Also known as:ad-litem · guardian ad litem · for the suit
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin phrase indicating an appointment or proceeding undertaken solely for the purposes of a particular lawsuit. The designation limits the representative's authority to the litigation at hand and ends once that suit concludes.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Lawyer Seeks Guardian for Client
Abigail Alvarez met with her lawyer to sign a personal guarantee on a commercial lease while exhibiting rapid speech and unrealistic revenue projections. The lawyer concluded that diminished capacity placed her at risk of substantial financial harm. The lawyer petitioned the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to evaluate the transaction and protect her interests.
Representation of Unborn Interests
Anika Anand filed suit challenging state restrictions on medical procedures affecting fetal development. The court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent potential interests of the unborn child in the litigation. The appointment ensured that arguments concerning the child's possible rights received independent presentation before the court reached its decision.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code.
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions.
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
Ariana Azizi lay in a persistent vegetative state with no appointed surrogate. Family members sought to discontinue artificial nutrition. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate and advocate for the patient's previously expressed wishes during the proceeding.
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept, of Health497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990)
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes.
She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care.
After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
Albert Allen, a minor, petitioned for authorization to obtain an abortion without parental involvement. The court appointed a guardian ad litem to assist her in presenting evidence that the procedure would serve her best interests. The guardian ad litem participated solely for purposes of that hearing and had no authority beyond it.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth.
The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements.
Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face.
The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
When may a lawyer seek appointment of a guardian ad litem for a client?
A lawyer may seek the appointment when the lawyer reasonably believes the client has diminished capacity, faces substantial risk of harm, and cannot adequately protect personal interests. The appointment serves as one form of protective action under the applicable professional conduct rules.
Does a guardian ad litem replace a trustee or other fiduciary?
No. A guardian ad litem is appointed only for the limited purpose of a specific suit and does not assume ongoing fiduciary duties such as those of a trustee or conservator. The role ends when the litigation concludes.
May a minor or incompetent person sue without a guardian ad litem?
A minor or incompetent person without a duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem or issue another protective order when the person is unrepresented in the action.
How does a guardian ad litem protect a minor beneficiary during trust termination?
The guardian ad litem represents the minor's interests when beneficiaries seek to terminate an irrevocable trust and agree on a non-pro rata distribution. Court approval of the agreement after the guardian's participation binds the trustee to follow the agreed distribution rather than the original trust terms.
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
…as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole…