Also known as: accessories after the fact · accessory after fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person who, knowing that a felony has been committed, renders assistance to the felon with the purpose of hindering the felon's apprehension, conviction, or punishment.
After Leo smashed the lock and removed tools from the trailer, Omar arranged their resale and hid the paperwork. Omar knew the theft had occurred and acted to shield Leo from detection. Omar's conduct meets the definition of accessory after the fact because it occurred after the felony and was intended to help the principal avoid prosecution.
After Luis removed electronics from the container, Chen altered the cargo manifest and instructed the crew to remain silent. Chen knew the felony was complete and acted to prevent reporting in port. Chen qualifies as an accessory after the fact by providing knowing assistance aimed at helping the principal evade arrest and conviction.
After court staff questioned the forged settlement order, Charlie shredded the remaining drafts. Charlie knew the forgery had occurred and destroyed evidence to obstruct the inquiry. Charlie's post-crime actions establish accessory after the fact liability by aiding the principals in avoiding detection.
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He faced criminal charges in Kentucky after being arrested for transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer. Before entering a guilty plea to the drug distribution charges, Padilla's counsel did not advise him that the conviction would trigger deportation proceedings. Counsel instead told him that he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had lived in the country so long. Padilla relied on that advice when he pleaded guilty and later alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had received accurate information. In postconviction proceedings Padilla claimed that his attorney's erroneous advice about deportation constituted ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, treating deportation as a collateral consequence outside the protection of the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether federal law imposed on counsel an obligation to advise Padilla that his guilty plea would result in removal from the country.
View caseAfter Keith tapped the pipeline, Isaiah concealed the cutting tools in his barn once an investigation began. Isaiah learned of the completed felony and provided assistance to impede recovery of evidence. Isaiah's conduct satisfies accessory after the fact because it was knowing aid intended to help the principal avoid prosecution.
In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Jerry Helm was convicted in South Dakota of third-degree burglary. In 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, in 1973 of grand larceny, and in 1975 of third-offense driving while intoxicated. All six offenses were nonviolent and alcohol contributed to each. In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a no-account check for $100. He told the trial court he had been drinking in Sioux Falls, ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, and did not remember the incident, then pleaded guilty. Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision. After Helm served two years, he asked the Governor to commute the sentence so he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of a fixed term; the Governor denied the request in May 1981. Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.
View caseAfter Doug removed the laptops, Francis allowed them to be hidden in her spare room overnight. Francis was told the laptops came from the warehouse and knowingly provided temporary storage. Francis meets the accessory after the fact standard by rendering assistance after the felony to help the principal avoid arrest.
Victor Rita was convicted after a jury trial of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing justice in connection with an investigation into InterOrdnance, a gun company. Prosecutors had been examining whether buyers of InterOrdnance's PPSH 41 machinegun parts kits could assemble machineguns without proper registrations. Rita had purchased one such kit, allowed an ATF agent to inspect it after initially sending it back to the company, and provided a different kit that did not amount to a machinegun. When brought before the grand jury, Rita denied under oath that the agent had asked for the PPSH kit and that he had spoken to InterOrdnance about it shortly thereafter. A probation officer prepared a presentence report that grouped the five counts of conviction as stemming from a single incident and calculated a Guidelines sentencing range. The report determined a base offense level of 20 by treating the perjury as accessory after the fact to the underlying gun registration violation. It placed Rita in criminal history category I due to no countable prior offenses more than 10 years before the present offense. The report recommended a sentence of 33 to 41 months' imprisonment. The report noted no circumstances warranting a departure. At the sentencing hearing, Rita presented evidence and argument seeking a sentence below the Guidelines range based on his poor physical condition, fear of retaliation in prison due to his prior work in government criminal justice, and his lengthy military service of over 25 years with 35 commendations, awards, or medals. The Government did not seek a sentence above the range but noted that Rita's perjury had interfered with its case against InterOrdnance and that Rita should have known better as a former employee. The district judge listened to the arguments, found the Guidelines range appropriate, and imposed a sentence of 33 months' imprisonment. Rita appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately account for his history and characteristics and was greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, applying a presumption that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. Rita then petitioned for certiorari, noting a circuit split on the use of such a presumption, and the Supreme Court granted review.
View caseAfter the unauthorized broadcast, Luis ordered deletion of digital logs and helped prepare false statements. Luis knew the felony was complete and acted to destroy evidence and mislead investigators. Luis's post-crime assistance establishes accessory after the fact liability by hindering detection and prosecution.
James Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton were convicted of first-degree murder following their participation in an armed robbery of a convenience food store on June 3, 1974, during which the cashier was killed and a customer was seriously wounded. There were four participants in the robbery: Woodson, Waxton, Leonard Tucker, and Johnnie Lee Carroll. Tucker and Carroll testified for the prosecution after pleading guilty to lesser offenses, while the petitioners testified in their own defense. The prosecution established that the men had discussed the robbery for some time. On the day of the crime, Waxton struck Woodson to sober him up after heavy drinking, and the group armed themselves before proceeding to the store. Tucker and Waxton entered the store, where Waxton shot the cashier at point-blank range and took the money tray, with a second shot fired before they fled. The petitioners' testimony largely agreed with this account except that Waxton claimed Tucker had done the shooting. The petitioners were found guilty on all charges and, as required by North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder, were sentenced to death. The statute had been enacted after the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Waddell severed the discretionary provision from the prior law in response to Furman v. Georgia. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences in State v. Woodson, 287 N. C. 578, 215 S. E. 2d 607 (1975). The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider whether the imposition of the death penalties comported with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
View caseThe elements are that a completed felony was committed by another, the defendant knew of the felony, and the defendant provided assistance to help the felon avoid arrest, prosecution, or conviction. The assistance must occur after the crime is complete.
Supporting sources
A principal in the second degree aids or encourages the crime while present at the scene. An accessory after the fact provides assistance only after the felony is complete and with knowledge of its commission.
Supporting sources
…are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone 15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again clear distinctions that courts may…