech at issue is of public concern.12 When the plaintiff is public and the speech is of public concern, the Constitution requires the plaintiff to clear a much higher barrier than the common law raises. When the plaintiff is private but the speech is of public concern, as in Gertz, the Constitution still supplants the common-law standards, although its requirements are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding.13 When the plaintiff is private and the speech is of exclusively private concern, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common law.14 Hepps falls in the middle cell. Reasoning that the common-law rule had been superseded by a constitutional rule in both Gertz and New York Times, the Court held that the rule making the defendant prove truth “must similarly fall” to a requirement that the plaintiff show falsity as well as fault.15
The allocation of the burden matters only when the evidence leaves the factfinder unable to say whether a statement is true. The Court described the Hepps configuration (a private plaintiff, a newspaper, and speech of public concern) as one “where the scales are in such an uncertain balance,” and it held that the Constitution requires it “to tip them in favor of protecting true speech.”16 Its aim was “[t]o ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred.”17 Sullivan had already identified the mechanism. Under a rule that makes the speaker prove truth, would-be critics may be deterred from voicing criticism “even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so,” and they tend to make only statements that “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”18 A commentator summarizes the reasoning the same way: the common-law rule had to give way because of its chilling effect on speech on matters of public concern and the possibility of liability for speech that was actually true.19 Putting the burden on the plaintiff sends the uncertainty the other way, so a close case goes to the speaker.
The suit’s private character does not put the presumption beyond the First Amendment’s reach. In Sullivan the Court said that “[i]t matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only,” because the test is not the form in which state power has been applied but whether such power has in fact been exercised.20
The Court acknowledged that its rule can make a plaintiff’s task weightier. Pennsylvania’s shield law lets employees of the media refuse to divulge their sources, and the Court recognized that this made the plaintiff’s burden heavier. It said, however, that the permissible reach of such laws was not before it, and that it did not even know the precise reach of Pennsylvania’s statute.21
The Court divided 5–4.22 Justice Brennan concurred because he believed that wherever allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to prove falsity, whether a public official, a public figure, or a private individual.23 Gertz supplies the counterweight to his position: private persons are “more vulnerable to injury” because they lack access to the channels of effective communication to counteract false statements, and “more deserving of recovery” because they have relinquished no part of their good names by thrusting themselves into public controversies.24 The cost of the Hepps rule falls on that kind of plaintiff, since a private figure who cannot prove falsity recovers no damages, however well she proves fault.25
The holding’s own wording supplies the first limit: it speaks of a media defendant. The majority reserved the question whether the rule applies to nonmedia defendants, and Justice Brennan adhered to his view that such a distinction is irreconcilable with the principle that the worth of speech in informing the public does not depend on the identity of its source.26 Five Justices in Dun & Bradstreet, though writing separately, had already rejected any distinction between media and nonmedia defendants for purposes of defamation liability. Justice White, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the four dissenters “that the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech.”27 The Hepps majority nonetheless left the question open.
The subject of the speech supplies the second limit. Hepps involved a private figure and speech of public concern. When the plaintiff is private and the speech is of exclusively private concern, the constitutional requirements “do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape.”28 Surveys of the post-1964 cases treat that situation as a category of its own, apart from the private-plaintiff, public-concern case that Hepps governs.29 The Court’s only decision in that category, Dun & Bradstreet, concerned presumed and punitive damages.30 Hepps itself did not require the plaintiff to prove falsity there, although some states have placed the burden on the plaintiff anyway.31 A state that keeps the common-law presumption of falsity in that setting therefore violates nothing in Hepps.
Hepps added a burden on falsity without removing the fault requirement. The Gertz rule that a private figure cannot recover without some showing that the media defendant was at fault remains in place, and Hepps requires the plaintiff also to show falsity.32 A private plaintiff suing over speech of public concern must therefore prove falsity, some fault (usually negligence), and actual injury or damages, and proof of those three elements alone does not support punitive damages.33 Nor does Hepps make every plaintiff prove falsity in every setting, as the two limits above show.
Truth and Substantial Truth
Falsity is the gate every defamation claim must pass. Only false statements of fact can support liability, and on matters of public concern a statement must be provable as false before liability can attach.39 What counts as false is a question the courts answer the same way whoever carries the burden. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., the Court said that minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as “the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified,” and that the essence of that inquiry “remains the same whether the burden rests upon plaintiff or defendant.”40
Truth, when proved, is a complete defense, and the defense is traditionally called justification.41 Its rationale is straightforward: a person whose conduct or character actually was what the defendant’s statement represented should have no action.42 At common law the defendant had to plead and prove truth, and defendants often chose not to defend on that ground.43 After Hepps the allocation differs in public-concern cases, where the plaintiff must prove falsity, but the content of the inquiry does not. A plaintiff who carries the burden must therefore show that the sting is false, and pointing to a wrong date, number, or name does not do that. The common error is to treat any inaccuracy as falsity and move on to fault.
The sting is what the audience takes away. The Court’s formulation asks whether the statement “would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.”44 An error that leaves readers’ opinion of the plaintiff unchanged leaves the sting where it was, while an invented act changes it entirely. Sullivan itself noted discrepancies between what was true and what was asserted and observed that a ruling that they sufficed to injure the respondent’s reputation “may itself raise constitutional problems,” but the Court did not decide that question.45
Substantial truth forgives a wrong detail, but it does not forgive a different charge. A plea of truth “must be as broad as the alleged libel and must establish the truth of the precise charge therein made.”46 When the meaning conveyed is a general pattern of bad conduct, proof of a single instance of misconduct does not show truth: a “libellous journalist” was not justified by proof of a single libel. A word like “thief” may mean someone who has committed an act of misconduct or someone who commits such acts repeatedly, and it may mean a present thief or one at some time, past or present. The trier of fact decides what meaning the statement conveyed and then whether that meaning is true.47
A speaker who says “I’m only repeating what someone else told me” has usually proved less than the truth of the charge. Because the trier of fact decides what meaning a statement conveyed before deciding whether it is true, the question is what the audience would take from the words.48 Listeners who hear a repeated accusation ordinarily take away the accusation itself, so proof that someone else made it establishes the attribution and leaves the sting untouched.
Some courts have recognized a doctrine of neutral reportage, associated with Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., that would protect a publisher who accurately reports a charge made by someone else. A number of courts have rejected the doctrine, in part because it appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s allowance of liability to public officials and public figures when the defendant entertained serious doubts about the truth of what it published.49 It remains a separate and uncertain route, and it is no reason to treat attribution as proof of truth.
Accurate words can also carry a false sting. A statement or illustration may contain a false defamatory meaning because of what can be inferred from it, so a defendant who proves every sentence literally accurate has not necessarily proved the imputation true.50 Some courts have held that a public official or public figure cannot maintain an action based on a false defamatory insinuation arising from an accurate statement.51