Also known as: cases or controversies · case-or-controversy · case-or-controversy requirement · Article III case or controversy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional limitation on the judicial power of the federal courts that restricts their authority to actual disputes between adverse parties possessing concrete stakes in the outcome. The requirement bars advisory opinions on hypothetical or abstract questions and ensures that courts resolve live controversies capable of judicial redress.
Charlotte Chung sued Cypress Technologies in federal court for copyright infringement over the unauthorized use of her software code. She added a state unfair competition claim arising from the same code appropriation that allegedly diverted clients. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim because it shared the same operative facts as the federal claim.
Cody Callahan sued Valley Rural in federal court under a federal seed-labeling statute. He joined state-law nuisance claims against two neighboring farms whose cross-pollination damaged his crops from the same seeds. The district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because they formed part of the same constitutional case or controversy.
Claire Campbell and other physicians sued Arkansas to invalidate a long-dormant state rule criminalizing contraception counseling. No enforcement had occurred in decades and the health department had issued no recent guidance referencing the rule. The federal court dismissed the action for lack of a justiciable case or controversy.
Cade Carpenter and other tenants sued the Village of Belle Terre after receiving eviction notices under a local zoning ordinance limiting household composition. Several tenants vacated the property before the appeal reached the Supreme Court. The Court noted that the departure raised a serious question whether a live case or controversy still existed.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island’s north shore consisting of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one square mile. The village has restricted land use to one-family dwellings and excludes lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses. The ordinance defines “family” as one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. Up to two persons living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family. Appellees the Dickmans own a house in the village. In December 1971 they leased it for an 18-month term to Michael Truman. Bruce Boraas later became a co-lessee. Anne Parish then moved into the house along with three others. These six individuals are students at the nearby State University at Stony Brook, and none is related to the others by blood, adoption, or marriage. When the village served the Dickmans with an Order to Remedy Violations of the ordinance, the owners plus three tenants brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The District Court held the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the litigation the lease expired and was extended. Anne Parish moved out. Thereafter the other five students left, and the owners now hold the home out for sale or rent, including to student groups.
View caseCobalt Energy sued several defendants in federal court on diversity grounds. One plaintiff failed to meet the amount-in-controversy threshold. The Supreme Court held that supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367 still permitted the court to hear the claim because it formed part of the same case or controversy as the claims that satisfied the jurisdictional minimum.
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a class-action suit against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon. The plaintiffs invoked the District Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Each dealer's claim was for slightly less than the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocutory review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction over class members who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum. In a separate action, a 9-year-old girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She sought damages for unusually severe injuries she received when she sliced her finger on a tuna can. Her family joined in the suit seeking damages for emotional distress and medical expenses. The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist, finding that none of the plaintiffs met the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court's extension of supplemental jurisdiction to the class members who did not meet the amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the injured girl, but not her family members, had made allegations of damages in the requisite amount. It further held that section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. In a diversity case, original jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court.
View caseCanyon Construction challenged an NRC licensing rule in federal court after the agency denied its permit application. The court of appeals had ordered further agency proceedings under a new standard. The Supreme Court recognized that a live case or controversy existed between the company and the agency over whether the new rule must be applied to the existing license.
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively. In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record. NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977. The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
View caseIt prohibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinions on abstract or hypothetical questions. Courts may decide only live disputes between adverse parties who have suffered or face imminent concrete injury.
Supporting sources
Section 1367(a) authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy under Article III. Related state claims sharing a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim satisfy this constitutional threshold.
Supporting sources
A challenge is nonjusticiable when the statute has never been enforced and poses no realistic threat of enforcement. The dispute then remains hypothetical and federal courts will not issue advisory opinions on dormant laws.
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…failure, possible future pregnancy, and possible future unpreparedness for parenthood is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129. (c) The physician-appellant Hallford, who is under two pending prosecutions for violating the Texas abortion laws, has standing to challenge the facial validity of those…