Also known as: circles of foreseeable risk · zone of danger · foreseeability circle
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The scope of plaintiffs to whom a defendant owes a duty of care in negligence. A defendant is liable only for harm to persons situated within the range of reasonably foreseeable risk created by the defendant's conduct. Injury to a plaintiff outside that range does not give rise to liability even when the conduct is negligent and the harm occurs.
River Culinary's staff ignored repeated complaints about Frankie pacing and shouting near the restrooms. Earl entered solely to use the restroom and was attacked there by Frankie. Earl's position in the exact area of the known risk placed him inside the circle of foreseeable risk, so the policy limiting intervention to paying customers did not shield the restaurant from a duty to him.
Consolidated Rail's employees allowed a tank car to leak hazardous fumes near People Express's terminal building. The airline suffered economic losses when it had to evacuate and cancel flights. Because the terminal stood directly in the path of the foreseeable spread of fumes, the airline fell within the circle of foreseeable risk created by the leak.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
View caseA driver struck a child crossing the street while the child's mother stood on the curb a short distance away. The mother saw the impact and suffered severe emotional distress. Her presence at the scene placed her inside the circle of foreseeable risk, allowing recovery for the emotional harm caused by witnessing the injury.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseA defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff outside the circle even when the defendant failed to control a known risk-creating third party. The inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff's position aligned with the specific and localized risk the defendant should have addressed. When the plaintiff is not in that position, summary judgment for the defendant is proper.
Supporting sources
No. The circle is determined by the location and nature of the known risk rather than by customer status alone. When the plaintiff is injured in the precise area where prior complaints identified a danger, the plaintiff remains inside the circle even without having made a purchase.
Supporting sources
Yes. When regulations require safety briefings for everyone near a hazard and the plaintiff is an invited spectator in that area, the plaintiff falls inside the circle. The regulation's purpose of protecting persons in that location supplies the standard of conduct the defendant must meet.
Supporting sources
…trauma caused by the defendant's negligence only if the plaintiff were present at the scene of the accident and were in the zone of danger, is an artificial and unrealistically restrictive barrier. We shall explain that the availability of a cause of action for emotional trauma should turn on the defendant's breach of a duty…