Concept
The Seven Factors
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
The Seven Factors
Section 767 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts tells a court how to decide whether an intentional interference with a contract or a prospective contractual relation is improper: it directs the court to consider seven factors.1 The preceding sections made impropriety the element that separates liability from ordinary competition and, ordinarily, made it the plaintiff’s burden. This unit supplies the content of that element. Each factor asks its own question:
- What did the defendant do? That is the nature of the actor’s conduct,2 which in practice means the means of interference.3
- Why did the defendant act? That is the actor’s motive.4
- What did the plaintiff stand to lose? That is the interests of the other with which the conduct interferes, chiefly whether the plaintiff held an existing contract or only a prospective relation.5
- What was the defendant trying to protect or gain? That is the interests sought to be advanced by the actor.6
- What does society have at stake on each side? That is the social interests in protecting the actor’s freedom of action and the other’s contractual interests.7
- How close was the conduct to the interference? That is the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct.8
- What were the parties to each other? That is the relations between the parties.9
No factor decides the question alone. Comment b describes the decision as one that follows “a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved” and depends on “a judgment and choice of values in each situation.”10 The plaintiff therefore does not prove seven separate elements. The court weighs the factors together, and each can point either way. Motive weighs heavily against a defendant who acted from spite and little against one whose interference was a side effect of pursuing another purpose. A legitimate interest on the defendant’s side weighs against impropriety, yet it does not excuse wrongful means. Each subsection below asks what its factor examines and which way it cuts on different facts. How courts combine the seven into one ruling comes after the factors themselves.
Nature of the Conduct
Section 767(a) asks first what the defendant did to bring the interference about.11 The question concerns means, and it differs from the question why the defendant acted, which the next subsection takes up. In Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., the New York Court of Appeals called the nature of the conduct a chief factor in deciding whether an interference is improper.12 In practice the factor works as an inquiry into the means of interference.13 The inquiry has two poles: means the law condemns on their own account, and persuasion, which can redirect another’s contract or prospects without any independent wrong.
Conduct earns this weight because it is the most objective part of the inquiry. The law already condemns many ways of hurting people, whether or not the victim is a party to a contract. When a defendant uses one of those means, society has no interest in preserving the freedom to do so, and the plaintiff needs less from the other factors. Persuasion stands at the opposite pole. Sellers, recruiters, and advertisers persuade people to change their dealings every day, and persuasion that works always costs someone business, so a rule treating knowing persuasion as wrongful would make successful commerce tortious. Guard-Life drew the line there. Wrongful means include physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, and some degrees of economic pressure, but they do not include persuasion alone, even when it is knowingly directed at interference with the contract.14
The recognized catalog of improper means is long, and its members share one feature: the law condemns each independently of the contract it happens to disrupt. The usual list includes violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, and disparaging falsehood.15 Other authority extends it to breach of a fiduciary relationship and misuse of confidential information, and treats a statutory violation as relevant but not conclusive.16 Litigation counts only when unfounded, because a litigant asserting a bona fide claim has a privilege to interfere, a point taken up with the privileges later in this chapter.17
The factor examines the wrongfulness of the defendant’s side, and the plaintiff need not win a second lawsuit inside the first. In Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Oregon Supreme Court, citing comment c to § 767, noted that a plaintiff claiming improper interference need not prove every element of another tort if the elements pertaining to the defendant’s conduct are present. Fraudulent misrepresentations to a third party are therefore improper means whether or not the third party can show reliance injurious to itself.18 The structure of the claim explains why. Reliance and injury protect the person deceived, but the plaintiff complains of a different harm, the loss of its own contract or customer, and what matters is that the defendant used deceit to cause it.
Duties owed independently of the plaintiff’s contract belong in the same family. In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, the court emphasized that associates leaving a law firm had violated a provision of the state Code of Professional Responsibility against self-recommendation, had taken advantage of confidential information and of the clients’ trust acquired while working for the firm, and had “unduly suggested a course of action” for the clients, to the firm’s prejudice.19 Because the same list of wrongful means includes some degrees of economic pressure, the line between hard bargaining and wrongful coercion has to be drawn case by case.20
The bakery story involves a café with no contract because wrongful means is one condition of a competitor’s freedom: competitor status may excuse interference with prospective relationships only where, among other conditions, the means are not wrongful.21 Means also trade off against motive, as the next subsection shows.
