Concept
Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Invasion of privacy torts
Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists intrusion upon seclusion first among the four ways to invade the right of privacy and sends the reader to § 652B for its elements.1 Appropriation asked what the defendant did with the plaintiff’s identity. Intrusion asks what the defendant did to the plaintiff’s solitude. The defendant looked, listened, or searched where the plaintiff was entitled to be left alone, and the complaint is the prying itself.
That shift in focus changes what the plaintiff must prove. An appropriation plaintiff needed no valuable name: a person whose identity has no commercial value may still suffer mental anguish from an unauthorized use, and few courts require her to prove that value before recovering for mental suffering.2 She did need a use of her identity, though, and merely sharing a name with a character in a novel or a comic strip was not enough.3 Her protection also thinned where the defendant was a news or entertainment medium. Commercial profit and free speech are so intertwined there that a purely commercial appropriation is hard to tell from legitimate reporting, so public figures, especially entertainers, must tolerate more use of their names and likenesses.4
The intrusion plaintiff faces a different test. She must show that the defendant pried into a private place, conversation, or affair, and she need not show that anyone saw the result. The disclosure and false light torts, taken up later in this chapter, depend on an audience; intrusion does not. A person whose bedroom is watched through a hidden lens has lost her solitude when the watching begins, whether or not the footage ever reaches anyone. Compare a plaintiff whose injury follows a publication, such as the Athol selectman who lost his bid for reelection after a local newspaper and a web site ran a definition of “nazi” that included certain selectmen.5 The harm there flowed from what was published.
Without a publicity element to filter claims, intrusion draws its limits from two other places. The plaintiff must have been intruded upon in something she had secluded, and the intrusion must have been highly offensive to a reasonable person. The next subsection sets out the rule and the ways of intruding, including by technology. The two that follow take up the limits in turn.
Forms of Intrusion
Section 652B makes liable one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or the other’s private affairs or concerns, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.6 Wyoming recently joined the vast majority of states that accept this formulation in Howard v. Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., where the defendant had secretly installed software on a computer leased to the plaintiff that tracked the computer’s location, remotely activated its webcam, and captured screen shots and keystrokes.7 The comments to § 652B explain the tort’s parameters and what a plaintiff must show, and they organize the rest of this subsection.8
The tort is complete the moment the defendant intrudes. Disclosure and false light injure through exposure, so they wait for an audience. Intrusion injures by taking away the plaintiff’s power to decide who may look at, listen to, or search a private space, conversation, or record, and that power is gone as soon as the defendant pries. The comments say so directly. This form of invasion “does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs,” and the intrusion itself makes the defendant liable even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or information obtained.9 The tort also requires intent, because the comment describes an intentional interference; an accidental overhearing is not enough. The common exam error is to reject an intrusion claim because the defendant never shared what he saw or heard, which imports the disclosure tort’s publicity element into a branch that has none.
Speech doctrine follows the same line. Speech concerns weigh heavily against liability for publication; the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional statutes that allocate to victims the profits a criminal makes from writing about his crime.10 The First Amendment may likewise protect newsgathering when the privacy claim is based on publication of the information. But a defendant who acts for the news media does not gain a privilege to trespass or invade privacy for that reason alone.11 Intrusion targets how information was gathered, not what is later said.
The comments sort intrusions into three routes to something the plaintiff has kept private:12
- Physical intrusion into a place the plaintiff has secluded, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s hotel room or enters his home over his objection.
- Use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear private affairs, as by looking into upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping telephone wires.
- Some other form of investigation or examination into private concerns, as by opening private mail, searching a safe or a wallet, examining a private bank account, or compelling an inspection of personal documents with a forged court order.
The second route is where technology has widened the tort most. The standard modern examples involve equipment used to record or observe private places or conversations: wiretaps in Rhodes v. Graham, a listening device in Roach v. Harper, a hidden bedroom camera in In re Marriage of Tigges, and a bathroom camera in Koeppel v. Speirs.13 The tort now also reaches “hacking” and other surreptitious access to the contents of private electronic communications and files in computers.14 The software in Howard belongs to that line. It turned the plaintiff’s own computer into a tool for tracking, watching, and recording him, and nothing in it required the defendant to step onto anyone’s property.
Two divisions of authority remain. The first concerns proof of what a device captured. Oliver v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. required evidence that the defendant actually saw or heard something private, but the prevailing view is that installing a device capable of recording or observing private conduct or conversations is enough.15 The prevailing view makes sense because a person who finds a hidden device cannot know what it recorded. The second division concerns physical invasion. A minority of courts confine the tort to it, as Davis v. Emmis Publishing Corp. did, while the Illinois Supreme Court in Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois joined the vast majority of jurisdictions on facts in which telephone records were gathered through misrepresentation to learn whether the plaintiff had violated a covenant not to compete.
The tort also reaches ways of getting at private information that involve no camera or electronic device. Liability has been found for peering into a residence’s windows, as in Vega v. Chicago Park District, for opening the plaintiff’s mail, as in Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., for improperly accessing bank or credit records, as in Rodgers v. McCullough, and for obtaining sensitive personal information by misrepresentation, as in Taus v. Loftus.16 Against that list stands the rule that compiling personal information is generally not tortious, as Tureen v. Equifax, Inc. and Myrick v. Barron illustrate, although the means of acquiring it may be.17 The comments add that examining a public record about the plaintiff, or documents the plaintiff must make available for public inspection, is no intrusion, because the plaintiff has secluded nothing.18 Breaking into confidential files is an intrusion, although in Pearson v. Dodd reporters who only received and published copies of such files were held not liable, a result that fits a tort aimed at the act of getting in.19 What matters is the route the defendant took to the information.
Persistent pursuit is a further form of intrusion, and it shows that the compile-versus-pry line does not shelter a defendant whose conduct is aimed at the plaintiff. In the litigation between Jacqueline Onassis and the photographer Galella, the court of appeals limited the relief to the “paparazzo” conduct that set Galella apart from other photographers. It barred approaching within twenty-five feet of her or touching her, blocking her movement in public places, any act reasonably calculated to endanger her, and any conduct reasonably foreseen to harass, alarm, or frighten her, while leaving room for reasonable efforts to cover her.20 In Gersh v. Anglin, a website operator published the phone numbers, email addresses, and social media profiles of a woman, her family, and her friends and urged readers to contact them, and the court held that he could not avoid liability by pointing out that the information was already public. How much persistence the tort demands is the offensiveness question taken up below, but the comments mark the ends of the range: knocking at a door or calling once, twice, or three times to demand payment of a debt is not enough, while calls repeated with such persistence and frequency that they amount to a course of hounding are.21
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Comment c to § 652B states the first element: the defendant is liable only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.23 The previous subsection showed that the tort is complete when the defendant pries. This element asks what made a look, a listen, or a search count as prying, and the answer lies on the plaintiff’s side of the encounter: something must have been secluded. Courts frame the requirement as a reasonable expectation of seclusion in the place, conversation, or matter the defendant reached.
The element carries more weight here than in any other branch of the privacy family. Intrusion has no publicity requirement, so the plaintiff’s seclusion is the main thing separating actionable prying from the ordinary traffic of social life. Everyone who leaves the house is seen, and everyone who speaks in a shared space may be overheard. The test therefore asks what a reasonable person would expect and does not let the plaintiff’s private wishes set the defendant’s duty.
Observation in a public place falls outside the tort for this reason. Comment c says there is no liability for observing a person, or even photographing him, while he walks on the public highway, because he is then not in seclusion and his appearance is public and open to the public eye.24 Examining a public record concerning the plaintiff, or documents the plaintiff must keep available for public inspection, is likewise no intrusion.25 The comment leaves a margin, though. Even in a public place there may be matters, such as a person’s underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze, and an intrusion on those matters may still invade privacy.26
Because the expectation is measured against a particular intruder, it need not be an expectation of complete privacy. Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. worked this out inside a workplace. Mark Sanders was a telepsychic who took customer calls in a large room of cubicles where coworkers could see and overhear one another, but where the employer barred nonemployees without permission. A reporter took a job there to investigate the industry and secretly videotaped conversations, two of them with Sanders. The court held that a person who lacks a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in a conversation, because coworkers (but not the general public) could see and overhear it, may still have an intrusion claim based on a television reporter’s covert videotaping of that conversation. It reasoned that privacy must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged intruder and the nature of the intrusion, and it pointed to De May v. Roberts, where an unnecessary male observer at a home delivery was held to be an intrusion even though the plaintiff’s husband, the doctor, and a woman assistant were also present.
The rule follows from how people actually share what is private. A plaintiff who speaks where coworkers might hear has accepted exposure to coworkers, but the acceptance extends no further than the people she could expect to be listening. A rule demanding complete privacy would let the presence of any other observer defeat the claim and would protect only the person speaking alone.
