Also known as: abrogation doctrines · abrogation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine under which Congress may override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from private damages suits in federal court. The doctrine requires Congress to express its intent unequivocally and to act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority such as the enforcement power in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article I powers supply no basis for abrogation.
Alan Ackerman, a resident of State A, filed a federal suit against State A seeking money damages for injuries sustained at a state-run facility. The complaint relied on a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause that purported to authorize such actions. The district court dismissed the case because the statute supplied no valid basis for overriding the state's immunity.
The Red River Tribe sued the State of Danton in federal court for unpaid revenue-sharing amounts under a compact authorized by a federal statute resting on the Indian Commerce Clause. Danton moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The court granted the motion because Congress lacked power under Article I to abrogate the state's immunity.
Angela Acosta, a nurse at a state hospital, sued the state health department in federal court for back pay under a federal overtime statute. The department moved to dismiss asserting sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion because the statute rested on Article I authority rather than the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role. Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels. Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
View caseAntonio Alvarado, a tugboat captain and resident of State X, sued the State X Port Authority in federal court under federal maritime law for personal injuries. The authority moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court dismissed the action because no valid abrogation appeared in the governing statute.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAether Technologies sued the State of Pennsylvania in federal court under a federal environmental statute seeking damages for cleanup costs. Pennsylvania asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court dismissed the suit because the statute relied on Article I authority that cannot support abrogation.
For about 50 years, the predecessors of respondent Union Gas Co. operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a by-product. The plant was dismantled around 1950. A few years later, Pennsylvania took part in major flood-control efforts along the creek. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements to the property along the creek, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek. The coal tar began to seep into the creek, and the Environmental Protection Agency determined that the tar was a hazardous substance and declared the site the Nation's first emergency Superfund site. Working together, Pennsylvania and the Federal Government cleaned up the area, and the Federal Government reimbursed the State for clean-up costs of $720,000. To recoup these costs, the United States sued Union Gas under §§ 104 and 106 of CERCLA, claiming that Union Gas was liable for such costs because the company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar into the ground near Brodhead Creek. Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the Commonwealth was responsible for at least a portion of the costs because it was an owner or operator of the hazardous-waste site. Its flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contributed to the release of the coal tar into the creek. The District Court dismissed the complaint, accepting Pennsylvania's claim that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, finding no clear expression of congressional intent to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA. While Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended CERCLA by passing SARA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of these amendments. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the language of CERCLA, as amended, clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages and that Congress had the power to do so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 485 U. S. 958 (1988), and affirmed.
View caseAmelia Amari, a state employee, filed a federal overtime claim against the State of Maine in Maine state court. Maine moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court dismissed the action because Congress cannot subject nonconsenting states to private damages suits in their own courts under Article I legislation.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseCongress must act under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article I powers such as the Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause do not suffice.
Yes. The bar extends to suits brought by a state's own citizens absent consent or valid abrogation.
No. Waiver must be clear and unmistakable. Participation in a federal scheme alone does not constitute waiver.
Yes. A state may not be sued for damages in the courts of a sister state without its consent.
…Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. , 554 U. S. 527, 547 (2008) (describing fraud and duress as “traditional grounds for the abrogation of [a] contract” that speak to “unfair dealing at the contract formation stage”); Hume v. United States , 132 U. S. 406, 411, 414 (1889) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “such…