The Actor’s Motive
Section 767(b) asks why the defendant acted.23 Motive must be kept apart from the intent element the tort already requires. Intent is satisfied when the defendant desires the interference or knows it is substantially certain to follow. Motive asks about the reason for the conduct, and the answer changes how heavily the interference weighs as improper. K & K Management, Inc. v. Lee shows the separation. Officers of K & K closed a restaurant, and the Maryland court assumed that the closing was substantially certain to disrupt the Lees’ relations with their Korean customers.24 It still found no tort, because acts have multiple effects and the uncontradicted evidence showed that the officers’ purpose in closing the restaurant was not directed at the Lees’ relations with their customers.25 The Restatement analysis, the court explained, distinguishes purpose from intent.26
When the defendant’s sole motive is to injure the plaintiff, comment d to § 767 says the interference is almost certain to be held improper, and adds that “[a] motive to injure another or to vent one’s ill will on him serves no socially useful purpose.”27 The reasoning follows from how the test is built. The court weighs the harm to the plaintiff against the interests the actor was advancing and the social interest in leaving the actor free to act, and a purely malicious motive puts nothing on the actor’s side. Tuttle v. Buck shows the point at full strength. The complaint alleged that a wealthy banker opened a barber shop and used his influence in the community to draw customers from the plaintiff’s shop, not to serve any legitimate purpose of his own but solely to ruin the plaintiff. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a claim. Opening a shop is lawful, and malice as the only purpose made it a tort.
The desire to interfere need not be the only motive for it to matter. If it is the primary motive, it may carry substantial weight in the balancing process, and even a casual motive may be significant in some circumstances.28 The weight therefore tracks how much the bad purpose actually drove the conduct. Courts do not all follow the Restatement’s flexibility. In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, the Utah court described the second element as interference “for an improper purpose or by improper means.”29 The California Supreme Court, having approved requiring the plaintiff to show wrongfulness, left open whether to add a refinement such as proof that the defendant was “motivated by unalloyed malice.”30 A plaintiff with mixed-motive facts should check which formulation the jurisdiction applies.
At the other end of the scale is the interference that is only a side effect. If the actor has no desire at all to accomplish the interference and it results only as a necessary consequence of conduct engaged in for an entirely different purpose, the actor’s knowledge still makes the interference intentional, but motive carries little weight toward finding it improper.31 The Restatement’s comment on prospective relations says the same in terms of purpose. An actor who knew the interference would be a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose may be found to have acted without impropriety, although other factors, particularly the nature of the actor’s conduct, come into play.32 The legitimate purpose puts something on the actor’s side of the scale, so the harm to the plaintiff reads as a by-product rather than the goal. That explains K & K. Little weight is not no weight, however, and an incidental interference can still be improper if other factors, especially the means, carry the case.
Motive and conduct trade off against each other. Comment d states that when the conduct is independently wrongful, as when it is illegal or tortious toward the third person, the desire to interfere may be less essential to a holding of impropriety, and that when the means are innocent or less blameworthy, the desire to interfere may be more essential.33 The comment on prospective relations draws the same line. Innately wrongful, predatory means may make a purpose to interfere unnecessary, while a sole purpose to vent ill will may make an interference improper even though the means are less blameworthy.34 Tuttle sits at the innocent-means end, which is why malice had to do all the work. The wrongful-means end looks different.
Do not let the defendant’s knowledge that harm will follow stand in for motive; knowledge satisfies intent and nothing more. Ask in order what the defendant was trying to accomplish, whether the interference was the goal or a side effect of some other purpose, and how blameworthy the means were, since the last answer shows how much the first two must supply. A later section returns to how courts reduce the factors to means and motive in practice.
The Plaintiff’s Interests
Section 767(c) turns from the defendant to the plaintiff and asks what the plaintiff stood to lose and how firmly the law protects that expectation.36 Guard-Life listed the interest of the party being interfered with among its factors and sorted the possibilities into an enforceable contract on one side and, on the other, a contract that is voidable, and thus unenforceable or terminable at will.37 The sorting matters because identical conduct weighs differently depending on the interest it disturbs.
The anchor of the factor is the line between an existing contract and a prospective relation. Guard-Life explained that greater protection goes to an interest in an existing contract, where “respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit to be derived from unfettered competition,” than to the “less substantive, more speculative interest in a prospective relationship,” where liability “will be imposed only on proof of more culpable conduct on the part of the interferer.”38
The two interests differ in what each one is. An existing contract gives the plaintiff a legal right to performance, so an outsider who induces breach takes something the plaintiff already has. A prospective relation is a hope of future business, and a competitive economy runs on rivals interfering with one another’s prospects. Society has less reason to guard prospects, and the defendant has more freedom to act. The tort’s oldest ancestor, the master’s action for loss of a servant’s services, likewise protected an existing relationship.39
The difference in protection becomes a difference in what the plaintiff must show about the defendant. Where the interest is a binding contract, the interest itself carries much of the weight, and the plaintiff may need less from the other factors. Where it is only a prospect, the plaintiff must find the weight elsewhere, and in the case law that has come to mean improper means or an improper motive.40
Guard-Life itself framed this contrast among business rivals. A competitor’s status does not shield the interferer from the consequences of interfering with an existing contract, although it may excuse interference with prospective relationships where the interference is intended at least in part to advance the competing interest, no unlawful restraint of trade results, and the means are not wrongful.41 The competitor’s privilege receives fuller treatment later, but its two-tier result is this factor at work.
Between the two poles sit interests that are less than fully enforceable, and the voidable contract, one the other party could escape by invoking a defense, shows the difficulty. Ample authority allows the inducement action even when the contract is voidable (say, because a child is underage) or unenforceable (say, because of the statute of limitations or the Statute of Frauds), though not for gambling contracts that violate public policy.42 Other courts treat enforceability as a prerequisite. They have refused the claim where the contract was an unreasonable restraint of trade or was made by a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state, reasoning that the tort presupposes an enforceable contract.43 When a problem involves a flawed contract, ask whether the jurisdiction treats the flaw as one consideration to weigh or as a bar to the claim.
Contracts terminable at will present the most contested placement. Either party can end the arrangement at any moment, so the plaintiff holds no legal right to its continuation, and what an interferer disrupts looks more like a prospect than a binding right. Guard-Life listed such contracts with the weaker interests.44 In PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., a California appellate court found Guard-Life’s rationale persuasive for drawing a clear line between enforceable and unenforceable contracts, yet questioned its holding and discussion where the defendant interferes with an at-will contract.45 The treatment therefore varies by jurisdiction.
Even where an at-will arrangement is treated as a weaker interest, serious misconduct remains actionable. In Albert v. Loksen, the Second Circuit held that whether the defendant acted with malice was a triable issue even though the plaintiff’s employment was at will. The court explained that an at-will employee may sue where a third party used wrongful means such as fraud, misrepresentation, or threats, where the means violated a duty owed to the plaintiff, or where the defendant acted with malice. A weaker interest therefore raises the showing the plaintiff must make without removing the claim.
The Actor’s Interests
Section 767(d) turns back to the defendant and asks what the defendant was trying to protect or gain.47 It pairs with the fifth factor, because the two together examine the defendant’s reason for interfering and ask whether that reason is significant enough to outweigh the harm.48 The fifth measures society’s stake and has its own subsection, so this one stays with the defendant’s own interests.
Owners, creditors, investors, and litigants hold stakes they can often defend only by acting in ways that disturb someone else’s contract. If every such act were actionable, those stakeholders would have to give up their rights or defend a lawsuit each time they asserted them. Where the defendant advances an interest the law already recognizes, the harm to the plaintiff’s contract is a side effect of protecting something legitimate, and the defendant’s side of the scale carries real weight. Where the defendant has no interest of its own to advance, nothing offsets the harm. The factor therefore counts against impropriety in the first situation and toward it in the second.
Westfield Development Co. v. Rifle Investment Associates shows a recognized interest at work. The alleged interference there was the filing of a notice of lis pendens, a public notice that litigation affecting title to land is pending. The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that a litigant asserting a bona fide claim has a privilege to interfere in that way. A defendant against whom intentional interference, causation, and damage are shown may therefore still escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that it was asserting a bona fide claim.49 The claim of right gives the filing its weight. The litigant has a stake in the property apart from the plaintiff’s contract, and a sale that collapses after the notice is a foreseeable consequence of protecting that stake. How the burden falls belongs to the privilege doctrine taken up later; for this factor, the lesson is that a bona fide claim puts real weight on the defendant’s side.
Courts allow a defense of justification or privilege in some circumstances,50 and the recognized interests follow one pattern. Investors in a musical who demanded the lead actress’s replacement, because they thought she lacked the ability to sing and dance the role, were protecting their investment, and the court in Knapp v. Penfield treated that stake as a justification for inducing breach of her contract. A parent corporation’s economic interest in its subsidiaries has justified causing a subsidiary to breach a contract, as in Felsen v. Sol Cafe Manufacturing Co. A public interest can serve as well. The New Jersey court in Middlesex Concrete Products and Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Industrial Association accepted municipal taxpayers’ interest in preventing an unwarranted settlement payment by their municipality. The Restatement’s comment on this factor lists public interests of the same kind, such as preventing environmental damage, protecting public morality, and preventing discriminatory practices. Each interest exists independently of the plaintiff’s contract. The investors, the parent, and the taxpayers would hold theirs even if the contract had never been made.
A legitimate interest is a weight on the scale, not a conclusion. The court balances the defendant’s interest against the harm to the plaintiff and against the interest in stable contracts, and courts have put real weight on the second. In Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, Justice Traynor concluded that “contractual stability is generally accepted as of greater importance than competitive freedom,” a statement quoted in Bendix Corp. v. Adams.51 Bendix’s footnote also cites, among its examples of interference, a defendant that lured away an oil jobber and a group of associates who left a law firm and tried to take its clients.52 The Adler associates were building a practice of their own, and that interest did not rescue them once their means and their use of confidences were weighed.53 A defendant with a legitimate stake who uses wrongful means remains exposed, because the interests factor and the conduct factor are separate inputs and the second can outweigh the first.
A bare desire for money does not count as a legitimate interest. Every rival wants the plaintiff’s customer, and the wish to win the plaintiff’s business exists only because of the plaintiff’s contract. The law handles that wish through the separate competitor’s privilege taken up later, and under this factor a purpose limited to taking the benefit of the plaintiff’s contract adds nothing to the defendant’s side of the scale. The factor credits stakes such as a lien, an ownership share, an investment, or a bona fide claim, each of which the defendant would hold even if the plaintiff’s contract had never existed. The same facts also support the privilege for protecting one’s own interests, which a later section treats as a defense. This factor asks only how much weight the interest adds to the overall balance.
Social Interests at Stake
Section 767(e) steps back from the parties and asks what society has at stake on each side.55 The first four factors concern what the defendant did and why, what the plaintiff stood to lose, and what the defendant hoped to gain. This one makes the “choice of values” that comment b says the whole inquiry requires.56 The other six factors supply facts, and factor (e) tells the court how much those facts weigh.
The two social interests pull against each other, and each has its own reason for carrying weight. Guard-Life described the balance as one between, on one side, the plaintiff’s interest in future enjoyment of contract performance together with society’s interest in respect for the integrity of contractual relationships and, on the other, the interferer’s freedom of action together with society’s concern that competition not be unduly hampered.57 Contract integrity matters because a promise is worth having only if the promisee can count on performance. If outsiders could induce breach whenever they saw a profit, every contracting party would have to guard against third parties as well as against the counterparty. Freedom of action matters for the opposite reason. Markets work because rivals pursue one another’s customers and buyers hear competing offers, and a rule that walled off every customer already under contract would insulate incumbents and turn each solicitation into a possible lawsuit. Pressed to its limit, each interest would swallow the other, so the law cannot pick one for all cases.