The expectation can fail even when the intruder is a reporter, and the cases show which facts move the answer. In Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., a flight attendant who had refused an interview with ABC later spoke with an ABC reporter on the street and was videotaped without her knowledge. The court held that in the circumstances she could not expect privacy and that the defendant had not acted offensively. What separates her from Sanders is the setting: Sanders spoke inside a workplace that excluded the public, while she spoke on a street with the reporter himself. The comment’s own examples of physical intrusion are entering a hotel room and entering a home.27
Two mistakes recur on this element. One treats any admitted exposure to some audience as the end of the plaintiff’s claim, which overlooks that a plaintiff who expected coworkers to overhear a conversation has not given up the expectation that a hidden camera will not record it. The other treats every setting as protected, which the public-street cases foreclose. Satisfying this element still leaves the second requirement, that the intrusion be highly offensive to a reasonable person, for the next subsection.
Highly Offensive Intrusion
Comment d to § 652B supplies the second element: there is no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable person, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable person would strongly object.29 The comment illustrates the line with debt collection. Knocking at the plaintiff’s door, or calling him to the telephone once, twice, or three times to demand payment, creates no liability. Privacy is invaded only when the calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency that they amount to a course of hounding that becomes a substantial burden on his existence.30 The first element asked whether the defendant reached into something the plaintiff had secluded. This element asks how serious the reach was, so a plaintiff who proves a private place or matter has cleared only half the test.
The standard does two jobs. The requirement of a substantial interference screens out slight or fleeting contacts. Without that screen, every unwelcome call, curious glance, and business inquiry would be an intrusion, because the plaintiff invited none of them. Courts recognize the stakes. In Nader v. General Motors Corp., the court observed that some intrusions into one’s private sphere are inevitable concomitants of life in an industrial and densely populated society and that “[t]he law does not provide a remedy for every annoyance that occurs in everyday life,” while recognizing that the law should and does protect against certain types of intrusive conduct.31 The requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive to a reasonable person does the second job. Because the test is objective, a plaintiff’s unusual sensitivity cannot enlarge the defendant’s duty.
The bar sits high. Numerous intrusion actions have failed because the court ruled the intrusion was not highly offensive, and one example is a debt collection agency’s numerous telephone calls to the plaintiffs’ home in Rush v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC.32 Frequency and pattern decide a debt-collection claim, and the tone of any one call does not.
Setting matters as much as frequency. In Boring v. Google Inc., a couple sued over images of their home taken by Google’s street-imaging vehicle. The court noted that the Borings did not allege that they themselves were viewed inside their home, which is a relevant factor in analyzing intrusion claims, and it decided the highly offensive issue as a matter of law at the pleading stage.34 A plaintiff who loses on this element has usually shown either a contact too slight to burden anyone or a contact with something exposed.
Because the element sets a floor, courts act as gatekeepers. Whether an intrusion was highly offensive is generally a question for the jury or other trier of fact, but the court decides as a matter of law whether the conduct could be found highly offensive.35 Courts do decide the issue at the pleading stage when appropriate.36 The standard also differs from the one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Romero v. City of Miami, the alleged conduct could be considered highly offensive for an intrusion claim but not extreme and outrageous for the distress claim, so an intrusion claim can survive on facts that would not carry the other tort.37
The defendant’s purpose also shapes the answer. In employment cases, the legitimacy of the reason for inquiring into an employee’s private concerns is an important factor in determining liability.38 A protective aim pursued by narrow means can defeat offensiveness. In Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., the court decided it was not highly offensive to install hidden cameras in a two-person business office to find the person who was using a computer there at night to view pornographic web sites.39 In Elmore v. Atlantic Zayne, Inc., a retail store successfully defended an action for observing a customer in a restroom stall through a crack in the ceiling, arguing that this was reasonable to verify another customer’s complaint that illegal activity was occurring there.40 Some decisions hold that the privileges found in defamation law and other branches of privacy law do not apply to intrusion, since liability does not rest on publication. Even so, a defendant’s object of protecting or advancing a legitimate interest may weigh against finding the intrusion highly offensive.41
A news-gathering purpose does not receive that treatment automatically. Media personnel have no privilege to commit intrusion in order to report on a matter of public interest, as Dietemann v. Time, Inc., where reporters entered a healer’s home under false pretenses and recorded him with hidden equipment, and Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. show. An intrusion might still be found not highly offensive if it was intended to obtain material for a news report on an important subject.42 The dispute in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos. shows how these cases arise: an eye clinic and two of its surgeons sued ABC, a producer, and a reporter for trespass, defamation, and other torts arising from a PrimeTime Live segment highly critical of the clinic.43 The contrast with Hernandez lies in the means. The employer used a narrow measure in a small office to identify a single wrongdoer, while the reporters in Dietemann entered a home by deception and recorded a private conversation.
Run on the facts of Hernandez, the steps point to a narrow measure in a two-person office, aimed at a single nighttime computer user and taken to identify that user, which is why the court found the cameras not highly offensive. Run on the facts of Dietemann, the same steps reach the opposite result at steps two and three.