Concept
Intentional Interference Compared
Negligent interference with contract or prospective relations
Intentional Interference Compared
Section 766C is easiest to understand beside the tort it leaves open. The Restatement (Second) of Torts denies recovery for pecuniary harm that does not derive from physical harm to the plaintiff when the harm results from the defendant’s negligently causing a third person not to perform a contract with the plaintiff, interfering with the plaintiff’s performance or making it more expensive or burdensome, or interfering with the plaintiff’s acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.1 Negligent interference with contract is not ordinarily actionable.2 The same loss can be recoverable when the defendant causes it deliberately, because interference with contract has always been an intentional tort: a defendant can be liable for intentionally causing a breach of the plaintiff’s contract but not for causing one unintentionally.3
The tort descends from the ancient action of a master for the loss of a servant’s services. After the Black Death, surviving laborers demanded high wages and left their masters whenever they could get better pay and conditions elsewhere, and the law answered with that action.4
Today the interference torts are pure economic torts. When a defendant interferes by a physical tort, such as beating the plaintiff, the plaintiff recovers the proven economic loss as consequential damages from the battery. The pure economic tort arises only when the interference occurs without any physical tort, as when the defendant offers a better deal to the plaintiff’s promisor or uses economic power to make the plaintiff’s deal costly.5 Some jurisdictions conceive of these torts so broadly that they cover much the same ground as many other torts with more specific rules.6 Because an act as ordinary as a better offer can count as interference, the tort depends on what the defendant knew and intended and on whether the conduct was improper.
Relying on the Restatement definition, most courts recite four elements for interference with an existing contract:
- a valid contract subject to interference;
- the interferor’s knowledge of the contractual relationship;
- intentional and improper interference that induces or causes a breach or termination of the contract; and
- resulting damages.
The closely related tort of interference with prospective contractual relation covers a plaintiff who had not yet entered a contract. Its elements run parallel:
- a relationship between the plaintiff and a third party carrying the probability of future economic benefit;
- the defendant’s knowledge of that relationship;
- intentional and improper interference that prevents the relationship from maturing; and
- resulting damage.7
The negligent defendant of § 766C fails at the third element of both lists, which demands interference that is intentional and improper. The two subsections below take those words in turn.
The Intent Requirement
Under the Restatement, interference is intentional if the actor desires to bring it about or knows it is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct.8 That definition reaches the rival who sets out to take the plaintiff’s contract and also the actor who wants something else and accepts the plaintiff’s loss as the price. Ill will toward the plaintiff is unnecessary. Courts have never agreed on a single formulation: the required intent may be a purpose to interfere with the plaintiff’s expectation, knowledge that interference would result, or knowledge combined with some other wrongful or improper conduct.9 Unless a problem signals a stricter rule, apply the Restatement’s two routes.
Intent presupposes knowledge, because a defendant cannot desire or expect the disruption of a contract it has never heard of. Both lists of elements therefore require the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship.10 For interference with contract, the defendant must know of the contract and know enough of its terms to realize that what the defendant induces the contracting party to do is a breach.11 The formulation that descends from Lumley v. Gye states the same requirement: the defendant must know of the contract and intend to interfere with its performance.12
A mistaken belief about the contract offers uncertain protection. It is arguable that a defendant who knew of a contract is liable even if the defendant wrongly believed that the contract would not be violated or was unenforceable. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., a defendant who knew of the plaintiff’s agreement to buy a corporation avoided liability because it was reasonable to believe the agreement was not binding. In Robey v. Sun Record Co., by contrast, the defendant was held liable despite its alleged belief that the contract was invalid.13 Typical cases include inducing breach of a covenant not to compete by offering the covenantor a job with a competitor and, as in White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas Corp., a competing business’s inducing breach of the plaintiff’s contract with a customer to be the exclusive provider of goods or services.14
The same delay to a plaintiff can arise without intent.
What separates the driver from Brandt is what each knew and wanted. Brandt knew of Dunmore’s contract and knew that breach would follow; the driver knew of no contract and expected no interference.
Foreseeable harm is not intended harm, and exam answers go wrong by blurring the two. A driver who should have realized that blocking a gate might delay someone’s shipments was negligent, and § 766C bars recovery of the resulting economic loss.15 Intent asks instead what the defendant desired or knew to be substantially certain.16
General awareness that some people are under contract is not knowledge of the plaintiff’s contract. A speaker who praises high wages in another region, knowing that some listeners hold jobs under contract, knows of no particular contract or its terms and aims at none; any effect on one employer is a by-product of addressing a crowd. The knowledge element fails.17 The same speech aimed at a listener whose contract the speaker knows, to pull that listener out of it, would supply knowledge and purpose, and only the question of impropriety would remain.
