Also known as: testamentary intent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The present intention that a document operate as a disposition of property effective only upon the maker's death. This mental element must accompany execution for the instrument to qualify as a will rather than a sham or inter vivos arrangement.
Adrian Aguilar signed a document reciting that it was his last will and leaving his estate to his niece. After his death his brother petitioned for intestacy and introduced evidence that Adrian executed the paper only to persuade a creditor he was insolvent. The court placed the burden on the brother to prove lack of animus testandi and, finding the evidence sufficient, refused probate.
Anika Anand executed a formal document labeled her last will that left everything to her neighbor. After her death the neighbor offered it for probate. The decedent's son introduced letters showing Anand signed the paper solely to induce the neighbor to lend her money. The court held the extrinsic evidence rebutted any presumption of testamentary intent and denied probate.
Amber Alonzo wrote a handwritten letter to her cousin stating she wanted him to have her Montana cabin if anything happened to her. After her death the cousin offered the letter for probate. The court examined whether the letter expressed animus testandi and, after weighing the language and surrounding circumstances, admitted it as a holographic will.
Charles Kuralt and Patricia Elizabeth Shannon maintained a long-term intimate personal relationship that they kept secret from Kuralt's wife, Petie. Over nearly thirty years, Kuralt provided primary financial support to Shannon and her three children, transferred a home in Ireland to her, and established close relationships with her family. In 1985, Kuralt purchased a 20-acre parcel along the Big Hole River in Madison County, Montana, where he and Shannon built a cabin. Subsequently, in 1987, he acquired two adjoining parcels creating approximately 90 acres total. On May 3, 1989, Kuralt executed a holographic will bequeathing to Shannon all his interest in the land, buildings, furnishings, and personal belongings on Burma Road, Twin Bridges, Montana. Kuralt mailed a copy of this will to Shannon. On May 4, 1994, Kuralt executed a formal will in New York City prepared with counsel that did not mention the Montana property and named his wife and two children as beneficiaries. Shannon had no knowledge of the 1994 will until these proceedings began. On April 9, 1997, Kuralt deeded the original 20-acre parcel with the cabin to Shannon in a transaction disguised as a sale, supplying the purchase price himself. Shannon then sent Kuralt a blank buy-sell form at his request to convey the remaining 90 acres similarly, with plans to complete the transfer in September 1997. On June 18, 1997, while hospitalized in New York, Kuralt wrote a letter to Shannon enclosing checks for $8,000 and $9,000, stating he would have the lawyer visit to ensure she inherited the rest of the Montana property if necessary. Shannon petitioned to probate the June 18, 1997 letter as a holographic codicil to the 1994 will. The Estate opposed, leading the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to the Estate on May 26, 1998. Shannon appealed, resulting in reversal and remand by this Court in Kuralt I for trial on disputed facts. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found the letter a valid holographic codicil and entered judgment for Shannon, from which the Estate now appeals.
View caseAlan Ackerman conveyed land by deed to a city for a park open only to white persons. After his death heirs challenged the restriction. The court held the racial limitation rendered the charitable purpose unenforceable, causing the property to pass by resulting trust to the heirs.
In 1911, United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised a tract of land to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon for use as a park and pleasure ground exclusively for white people, with control vested in a Board of Managers composed entirely of white persons, and the will expressed the Senator's view that the two races should be forever separate while providing that the property under no circumstances was to be devoted to any other purpose. The city accepted the trust and initially operated the park on a segregated basis, but after it began allowing Negroes to use the park, members of the Board of Managers sued in state court to remove the city as trustee and appoint new trustees, prompting Negro citizens to intervene in the proceedings. Following the city's resignation as trustee, the Georgia courts appointed private trustees, but in Evans v. Newton the United States Supreme Court held that the park must be operated without racial discrimination, leading the Georgia Supreme Court to determine that the purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill and to remand the case for further proceedings. The trial court declined to apply the cy pres doctrine, ruled that the trust had failed, and determined that the property had reverted to Senator Bacon's heirs, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; petitioners, the Negro citizens of Macon who had sought integration of the park, challenged the termination of the trust, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseAisha Ahmed consulted an attorney about estate planning and later died. The government subpoenaed the attorney's notes. The court held that the notes could not be compelled because the client's communications remained protected after death.
In July 1993 Vincent W. Foster, Jr., then Deputy White House Counsel, met with attorney James Hamilton of the firm Swidler & Berlin to seek legal representation concerning possible congressional or other investigations of the 1993 dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office. During the two-hour meeting Hamilton took three pages of handwritten notes, one of the first entries of which was the word "Privileged." Nine days later Foster committed suicide. In December 1995 a federal grand jury at the request of the Office of the Independent Counsel issued subpoenas to Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin for Hamilton's handwritten notes of the meeting with Foster. Petitioners filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. After examining the notes in camera the District Court concluded they were protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege and denied enforcement. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. It recognized that most courts assume the privilege survives death but concluded that a balancing test should apply in the criminal context. The Court of Appeals also held that the notes were not protected by the work-product privilege. A dissenting judge would have affirmed the District Court's judgment protecting the notes under the attorney-client privilege. Petitioners sought review in the Supreme Court on both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998.
View caseThe proponent must show the decedent intended the instrument to dispose of property only at death. A clear statement in the document itself creates a strong but rebuttable presumption. Extrinsic evidence may be considered to confirm or negate that intent.
Yes. When a document on its face appears to be a will, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove it was executed for a non-testamentary purpose such as inducing another person to act. If the evidence is clear the instrument is a sham and is denied probate.
No. Language such as a condition tied to a voyage or other event does not automatically defeat intent. The court examines the entire writing and surrounding facts to decide whether the maker intended the document to operate at death.
The rule allows a court to overlook formal defects if clear and convincing evidence shows the decedent intended the document as a will. The focus remains on whether animus testandi existed, not on perfect compliance with execution formalities.
…he wrote the provision creating Baconsfield as a public park open only to the white race, he was not merely expressing his own testamentary intent, but was taking advantage of the special power Georgia had conferred by §§ 69-504 and 69-505 on testators seeking to establish racially segregated public parks. As Mr. Justice White…