Also known as: background principles exception · background-principle exception · background-principles exceptions · background principles
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
An exception to the per se regulatory takings rule that excuses the government from paying just compensation when a regulation eliminates all economically beneficial use of land. The exception applies only if the prohibited use was already barred by background principles of state nuisance or property law in effect when the owner acquired title.
Metro Tech purchased coastal bluff land to build a data center. After acquisition, the state banned all new structures in an erosion zone. The ban prevents any buildings and leaves only open-space value. Because the restriction codifies preexisting nuisance rules against erosion harm that predated the purchase, the background-principles exception prevents a per se taking claim.
Red River Farms bought low-lying riverfront acres for row crops when farming was lawful. The state later barred all cultivation and structures. The cooperative shows no preexisting nuisance doctrine barred ordinary farming at purchase. The background-principles exception therefore does not apply and the total wipeout triggers compensation.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Riverton Fabrication acquired an inland wetland parcel when permits still allowed industrial development. A new rule barred all filling and building. The state claims speculative conservation credits preserve value. Because no background property principle already prohibited the plant at acquisition, the exception fails and the regulation effects a per se taking.
Harbor Host bought beachfront dunes for a resort when no specific bar existed. The city then forbade all building to protect dunes. Residual conservation sales remain possible. The background-principles exception shields the city because longstanding nuisance rules against dune destruction already limited development at the time of purchase.
Seaside Development bought an island parcel when residential construction was permitted. After storms the county rezoned it a no-build zone. The land became unsaleable. The background-principles exception does not protect the county because no preexisting nuisance or property rule barred homes when the developer acquired title.
The Green Valley partnership bought fields for orchards when no formal farming limits existed. The state later designated the land a protected corridor and barred all planting and buildings. Limited grazing and small stipends remain. The background-principles exception does not apply because preliminary studies had not ripened into enforceable nuisance rules at purchase.
The exception applies only when the prohibited use was already barred by background principles of state nuisance or property law that existed at the time the owner acquired title. If the use was lawful at purchase, the exception does not shield the government from paying just compensation.
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Residual uses defeat the per se claim only if they supply economically beneficial or productive use comparable to the owner's intended development. Marginal conservation sales or low-impact recreation that fall far short of planned returns do not prevent application of the categorical rule.
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The owner must demonstrate that the restricted use was lawful and common at the time of acquisition and that no established nuisance or property doctrine already barred it. Evidence that similar parcels supported the same activity before the regulation confirms the use was part of the acquired title.
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Yes. A regulation enacted after acquisition cannot invoke the exception if the use was lawful when the owner bought the land. Preexisting background principles must have already prohibited the activity at the moment title passed.
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…rendered petitioner's lots valueless must be accepted, and the South Carolina Supreme Court must determine on remand whether any background principles of state property or nuisance law would have prohibited the uses petitioner now intends. Pp. 1014-1032. (a) Early in this Court's takings jurisprudence, it was determined that government…