The Improper Conduct Requirement
Purposeful interference does not by itself create liability. Most courts recite “intentional and improper interference” as the third element of both torts, following the Restatement.19 The word improper does the sorting, and the Restatement’s factors show how: they weigh the interests the actor seeks to advance and the social interest in protecting the actor’s freedom of action against the plaintiff’s contractual interests, so a legitimate business objective is part of the balance.20
The first Restatement made intentional interference a prima facie tort. Acknowledging criticism, the American Law Institute discarded that requirement in the Second Restatement, whose § 766B requires that the defendant’s conduct be “improper” and adopts a multifactor balancing approach, with seven factors for the trier of fact to weigh.21 Section 767 lists the factors:
- the nature of the actor’s conduct;
- the actor’s motive;
- the interests of the other with which the conduct interferes;
- the interests the actor seeks to advance;
- the social interests in protecting the actor’s freedom of action and the other’s contractual interests;
- the proximity or remoteness of the conduct to the interference; and
- the relations between the parties.22
In the case law, however, the major grounds for finding interference improper have become improper motive and improper means. They are alternative bases of liability, and a court may also find conduct improper because of a combination of the two, as in Pleas v. City of Seattle.23
Means are improper when they are wrongful independently of the interference. Under the opinion in Top Service Body Shop, a means may be wrongful “by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession.”24 Defamation fits that description. In Kraemer v. Harding, a defamatory statement was an improper means of interfering with a school bus driver’s employment. In Vito v. Inman, messages left for a podiatrist’s patient did not support the claim, because they were not actionable as defamation and so were not improper means.25
Improper motive includes a purpose to inflict injury, and under the Leigh Furniture opinion an improper purpose must have been predominant to support motive-based liability.26 A rival who wants an account for its profit, and knows that the other seller will lose it, has a purpose to earn that profit; injury to the other seller is a known consequence, not the predominant aim.
Some courts place the burden of showing wrongfulness on the plaintiff. In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the California Supreme Court approved requiring the plaintiff to show wrongfulness as part of its case. It left for another day whether to refine that requirement by demanding an independently tortious act, anticompetitive behavior proscribed by positive law, or unalloyed malice.27 Each of those refinements looks for wrongfulness beyond the interference itself. Burden-shifting language still appears elsewhere: a defense of justification or privilege is allowed in some circumstances.28 One treatise observes that, in a sense, there is liability unless the defendant had an especially “proper” purpose, but cautions that this way of putting the matter wrongly suggests that the defendant always bears the burden of proof.29
Competition for customers shows how the requirement works. A defendant who wins an account with a lower price and better service uses neither a wrongful means nor, predominantly, a purpose to injure, so the interference is not improper. The analysis changes when an existing contract stands in the way. The Second Restatement suggests that an offer of better terms, even a truthful one, is impermissible when it deals with an existing contract.30 A competitor’s inducing breach of a customer’s exclusive-provider contract, as in White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas Corp., is a typical case of actionable inducement.31
The Restatements also state privileges that defeat liability even for intentional interference. The Third Restatement’s § 20 “primarily states privileges that defeat liability for interference with contract under § 17,” and where the conditions of the Second Restatement’s § 772 are present, it is immaterial that the actor also profits by the advice or dislikes the third person and takes pleasure in the harm.32
Both plaintiffs lost an account to a rival who meant to take it, and the method is the only difference. On an exam, ask what the defendant did to get the customer, since wanting the customer is the point of competing.
Negligence cannot satisfy the improper-conduct requirement. A careless act carries no purpose to injure, and it is not wrongful in the way a knowing lie is wrongful, so it supplies neither an improper motive nor an improper means. Section 766C separately denies recovery for the pecuniary harm that negligence causes.33 A negligence action for pure economic harm is allowed only when the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care because of an undertaking or special relationship, as in legal malpractice, and that route lies outside this comparison.34 The two elements are also separate: a defendant who knew of the plaintiff’s contract has met only the knowledge half of intent, and if what the defendant did was merely careless, the claim still fails, as it does against the driver whose truck blocked the gate.