Concept
Prospective Versus Existing Contracts
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Prospective Versus Existing Contracts
Two businesses lose the same customer to the same rival, which uses identical tactics against both. One had signed a supply contract with the customer; the other had spent a year courting it and had a bid pending. Each may sue, but their burdens differ. The law gives an interest in an existing contract greater protection than a hope of future business, because respect for contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition. It imposes liability for interfering with the “less substantive, more speculative interests” of a prospect only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.1
Section 766B supplies the prospective claim. It reaches one who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s prospective contractual relation (a contract to marry excepted), and it measures liability by the pecuniary harm from losing the relation’s benefits, whether the defendant induces or otherwise causes a third person not to enter into or continue the relation or prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing it.2 Section 766 addresses interference with an existing contract.3 Both sections ask whether the interference was improper, and the answer can turn on what the plaintiff held: the Massachusetts court observed that the existence of a contract, and not just a prospective relationship, might be a factor in deciding whether intentional conduct was improper.4
The contract tort grew from a master’s action for the loss of a servant’s services. After the mid-fourteenth-century plague, surviving laborers could demand high wages and left their masters when better pay and conditions were available elsewhere, and the action was a legal consequence of that upheaval.5 The modern archetype is Lumley v. Gye: a theatre manager held a singer’s promise to perform for him for a set time and not elsewhere, and the defendant, knowing those terms, enticed her to refuse to perform. The defendant had caused the breach of a promise the plaintiff already held. California states the consequence directly: in Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the court said that intentionally inducing or causing a breach of an existing contract is “a wrong in and of itself.”6 The First Restatement set the bar low for contract plaintiffs. Its § 766 required neither improper motive nor improper means, and proof of intentional interference made the plaintiff’s prima facie case.7
Extending that low burden to prospects drew criticism. Critics argued that a plaintiff who had to show only the defendant’s conscious act and its own economic injury could pull rivals into time-consuming, expensive lawsuits over conduct the commercial world regarded as commonplace and appropriate.8 By one California court’s count, close to a majority of state high courts had come to require the plaintiff to plead and prove that the interference was “wrongful,” “improper,” “illegal,” “independently tortious,” or some variant of those terms.9 The premise is that knowing interference with another’s prospects of income is extremely common in ordinary business, property, and employment transactions, so it cannot produce liability unless the defendant’s conduct was improper.10
Greater protection for a contract is not absolute protection. Some courts treat a third party as privileged or justified in interfering with another’s contractual rights if it acts in a bona fide exercise of its own rights or holds a right in the subject matter equal or superior to the plaintiff’s. The privilege is lost if the interferor goes beyond what is necessary to protect its legitimate interests or uses improper means.11
The line between the two torts blurred once liability reached prospective relationships, and California redrew it in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Korea Supply, which clearly distinguished interference with a complete contract from interference with prospective contractual relations.12 In PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., a California appellate court noted that an earlier authority had suggested it might be preferable not to distinguish the two as separate torts, but it read Della Penna as specifically directing courts not to blur the analytical difference between them.13
Other courts press the distinction less hard. One California appellate court called interference with contract “merely a species of” the broader prospective tort, whose principal difference is that a legally binding agreement is not a prerequisite to the broader claim.14 The Massachusetts court admitted that it had not consistently distinguished the two torts and said that, given its holding, it need not distinguish them in deciding what conduct is actionable.15 Whether a court keeps the separate labels or drops them, a contract can still bear on whether the defendant’s conduct was improper.
United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman shows the prospective end of the range. The plaintiff had courted a customer, Matthew’s, for years and bid on an account that went to another company; it held a hope and a bid, but no promise from Matthew’s.16 The court drew on an Oregon formulation under which the plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant intentionally interfered but also that the defendant had a duty of non-interference: that it interfered for an improper purpose rather than a legitimate one, or used improper means.17 Older formulations show what such wrongfulness looks like. Liability attaches when the defendant acts from spite, out of a desire to do harm for its own sake, or for the purpose of harming the plaintiff’s interests in a manner in which he is not privileged to interfere; it also attaches when the defendant knows that what he says is false, whatever his motive.18 Lumley’s manager could point to a promise. United had to supply the wrongfulness itself.
Two gray zones test the boundary between the interests. The first is the contract either party may end at will. The Restatement approach treats interference with such a contract under the rules for prospective relations, and many courts follow it, so the plaintiff must prove improper conduct and not merely knowing interference.19 The idea is that the plaintiff loses only the likelihood that the relationship would have continued, an interest as speculative as a prospect. California goes the other way: its authority treats an at-will contract as an enforceable contract, so interference with it may be actionable under the contract tort.20
The label matters most in closer cases, where the defendant’s conduct is hard-edged but lawful. A court that classifies the relation as prospective then requires the plaintiff to prove something more than the competitive pressure itself.
The second gray zone is the contract the law would not enforce against a party who chooses to resist it. A contract that the other party could avoid but has not avoided remains “a valid and subsisting relation, with which the actor is not permitted to interfere improperly,” and the defendant is not free to interfere with performance before the contract is avoided.23 Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court, speaking of voidable contracts, located the wrong in the inducement itself: “The actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the contract or to sever the relationship, not in the kind of contract or relationship so disrupted, whether it is written or oral, enforceable or not enforceable.”24 Contracts that are void rather than voidable draw different answers in different jurisdictions.25