The facts that do most of the deciding come from the third factor. Whether the plaintiff holds an existing contract or only a prospect tells the court which social interest is stronger in the setting. Guard-Life connected the two when it explained why a competitor is treated differently in each. An existing contract earns greater protection because respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition, while a prospective relationship earns less because liability requires more culpable conduct.58 Justice Traynor’s view, quoted in Bendix, that contractual stability is generally of greater importance than competitive freedom states the generalization, and Guard-Life shows how far it travels.59 The generalization prevails for existing contracts. For prospective relations it gives way to the competitor’s freedom, provided the interference is intended at least in part to advance the competing interest, no unlawful restraint of trade results, and the means are not wrongful.60
Competition wins most clearly where the defendant has done nothing aimed at anyone’s contract. Ordinary advertising and routine sales solicitation do not amount to inducing a breach, even though some recipients happen to be bound to a rival.61 Nobody has been asked to break a promise, so the contractual interest is barely engaged while society’s interest in letting buyers hear competing offers is at full strength.
Guard-Life supplies the reasoning for the second scene. A competitor’s status does not protect the interferer from the consequences of interfering with an existing contract, though it may excuse interference with prospective relationships on the conditions just described.62 Because wrongful means do not include persuasion alone, even when it is knowingly directed at the contract, the nature-of-the-conduct factor would still favor the sales representative.63 That is why factor (e) is one input into a balance and not a verdict, and why the representative’s call is not automatically tortious.
Courts treat the factor as one entry on the full list. In Western Technologies, Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that comment l to § 767 treats the existence of the privilege as possibly a question of law where identifiable standards of business ethics or recognized community customs have developed. The court was not dealing with such standards, but it concluded that the propriety of the defendant’s actions could be decided as a matter of law on the facts before it.64 The balance of social interests is therefore sometimes a question for the judge.
Factor (e) is also where the law’s settled answers first appear. Section 768 is the Restatement’s attempt to articulate this balance for competitors, and it hardens one recurring result of the weighing into a privilege that a later section develops.65 Until then, avoid reciting a slogan in place of an analysis. “Competition is healthy” and “contracts must be honored” are both true, and an answer that states only one of them has not applied the factor. The analysis identifies which social interest the facts actually engage, an existing enforceable contract the defendant knew about and targeted or ordinary solicitation that merely reaches a prospect, and then assigns the weight that follows.
Proximity or Remoteness
Section 767(f) measures distance: how many steps separate the defendant’s conduct from the nonperformance on which the suit rests?67 Courts sometimes call the gap the degree of attenuation.68 When the defendant persuades the third party directly not to perform its contract with the plaintiff, the Restatement treats that closeness as strong evidence of impropriety. When the defendant’s conduct is only a remote or incidental cause of the nonperformance, the factor points the other way.69
Distance matters because of what the tort is meant to reach. A defendant should answer for a breach to the extent the breach can fairly be attributed to the defendant’s own choice. If the defendant asks the third party to break the contract, the breach is the direct product of that request. If the defendant’s act is one link in a longer chain, other people’s decisions stand between that act and the loss, and the claim that the defendant chose the breach weakens with each added link. Liability for remote causes would also expose anyone whose ordinary conduct ripples through a web of commercial relationships to suits over losses the defendant never aimed at, and that exposure would chill the competition the rest of § 767 protects.
The same idea appears in the elements, so the factor does double duty. Interference liability does not stem merely from an intentional act by the defendant that happens to affect the plaintiff’s contracts. Section 766 asks whether the defendant induced or otherwise caused the third person not to perform.70 Its comments treat a seller that merely does business in the ordinary course, answering a customer’s inquiry with a better price than a rival’s, as not inducing a breach. Comment n adds that “[o]ne does not induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person under the rule stated in this Section when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract with the third person.”71 A defendant whose conduct is too remote has not committed the required act at all, and a defendant who has committed it still gains or loses weight under § 767(f) according to how close the connection was. Knowledge of the plaintiff’s contract and of the plaintiff’s resulting loss proves neither inducement nor causation. Knowledge supplies intent, and the loss supplies damages. An essay stem that says only that the defendant knew its new customer was bound to the plaintiff has not yet told you which way this factor points, because the stem must also reveal who made the first approach.
Winternitz v. Summit Hills Joint Venture shows a second kind of collateral harm, in which the defendant’s breach of its own contract with the plaintiff injures the plaintiff’s dealings with others. The tenant’s claim rested on a landlord’s refusal to perform an agreement to renew a lease and permit its assignment. The Maryland court held that the collateral effect of a breach on the plaintiff’s other contracts does not, of itself, establish the tort.72 Foreseeable losses of that kind may be recoverable as damages for the breach, and the other § 767 factors bearing on how pernicious the defendant’s conduct was must also be taken into account.73 The reason is structural. Contract law already compensates the foreseeable ripple effects of a breach, and letting the same facts support a tort claim would erase the line between the two bodies of law.
