Also known as: de-facto segregation · de facto · factual segregation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A separation of persons by race that arises from private choices or socioeconomic factors rather than from intentional government policies. The absence of state action means the pattern receives no scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
Dolores Diaz and her family move into a neighborhood where most residents share her racial background because of longstanding private real-estate practices and income differences. The local school board draws attendance zones that track these existing residential lines. No court finds an equal-protection violation because the resulting school composition stems from private decisions rather than official racial assignments.
Dominic Drake's children attend a school whose student body is overwhelmingly one race after families exercise a district-wide choice plan. The plan contains no racial criteria and produces the imbalance solely through parental preferences tied to housing costs. Because the imbalance lacks proof of purposeful government design, the arrangement is treated as de facto segregation outside equal-protection reach.
Damian Decker lives in a district whose voluntary transfer policy allows students to move between schools but produces no meaningful racial mixing. The policy is facially neutral and responds only to existing residential patterns created by private housing markets. The resulting racial concentrations remain beyond judicial remediation under equal-protection doctrine.
In the late 1990s the Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a student assignment plan for its ten regular public high schools. Incoming ninth graders ranked preferences among schools. The district applied a series of tiebreakers when schools were oversubscribed. The second tiebreaker classified students as white or nonwhite. It selected students whose race would bring an integration-positive school within ten percentage points of the district-wide balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. The plan affected assignments at five oversubscribed schools in the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools filed suit in the Western District of Washington in July 2000 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a 1975 federal desegregation decree. The decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding of unitary status. The district adopted a voluntary assignment plan in 2001. The plan required all nonmagnet schools to maintain black enrollment between 15 and 50 percent. The plan grouped elementary schools into clusters. It assigned kindergartners and new students within clusters according to space and racial guidelines. It denied transfer requests that would push a school outside the guidelines. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students were black. When Crystal Meredith moved into the district in August 2002 she sought to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at Bloom Elementary one mile from their home. The district denied the intercluster transfer from Young Elementary because it would adversely affect desegregation compliance at Young which was then 46.8 percent black. Meredith filed suit in the Western District of Kentucky alleging an Equal Protection violation. The Seattle District Court granted summary judgment to the district in 2001. The Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the federal constitutional ruling in 2005. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was in all relevant respects narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases in 2006.
Deborah Dunn's children attend schools whose lower per-pupil spending traces to local property-tax bases that reflect private residential choices. The state financing system contains no racial classifications and was not adopted with discriminatory purpose. The funding gaps therefore constitute de facto segregation immune from equal-protection attack.
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
Denise Donovan's children attend a district whose enrollment rules exclude students lacking legal immigration status. The resulting racial imbalance arises from demographic patterns unrelated to any state intent to segregate by race. Courts therefore classify the imbalance as de facto segregation not remediable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since the late 19th century the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry is a crime and those who enter unlawfully are subject to deportation, yet a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering and now live within various States including Texas. In May 1975 the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold state funds from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States. The revision also authorized local districts to deny enrollment to such children under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031. In September 1977 a class action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County who could not establish legal admission. The suit challenged their exclusion from the Tyler Independent School District schools, and the State of Texas intervened as a defendant. After certifying a class of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin in the district, the court held an extensive hearing in December 1977. It found that the statute had neither the purpose nor effect of keeping illegal aliens out of Texas, that enrollment increases stemmed primarily from legal residents, and that barring undocumented children would save money but would not necessarily improve education quality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction. During 1978 and 1979 additional suits were filed in other Texas districts. The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated them in the Southern District of Texas. After a hearing the district court held the statute violated equal protection, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases.
Diane Dawson's children remain in a racially homogeneous school after parents exercise unfettered choice among several district options. The district maintains no assignment rules keyed to race and simply honors individual family decisions. The resulting separation is deemed de facto segregation outside the scope of equal-protection remedies.
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.
De facto segregation arises from private decisions or socioeconomic patterns without intentional government involvement. De jure segregation results from purposeful state action that classifies students by race. Only the latter triggers equal-protection scrutiny and judicial remedies.
No. Federal courts may not order adjustments to racial balance in schools absent a finding of intentional, officially maintained segregation. De facto patterns, however severe, fall outside judicial remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
…upheld today, authorizing the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, just as we have recognized should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed by legislators held to have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional…
…answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals." There was, of course, no room for application of any doctrine of de facto status to uphold prior acts of an officer not authorized de jure , for such would have defeated the plaintiff's very action. A decision for the plaintiff would inevitably have produced…
…R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an individual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life…
…and appellate courts quite needlessly, and for the indefinite future. Will appellate review for "unreasonableness" preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines ranges? Will it simply add another layer of unfettered judicial discretion to the sentencing…
…but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications”). The dissent elides this distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
No. Disproportionate impact is relevant but not controlling. The essential element remains a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action. Purpose or intent to segregate supplies the differentiating factor between de jure and de facto segregation.
Any such measures receive strict scrutiny. The interest in avoiding racial isolation may be compelling, yet the program must be narrowly tailored. Courts apply the same demanding review used for other racial classifications.
Yes. Without purposeful racial discrimination by government actors, the unequal distribution of benefits or burdens receives no judicial review under the equal protection clause. Private choices producing racial imbalance remain outside constitutional reach.