Also known as: burden of persuasion · burdens of persuasions · persuasion burden
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The ultimate obligation of a party to convince the trier of fact of the truth of a proposition by the applicable standard of proof. This burden remains fixed on the party who originally bears it and does not shift during the proceeding even when a presumption or burden of production moves to the opposing side.
Dylan files a petition seeking a declaration that Jordan died intestate and supplies evidence of death, venue, and heirship. Peggy counters with a petition to probate a digital document as Jordan's will. Because the petitions are opposed, the court first requires Peggy to establish prima facie proof of due execution before any intestacy determination proceeds.
Nova Development offers five years of maintenance logs to create a presumption that Pacific Estates's neglect caused flooding damage. Pacific Estates responds with a notarized acceptance certificate. The court requires Pacific Estates to produce rebuttal evidence on causation but leaves the ultimate burden of persuasion on Nova Development throughout the case.
A defendant charged with murder presents psychiatric evidence of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court instructs the jury that the prosecution must prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt while the defendant must prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicts after finding the defense unproven.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseCelotex moves for summary judgment arguing that Catrett cannot produce evidence showing exposure to its asbestos products caused her husband's death. The court grants the motion after Catrett fails to meet her burden of production. The ultimate burden of persuasion on causation remains with Catrett and is unaffected by the shift in production.
In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation. The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds. After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers. In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.
View caseAfter a jury convicts the defendant of robbery, the sentencing court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the offense. The court imposes an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence because the visible-possession fact is treated as a sentencing factor rather than an element of the crime.
The Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in 1982. The statute applies to persons convicted of enumerated felonies including third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping. Under the Act a sentencing judge must impose a minimum term of five years' imprisonment upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during commission of the offense. The judge considers trial evidence plus any additional evidence offered by the parties at the sentencing hearing. The Act does not increase the statutory maximum penalty for the underlying felony. Petitioner McMillan was convicted by jury of aggravated assault after shooting his victim in the right buttock during an argument over a debt. Petitioner Peterson was convicted after a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter after shooting and killing her husband. Petitioner Dennison was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated assault after shooting and seriously wounding an acquaintance. Petitioner Smalls was convicted after a bench trial of robbery after holding up a seafood store at gunpoint. In each case the Commonwealth provided notice before sentencing that it would seek application of the Act. The four sentencing judges each held the Act unconstitutional and imposed sentences below the five-year minimum. The Commonwealth appealed all four cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which consolidated them and upheld the statute. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional challenges.
View caseA Black defendant objects when the prosecutor uses peremptory strikes to remove all Black venire members. The defendant must first make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Once that showing is made, the burden of persuasion remains on the defendant to prove that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations are pretextual.
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on every element of a negligence claim, including duty, breach, causation, and damages. Even when the plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence or an inference of negligence, the ultimate obligation to convince the factfinder remains with the plaintiff.
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No. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301 a presumption shifts only the burden of production to the party against whom it is directed. The burden of persuasion remains on the party who originally bore it.
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The proponent of the will must establish prima facie proof of due execution. The contestant bears the burden of persuasion on lack of capacity, undue influence, or revocation. Each party retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the matters for which it carries the initial burden.
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The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the panel did not act in good faith after a reasonable inquiry. The statute places this burden on the plaintiff when the determination is made by a court-appointed panel.
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…the State is to prove in order to convict, but constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion. Pp. 206-207. 3. The Due Process Clause does not require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the affirmative defense, since (a) the affirmative defense does…