aggrieved party

In 1970, the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that members of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives had planned to blow up heating tunnels linking federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. The group had also discussed kidnapping National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. On November 6, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap on the telephone of William Davidon, a Haverford College physics professor and group member. The stated purpose was gathering intelligence in the interest of national security. The FBI installed the tap in late November 1970 and it remained in place until January 6, 1971. During that period the Government intercepted three conversations between Davidon and respondent Keith Forsyth. Forsyth learned of the wiretap in 1972 while facing unrelated criminal charges. He moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3504 for disclosure of any electronic surveillance to which he had been subjected. The Government's response revealed that Forsyth had participated in conversations overheard during surveillance expressly authorized by the President acting through the Attorney General. An affidavit from then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated the surveillance was authorized under the President's national security authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). Shortly after this Court decided United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), Forsyth filed suit against Mitchell and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. He sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages. Discovery and preliminary proceedings continued for five and a half years. By early 1978 both parties had filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court found no genuine dispute that the FBI had informed Mitchell of the ECCSL plots, that Mitchell had authorized the warrantless tap on Davidon's phone, and that the ostensible purpose was national-security intelligence gathering. The court rejected Mitchell's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman but held that he could assert qualified immunity. Neither side had established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his good faith, so the court denied both summary-judgment motions. Mitchell appealed the denial of absolute immunity. The Third Circuit remanded for further factfinding on whether the authorization was necessary to a decision to initiate a criminal prosecution. On remand the District Court held a hearing and concluded that Mitchell's authorization was not intended to facilitate any prosecutorial decision. After this Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the District Court reconsidered qualified immunity, denied Mitchell's motion for summary judgment, granted Forsyth's motion on liability, and scheduled proceedings on damages. Mitchell again appealed. The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the absolute-immunity denial but that the qualified-immunity denial was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, and it remanded for further proceedings. Mitchell petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted.