Also known as:adequate representations · effective assistance of counsel
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in civil procedure
An alignment of interests between actual parties and potential parties in a lawsuit that sufficiently protects the interests of those potential parties. The alignment must exist at the time of the litigation and requires that the representative understand the representative role or that the court take steps to safeguard the nonparty's interests.
2
in criminal procedure
The effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Effective assistance is presumed unless counsel's conduct so undermines the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
in civil procedure
An alignment of interests between actual parties and potential parties in a lawsuit that sufficiently protects the interests of those potential parties. The alignment must exist at the time of the litigation and requires that the representative understand the representative role or that the court take steps to safeguard the nonparty's interests.
Examples3
State Agency Seeks Intervention
Residents sued a chemical company over groundwater contamination. The state environmental department moved to intervene to protect a preexisting consent order governing the same site. The residents sought only private damages and tailored injunctive relief. The department's distinct regulatory interest was not adequately represented by the private plaintiffs.
Sosna v. Iowa419 U.S. 393 (1975)
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage.
Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing.
Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal.
Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
A Kansas court certified a nationwide class of royalty owners seeking interest payments from an oil company. Nonresident class members received notice, an opportunity to opt out, and representation by named plaintiffs with aligned interests. The court exercised jurisdiction over their claims because the procedural protections satisfied due process.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts472 U.S. 797 (USSC 1985)
Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced or purchased natural gas from leased land in 11 states during the 1970s.
It sold most of the gas in interstate commerce at prices regulated by the Federal Power Commission, later the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Beginning in the mid-1970s Phillips proposed price increases. It collected higher amounts subject to refund with interest if disapproved. Phillips suspended royalty payments to lessors until final Commission approval. It paid the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978 without interest after the increases were approved.
In 1979 the Commission began investigating overcharges. In 1983 it issued an opinion ordering refunds. Royalty owners Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty Anderson, Oklahoma residents owning leases in Oklahoma and Texas, filed suit in Kansas state court seeking interest on the suspended royalties. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 royalty owners later reduced to 28,100 members after 3,400 opted out and 1,500 could not be notified. Fewer than 1,000 class members resided in Kansas and only about one-quarter of one percent of the leases were located there.
The Kansas trial court certified the class under a state statute modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on an opt-out basis. It sent first-class mail notice describing the action and the right to opt out. The court applied Kansas law to award interest at Commission rates followed by the Kansas post-judgment rate of 15 percent. After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984.
Employee Seeks to Intervene in Title VII Suit
Female employees sued their employer for pregnancy discrimination. A male employee moved to intervene to challenge the company's leave policy as applied to fathers. The existing plaintiffs did not share his interest in expanding coverage for male employees. The court denied intervention because the male employee's interest was not adequately represented.
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (“Cal. Fed.”) v. Guerra479 U.S. 272 (1987)
California amended its Fair Employment and Housing Act in September 1978 to prohibit certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
The amendment, codified at California Government Code section 12945(b)(2), requires employers subject to Title VII to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. The state agency interpreting the statute has construed it to require reinstatement to the same or a substantially similar job upon return from leave, unless business necessity prevents it.
Petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Association maintains a facially neutral leave policy permitting employees with three months of service to take unpaid leaves for disability and pregnancy. The policy attempts to provide a similar position upon return but reserves the right to terminate the employee if no similar position is available. In January 1982, employee Lillian Garland took pregnancy disability leave from her receptionist position at Cal Fed. Upon notifying the employer in April 1982 that she was able to return, Garland learned that her job had been filled and no similar positions were available.
Garland filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The Department issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on her behalf charging violation of the state leave provision. Before the scheduled hearing, Cal Fed, along with the Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of Commerce, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaration that the state statute is preempted by Title VII and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court granted summary judgment to the petitioners. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the preemption issue.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must a derivative plaintiff show to satisfy the adequate representation requirement?
The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she will fairly and adequately represent the corporation's interests in enforcing the corporate claim. Courts examine whether the plaintiff has conflicts that would impair loyalty to the corporation as a whole, such as personal animus or competing objectives.
Supporting sources
When does a class representative provide adequate representation under Rule 23(a)(4)?
Sense 2
2
in criminal procedure
The effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Effective assistance is presumed unless counsel's conduct so undermines the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result.
See Our Sources· 2 primary sources
Cases
Examples3
Omitted Jury Instruction on Extortion
Adam Anderson faced extortion charges after a business negotiation turned contentious. His lawyer failed to request a jury instruction distinguishing lawful hard bargaining from criminal threats. The jury convicted without that guidance. The omission left the adversarial testing incomplete and created a reasonable probability that the verdict rested on a misapplication of the law.
Refusal to Present Perjured Testimony
Albert Allen told his lawyer he intended to testify falsely at trial. The lawyer refused to cooperate, urged Allen to tell the truth, and warned that disclosure to the court would follow if necessary. Allen was convicted after truthful testimony from other witnesses. The lawyer's actions preserved the integrity of the proceeding without violating the duty of loyalty.
Indigent Defendant Denied Appointed Counsel
Austin Abbott was charged with a felony and could not afford a lawyer. The trial court refused to appoint counsel despite his request. Abbott represented himself and was convicted. The absence of counsel at a critical stage violated the constitutional guarantee of adequate representation.
Gideon v. Wainwright
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does a lawyer's refusal to present perjured testimony violate the client's right to adequate representation?
No. Counsel's duty of loyalty does not extend to assisting perjury. The lawyer must first attempt to dissuade the client, consider withdrawal, and, if necessary, disclose the perjury as a remedial measure under ethical rules.
Supporting sources
What presumption applies when a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel?
Effective assistance is presumed unless counsel's conduct so undermined the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result. The defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
The representative must be part of the class, possess the same interest, and suffer the same injury as class members. The representative's claims must be typical, and the court must ensure that the interests of absent members are protected through aligned incentives and court oversight.
How does the court determine whether existing parties adequately represent a proposed intervenor?
The court compares the interests of the existing parties with those of the intervenor. If the intervenor's interest is distinct and the existing parties do not share the same objectives or regulatory responsibilities, representation is inadequate and intervention as of right may be granted.
Supporting sources
372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense.
Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison.
Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief.
Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
of her interests by defendants. Her appeal from the order denying intervention was consolidated with the appeal on the merits. In an unreported order, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth…
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