Concept
Two Forms of Interference
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Two Forms of Interference
Both rivals cost the dealer the same sales, and § 766B reaches both if its other requirements are met, because it describes interference as taking either of two forms.1 In the first form, the defendant works on a third person, inducing or otherwise causing that person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation.2 In the second, the defendant acts against the plaintiff and prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing it.3 The first rival took the first route, and the second rival took the second.
A prospective relation has two ends: the plaintiff, and the person with whom the plaintiff expects to deal. A defendant who wants the business can go to either end, and the rule covers both routes.
The two routes raise different questions. When the defendant works on a third person, the loss passes through that person's decision. The third person was free to deal with the plaintiff and chose not to, so the question is what the defendant did to bring that choice about. When the defendant acts against the plaintiff, no outsider's decision intervenes, and the question is how the defendant obstructed the plaintiff's own ability to acquire or keep the relation.
Both clauses sit under the opening sentence of § 766B. The interference must be intentional and improper, and the plaintiff recovers for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation.4 Fitting a clause therefore settles only how the defendant reached the relation. Intent, impropriety, and harm remain to be proved.
Inducing a Third Person
The first form covers a defendant who induces or otherwise causes a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation.5 The third person is whoever stands at the other end of the plaintiff's expected dealings: the customer who would have bought, the employer who would have hired, the supplier who would have shipped. The wording is wide. Inducing covers persuasion, and otherwise causing covers anything else that moves the third person to turn away. What the methods share is a target. The defendant aims at the third person's decision, and the plaintiff's loss follows because that decision went the defendant's way.
Because the third person owes the plaintiff nothing, inducement alone does not make a tort. A customer bound to no one may switch suppliers for a lower price, a bad mood, or no reason at all. Persuading that customer with a lower price and persuading it with a lie both induce it to leave, yet only the lie is likely to be tortious. The difference is impropriety. Knowing interference with another's prospects of income is extremely common in ordinary business, property, and employment dealings, and it produces liability only when the defendant's conduct is improper.6
For existing contracts the starting point differs. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. describes intentionally inducing or causing a breach of an existing contract as "a wrong in and of itself."7 The First Restatement's rule on interference demanded neither improper motive nor improper means, and proof of intentional interference made the plaintiff's prima facie case.8 Section 766B instead writes "improperly" into the definition of the wrong.9 The later sections on improper interference ask what makes conduct improper.
The earliest decisions show the first form at its bluntest. In Garret v. Taylor (1620), the defendant threatened workmen with violence if they worked for the plaintiff at his stone pit and threatened other people with violence if they bought from the plaintiff.10 In Tarleton v. M'Gawley, the defendant fired at natives on the coast of Africa to prevent them from trading with the plaintiffs' ship.11 In both cases the harm reached the plaintiff through the people whose labor or custom the plaintiff needed. A threat leaves each of those people free to choose but makes choosing the plaintiff costly, and that is how a threat causes a third person to stay away.
Liability then outgrew physical interference. In the last half of the nineteenth century, commercial activity grew, large-scale industry arose, and labor unions gained members and militancy. Many disputes among businesses, and between proprietors and unions or their members, resulted in actions of this kind, and interference with prospective advantage became a major field of tort law.12
A knowing falsehood does the same work without force. One statement of the law holds that there is liability when the defendant knows that what he says is false, whether or not he has an ill motive.13
The buyer promised the plaintiff nothing and chose freely. Yet the choice rested on a premise the competitor supplied and knew to be untrue, which is what makes the lost sale the competitor's doing.
Pressure need not be violent or false. In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., a wholesaler sued a car manufacturer over warnings the manufacturer sent to its dealers about dealing with certain wholesalers. The dealers stayed free to buy or not, but the warnings attached consequences to one choice. That is another way of causing a third person to stay away without persuading it of anything. Whether pressure of that kind is improper is a separate question for the later sections.
Inducement also has a causal edge. A defendant who merely receives business that the third person had already decided to give elsewhere has caused nothing. The rule is stated most directly for existing contracts: if the third party has already breached the contract or decided to do so, and then offers to contract with the defendant, the defendant has not induced the breach.14 The same reasoning carries over to prospective relations, because a decision made before the defendant acts cannot have been produced by the defendant's conduct.
The customer's departure was not caused by anything the competitor did, so the plaintiff has no claim under this clause. In the false-statement hypothetical, the lie preceded and shaped the buyer's decision. Here the decision preceded the competitor's first word. The facts that move the answer are the order of events and who supplied the reason for leaving.
Preventing the Plaintiff
The second form covers a defendant who prevents the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.17 Here the defendant acts against the plaintiff, or against the plaintiff's access to the market. The customer, employer, or supplier may remain entirely willing to deal. The plaintiff loses the relation because the defendant has blocked the way to it. No outsider's decision stands between the conduct and the loss, so the inquiry shifts from the quality of the defendant's influence to the nature of the obstruction. Intent, impropriety, and pecuniary harm are still required.18
Tarleton shows how the two forms overlap. The gunfire frightened the natives away, which is pressure on third persons, and it also barred the plaintiffs' ship from the people it was trying to trade with.19 A plaintiff may invoke whichever clause the facts fit.
Modern cases show the second clause at work through quieter obstruction. In Morra v. Hill, a trailer park owner denied entry to an oil dealer who sold to the occupants of the trailers.20 The owner never had to persuade an occupant to change suppliers. The clause does not ask whether any occupant wished to keep buying. It asks whether the defendant blocked the dealer's way to them.
In Italverde Trading, Inc. v. Four Bills of Lading, a freight forwarder converted a shipment of products en route to the plaintiff in order to satisfy a debt claim against the manufacturer.21 The defendant stopped the goods before they reached the plaintiff, and the plaintiff lost what the shipment would have brought.
Obstruction of this kind is often a wrong in its own right. Conversion, as in Italverde, is an example, and when the obstruction is itself tortious, the lost relation commonly appears as an item of damages for that other tort. In many cases interference with contract is not so much a theory of liability in itself as an element of damage resulting from some other tort or the breach of some other contract.22 Conduct that supports another cause of action can also support an interference claim, and it is not uncommon to see both raised from the same facts.23
The word preventing implies obstruction, and that implication sets a limit. A defendant who simply withdraws from a relationship it was never obliged to continue has obstructed no one's path. The plaintiff had no claim to that dealing, and ending it is an ordinary business choice. Knowing interference with another's prospects of income is common in ordinary business and creates liability only when the defendant's conduct is improper.24
The manufacturer has taken nothing from the distributor and blocked no one's path. It has left a relationship it was free to leave, so the distributor has no claim under this clause. The trailer park owner in Morra stood outside the relation and closed the way into it. The manufacturer is one of the parties to the relation and chose to end it. An exam stem on this clause therefore turns on one question: did the defendant interpose itself between the plaintiff and the relation, or is the defendant the plaintiff's own counterparty declining to continue? Had the manufacturer promised to keep supplying the distributor, the distributor's complaint would sound in that promise, not in interference.