Proximity is one input into the overall judgment and does not decide it. Directness raises the weight toward impropriety without making honest persuasion of a prospective customer tortious, because the conduct, interests, and social-interest factors still have to be weighed. Remoteness lowers the weight, and it works together with the element of inducing or otherwise causing, so a remote defendant often fails at the threshold.
Relations Between the Parties
Section 767(g) asks what the plaintiff and the defendant were to each other before the interference occurred.75 The earlier factors looked at means and motive, at the interests on each side, at society’s stake, and at how close the conduct came to the breach. Guard-Life counted the relationship between the parties among the factors to be weighed.76 The answer matters because identical conduct, such as contacting a customer of the other side, can be routine between strangers and wrongful between parties who stand in a position of trust.
A relationship matters because it fixes what each party may fairly expect of the other, and § 767 asks in the end whether the defendant’s conduct should be tolerated despite its harm. Two kinds of relationship pull in opposite directions. When the parties stand in a position of trust, one of them has been given access, confidence, or information that exists only because of the relationship. Using that access to turn the other’s contract partners away exploits something the plaintiff placed in the defendant’s hands, so the plaintiff may fairly expect restraint. When the parties are arm’s-length rivals, each knows the other is pursuing the same customers, and the loss of a customer to a rival is a harm both accept as part of competing. In that setting the relationship gives the plaintiff nothing extra to complain of.
Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein displays the first kind. Associates who left a law firm contacted the firm’s clients whose cases were open and active. The court concluded that the contact “unduly suggested a course of action” for the clients and “unfairly prejudiced” the firm, and so was improper.77 It stressed that the associates had taken advantage of confidential information and of the clients’ trust in them, both acquired while working for the firm.78 The associates had even used the potential fees from those active cases as collateral for a bank line of credit for their new firm, and the court observed that “[n]o public interest is served in condoning use of confidential information which has these effects.”79
The clients’ trust and the confidential information both came from the associates’ position inside the firm. The relationship supplied the audience and the target. The associates’ breach of the professional rule against self-recommendation belongs to the conduct factor treated earlier. Under factor (g) the point is that these defendants were insiders who drew on what that position gave them.
Guard-Life sits at the other end of the range. The plaintiff and the defendant there were business competitors, and the court explained that rivalry changes the calculation. A competitor’s status does not protect it from the consequences of interfering with an existing contract, but it may excuse interference with prospective relationships where the interference is intended at least in part to advance the competing interest, no unlawful restraint of trade results, and the means are not wrongful.80 No confidence passed between rivals, so nothing the plaintiff entrusted to the defendant is being turned against it. The relationship adds no weight on the plaintiff’s side, and the plaintiff must find its weight in the other factors. The two decisions differ in the position the defendant occupied before acting. The Adler Barish associates had been inside the plaintiff’s business, while the parties in Guard-Life stood to each other only as rivals.
The second manager’s conduct resembles Adler Barish, which turned on more than the defendants’ prior employment. It also rested on confidential information and on clients with open, active matters.81 A plaintiff who proves only a prior employment relationship has proved little under this factor. A defendant who happens to be a competitor has not escaped the factor either, since competitor status does not shield interference with an existing contract.82
Employment settings add a third variation, because authority inside an organization is also a relationship. A supervisor who makes or recommends a decision to fire an employee may be liable for interference with the employee’s job if the supervisor acted for personal interests.83 The relationship cuts both ways. The supervisor’s role supplies a legitimate reason to make personnel decisions, and the same role aggravates the interference when it serves a private grievance. In Hunter v. Board of Trustees of Broadlawns Medical Center, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a verdict against a hospital’s executive director who fired the plaintiff within two weeks of taking the position. The two had competed for the job, the director disliked the plaintiff and snubbed him in public, and he decided on the discharge without considering job evaluations or giving a reason. That evidence was enough to show that he exceeded his privilege to make discharge decisions.84 A later section on agents and advisers develops the privilege itself.