Also known as: adulterer · adulteress · adulterine · adulterini · adulterium · infidelity · extramarital · adulterous
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and someone other than the person's spouse.
Arthur Abrams returned home early and found his wife in bed with another man. He immediately seized a nearby object and struck the man. The discovery of adultery supplied adequate provocation that reduced what would otherwise have been murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Abigail Alvarez and Alan Ackerman lived together for several years under an oral agreement to pool earnings and share property. When they separated, Alan sought to enforce the agreement. The court enforced the contract because the agreement was not inseparably founded on sexual services.
In October 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement. While the parties lived together, they would combine their efforts and earnings. They would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife. Plaintiff would render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff agreed to give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer. She did so to devote her full time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. In return, defendant agreed to provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life. The parties lived together from October 1964 through May 1970. During this period, as a result of their efforts and earnings, they acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property. This included motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November 1971 but thereafter refused to provide further support. Plaintiff brought this action asserting two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asked the court to determine her contract and property rights. The second sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. Defendant answered the complaint after an unsuccessful demurrer. Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings. This was augmented by a stipulation that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment. She asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after the divorce became final. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
View caseAnthony Arnold obtained a legislative divorce from his wife after she alleged his criminal intimacies with others. The decree was upheld against constitutional challenge even though it altered the marital status of the parties.
David S. Maynard and Lydia A. Maynard were husband and wife when David left their home in Ohio to seek opportunities in the western territories. Upon his arrival in the Territory of Oregon, David settled upon public land under the donation act of Congress of September 27, 1850, claiming 640 acres as a married settler to obtain the grant for himself and his wife. Subsequently, on December 22, 1852, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon passed a special act declaring the bonds of matrimony between David S. Maynard and his wife dissolved. David subsequently remarried another woman after the divorce took effect. Lydia received no notice of the legislative proceeding and received no support from David after his departure from Ohio, leaving her without resources during this period. Lydia A. Maynard filed a bill of complaint in the courts of the Territory asserting rights to the east half of the donation claim and alleging that no cause existed for the divorce.
View caseAndre Antoine transported a woman across state lines for an adulterous relationship. The woman consented but was not charged. The Court held that her consent did not make her a conspirator under the Mann Act.
Petitioners, a man and a woman, not then husband and wife, were indicted in the District Court for Northern Illinois for conspiring together, and with others not named, to transport the woman from one state to another for the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse with the man. At the trial without a jury there was evidence from which the court could have found that the petitioners had engaged in illicit sexual relations in the course of each of the journeys alleged. The man purchased the railway tickets for both petitioners for at least one journey. In each instance the woman, in advance of the purchase of the tickets, consented to go on the journey and did go on it voluntarily for the specified immoral purpose. There was no evidence supporting the allegation that any other person had conspired. The trial court overruled motions for a finding for the defendants, and in arrest of judgment, and gave judgment of conviction, which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the authority of United States v. Holte. This case is here on certiorari, 286 U.S. 539, to review a judgment of conviction for conspiracy to violate the Mann Act.
View caseAngela Acosta and her husband used contraceptives in violation of a state statute. The Court struck down the statute because it intruded on the privacy of the marital relationship even though the state retained power to prohibit adultery.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseA colonial statute listed adultery among capital crimes. The Court later examined the statute's historical context when reviewing the constitutionality of the death penalty for other offenses.
In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.
View caseAdultery was not a common-law crime in England. It was punished by the church as an ecclesiastical offense and later criminalized by statute in some American jurisdictions.
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Catching one's spouse in the act of adultery qualifies as adequate provocation at common law. The discovery must actually inflame the defendant and occur before a reasonable cooling-off period has elapsed.
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In fault-based divorce jurisdictions, proof of adultery may reduce the offending spouse's share of marital property. Courts also consider the effect of the conduct on children when awarding custody.
Consent or conduct showing willingness for the spouse to have adulterous relations bars the consenting spouse from recovering damages for harm to marital interests.
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