change in the character of a neighborhood

In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company executed a deed that conveyed the surface of property but reserved in express terms the right to remove all the coal under the same. The grantee took the premises with the risk and waived all claim for damages that might arise from mining out the coal. The plaintiffs claim under this deed. On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature approved the Kohler Act. The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used as a human habitation. The statute provides exceptions for land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any other person. The plaintiffs brought a bill in equity to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house. The Court of Common Pleas found that if not restrained the defendant would cause the damage to prevent which the bill was brought. It denied an injunction, holding that the statute if applied to this case would be unconstitutional. On appeal the Supreme Court of the State agreed that the defendant had contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States. It held that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs. A writ of error was granted bringing the case to this Court. As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract. The case involves a single private house. The statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. The Attorney General of the State, the City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted their contentions here. The statute purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land. The question presented concerns mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.

The Blaisdells executed a mortgage on their property in Minneapolis to the Home Building & Loan Association on August 1, 1928. The mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement. After default, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the Association on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98. The period of redemption under the law then in effect was set to expire on May 2, 1933. On April 18, 1933, Minnesota enacted Chapter 339 of the Laws of 1933, known as the Mortgage Moratorium Law. The statute authorized district courts to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as the court deemed just and equitable, not beyond May 1, 1935, upon condition that the mortgagor pay a reasonable part of the income or rental value toward taxes, insurance, interest, and principal. The Blaisdells applied to the District Court of Hennepin County for an extension of the redemption period. The district court found that the reasonable rental value of the property was $40 per month and the present market value was $6000. It extended the redemption period to May 1, 1935, requiring the Blaisdells to pay $40 per month to the Association. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the order. The Home Building & Loan Association appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reviewed the judgment sustaining the statute as applied to the preexisting mortgage.

Joseph A. Richardson and Ida Richardson divorced in December 1997. They executed a separation agreement providing that Joseph would pay Ida maintenance of $2,425.00 per month, terminating upon Ida’s remarriage or the death of either party. The agreement stated that its terms would not be subject to modification or change, regardless of the relative circumstances of the parties. The trial court incorporated the agreement into the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution and stated that maintenance was non-modifiable. In 2004 Joseph filed a motion to modify the judgment. In Count II he alleged that Ida sought out persons to burglarize his home, sought out persons to murder him, and attempted to hire a person to murder him. He further alleged that these acts breached the separation agreement, violated public policy, committed criminal acts, and waived any claim to maintenance. The trial court dismissed Count II with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal order was certified as a final judgment and order under Rule 74.01(b). Joseph appealed the dismissal. The Eastern District Court of Appeals transferred the matter to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

When petitioner Linda Sidoti Palmore and respondent Anthony J. Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced in May 1980 in Florida, the mother was awarded custody of their 3-year-old daughter. In September 1981 the father sought custody of the child by filing a petition to modify the prior judgment because of changed conditions. The change was that the child’s mother was then cohabiting with a Negro, Clarence Palmore, Jr., whom she married two months later. Additionally, the father made several allegations of instances in which the mother had not properly cared for the child. After hearing testimony from both parties and considering a court counselor’s investigative report, the court noted that the father had made allegations about the child’s care, but the court made no findings with respect to these allegations. On the contrary, the court made a finding that there is no issue as to either party’s devotion to the child, adequacy of housing facilities, or respectability of the new spouse of either parent. The court then addressed the recommendations of the court counselor, who had made an earlier report in another case coming out of this circuit also involving the social consequences of an interracial marriage. From this vague reference to that earlier case, the court turned to the present case and noted the counselor’s recommendation for a change in custody because the wife has chosen for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable to the father and to society, and the child is or at school age will be subject to environmental pressures not of choice. The court then concluded that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding custody to the father. The court’s rationale focused on the mother bringing a man into her home and carrying on a sexual relationship without marriage, placing gratification of her own desires ahead of concern for the child’s future welfare, and the inevitable social stigmatization the child would suffer at school age due to the racially mixed household. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed without opinion, thus denying the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the case. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the state court.