comity doctrine

In the late 1970s, ISO, an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers that serves as the almost exclusive source of support services for CGL insurance in the United States, began revising its 1973 standard CGL policy form. The 1973 form provided occurrence-based coverage for sudden and accidental pollution and did not cap defense costs. Primary insurers including Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and CIGNA Corporation sought four changes: a shift to claims-made coverage with a retroactive date, elimination of pollution coverage, and a legal defense cost cap. After ISO proposed 1984 forms that omitted some of these changes, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest American reinsurer, to procure the modifications or derail the program. The Reinsurance Association of America agreed to boycott the 1984 forms unless the changes were added, and domestic and London reinsurers informed ISO they would withhold reinsurance until the forms were altered. ISO then withdrew the 1984 forms and adopted 1986 forms containing a retroactive date and pollution exclusion; it later withdrew support services for the 1973 form. Separate agreements among London reinsurers required primary insurers to switch to claims-made policies and excluded pollution coverage from reinsurance contracts covering North American risks. Nineteen states and many private plaintiffs filed 36 complaints alleging that these actions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of California. The District Court granted motions to dismiss in 1989, holding the conduct fell within McCarran-Ferguson immunity and applying international comity to the foreign defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed in 1991. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992.

Respondent University of Illinois Foundation is the owner by assignment of U.S. Patent No. 3,210,767, issued to Dwight E. Isbell on October 5, 1965, for Frequency Independent Unidirectional Antennas, with the application filed on May 3, 1960. The antennas covered are designed for transmission and reception of electromagnetic radio frequency signals used in many types of communications, including the broadcasting of radio and television signals. The patent has been much litigated since it was granted, primarily because it claims a high quality television antenna for color reception. Petitioner Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. manufactures antennas, and respondent JFD Electronics Corp. is a licensee of the Foundation. One of the first infringement suits brought by the Foundation was filed in the Southern District of Iowa against the Winegard Co., an antenna manufacturer. After trial to the court and inquiry under Graham v. John Deere Co., Chief Judge Stephenson held the patent invalid as obvious and entered judgment for the alleged infringer. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied the patentee's petition for certiorari. The Foundation has filed six infringement actions based on the Isbell patent. In March 1966, well before the ruling in the Winegard case, the Foundation filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois charging a Chicago customer of petitioner Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. with infringing the Isbell patent and U.S. Patent No. Re. 25,740, reissued March 9, 1965, to P. E. Mayes et al. Blonder-Tongue chose to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court to defend its customer and filed an answer and counterclaim asserting that the patents were invalid, that its antennas did not infringe if valid, and other claims including unfair competition, antitrust, and infringement by JFD models. Trial was to the court, and on June 27, 1968, Judge Hoffman held that the Foundation's patents were valid and infringed, dismissed the unfair competition and antitrust charges, and found claim 5 of the B-T patent obvious and invalid. Before discussing the Isbell patent, Judge Hoffman noted the prior invalidity holding in Winegard but stated the court was free to decide on the evidence before it and determined both patents valid and enforceable. Blonder-Tongue appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the findings that the Isbell patent was valid and infringed, affirmed dismissal of the unfair competition and antitrust counterclaims, affirmed the invalidity of claim 5 of the B-T patent, but reversed the finding that the Mayes patent was valid. Blonder-Tongue sought certiorari, assigning as a primary reason the conflict between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits as to the validity of the Isbell patent, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, subsequently requesting the parties to discuss whether the holding of Triplett v. Lowell should be adhered to and whether the Winegard determination binds the respondents.

Paul Gibbs was hired in the summer of 1960 by Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, to serve as mine superintendent for a new mine at Gray's Creek and to haul the coal produced there under a separate contract. This arrangement occurred amid ongoing rivalry between the United Mine Workers of America and the Southern Labor Union for representation of coal miners in the southern Appalachian fields. On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of UMW Local 5881 prevented the mine from opening through threats and violence, including beating an organizer for the rival union, after learning that jobs they believed had been promised to them were going to others. George Gilbert, the UMW field representative for the area, was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred and did not return until late on August 16. Upon his return he received instructions from international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread. No further violence took place at the mine site, a picket line was maintained for nine months, and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period. Gibbs lost his superintendent position and never performed the haulage contract. He claimed to have lost other trucking contracts and mine leases in nearby areas as a result of a concerted union plan against him. He filed suit against the international UMW only, not against Local 5881 or its members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Jurisdiction over the federal claim rested on alleged secondary boycotts under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Jurisdiction over the state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott was premised on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. At trial the district court refused to submit claims of pressure on mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs. The jury returned a verdict finding violations of both section 303 and state law and awarded $60,000 in damages under the employment contract, $14,500 under the haulage contract, and $100,000 in punitive damages. On post-trial motion the court set aside the haulage contract award for lack of proof of damages and sustained a remitted award on the state law claim alone. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In September 1989 Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, both citizens of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Richards, the divorced father of the children, and Kesler, his female companion, had committed acts of sexual and physical abuse against the daughters and sought monetary damages. Federal jurisdiction rested solely on the diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. One month earlier, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, had entered a judgment under state child-protection statutes that permanently terminated Richards' parental rights on account of the alleged abuse and permanently enjoined him from any contact with the children. On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. The court cited In re Burrus for the proposition that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the States and invoked the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. It also relied on the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to three questions concerning the existence and scope of any domestic relations exception and the propriety of Younger abstention in the case.

In 2004, twenty-two residents of Argentina filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft, a German public stock company headquartered in Stuttgart that manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany. The complaint alleged that Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina's 1976–1983 Dirty War to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, including plaintiffs or persons closely related to them. The complaint asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and California and Argentina law. Jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, another Daimler subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA serves as Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States, purchasing vehicles from Daimler in Germany and distributing them to independent dealerships throughout the nation, including California. MBUSA maintains a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. MBUSA's California sales accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler's worldwide sales. A General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and MBUSA established MBUSA as an independent contractor that buys and sells vehicles for its own account and has no authority to make binding obligations for Daimler. Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing jurisdictional discovery on the agency allegations, the District Court granted the motion in November 2005 and reaffirmed the dismissal in February 2007, concluding that Daimler's own contacts with California were too sporadic and that MBUSA's contacts could not be attributed to Daimler. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed in 2011, holding that MBUSA was Daimler's agent for jurisdictional purposes and that its California contacts supported the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler. Daimler petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied over the dissent of eight judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2013 to decide whether Daimler is amenable to suit in California for claims arising from events occurring entirely outside the United States and unrelated to any activity in California.