death by one's own hand

In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.

On March 2, 1998, Patrick Kennedy called 911 at 9:18 a.m. to report that his eight-year-old stepdaughter L.H. had been raped in the side yard by two neighborhood boys who fled on a blue bicycle. Police arrived between 9:20 and 9:30 a.m. and found L.H. on her bed wrapped in a bloody blanket. She was bleeding profusely from severe vaginal injuries that included a laceration separating her cervix from the vagina and a torn perineum requiring emergency surgery at Children's Hospital. Kennedy initially told investigators that L.H. had been dragged from the garage to the yard. Both L.H. and Kennedy maintained this account in early interviews, including a three-hour videotaped session with a psychologist days after the assault. Physical evidence soon contradicted the yard account. The grass showed little disturbance except for coagulated blood. A bicycle found nearby had flat tires and spider webs. Blood was discovered on the underside of L.H.'s mattress inside the home. Kennedy had also made telephone calls before 7:37 a.m. inquiring how to remove blood from carpet. He had called a cleaning service. He did not contact 911 until roughly 9:18 a.m. Eight days after the crime, Kennedy was arrested. About a month later L.H. was removed from her mother's custody. On June 22, 1998, she first told her mother that Kennedy had raped her. In December 1999 she recorded a videotaped accusation at the Child Advocacy Center. The State charged Kennedy with aggravated rape of a child under twelve under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 and sought the death penalty. The trial began in August 2003 when L.H. was thirteen. She testified that Kennedy had been on top of her, had given her orange juice with chopped pills afterward, and had instructed her to blame neighborhood boys. The jury convicted Kennedy of aggravated rape. After hearing testimony from another child about prior sexual abuse by Kennedy, the jury unanimously sentenced him to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in 2007. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2008.

In 1961 two appeals reached the Supreme Court from judgments of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors sustaining demurrers and dismissing actions brought by Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a Yale professor of obstetrics and gynecology who also served as medical director of the Planned Parenthood Center in New Haven, together with married patients Paul and Pauline Poe and Jane Doe. The complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32 and 54-196. The women had consulted Dr. Buxton, who advised that contraceptive methods were medically indicated because of prior pregnancies that had resulted in stillbirths or critical illness. The statutes prevented them from obtaining or following such advice. The complaints further alleged that the New Haven County State's Attorney had made public statements threatening to prosecute violators of the statutes. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held that the allegations failed to show any specific threat of prosecution against these plaintiffs. It also held that the plaintiffs had not committed or were about to commit acts subjecting them to liability. Therefore, the court dismissed the actions for lack of a justiciable controversy. The cases came to the United States Supreme Court on appeal. The Court noted probable jurisdiction. The challenged statutes had been on the books since 1879. In the more than eighty years since enactment, the only recorded prosecution was a 1940 test case against two doctors and a nurse at a birth-control clinic. That case ended when the State moved to dismiss the information after the state supreme court upheld the statutes. Contraceptives were commonly and openly sold in Connecticut drug stores. Yet no prosecutions for sale or use were recorded.

Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court of the District of Columbia sitting without a jury. The prosecution proceeded on a charge arising from an incident on July 13, 1951, in which Durham was found in a house. Durham's history included discharge from the Navy in 1945 at age seventeen following a psychiatric examination revealing a profound personality disorder rendering him unfit for service. In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act and was placed on probation for one to three years. In January 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He experienced multiple discharges and readmissions to St. Elizabeths between 1949 and 1951, including a conditional release in June 1950 that he violated, and a further lunacy finding in 1951. Following the July 1951 housebreaking, Durham was indicted in October 1951 and adjudged of unsound mind based on psychiatrists' affidavits diagnosing psychosis with psychopathic personality. He underwent subshock insulin therapy during a six-month commitment ending in February 1953, after which Dr. Silk certified him mentally competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel. At the ensuing trial, the prosecutor expressed a plan to allow Durham to raise an insanity defense on this charge. The court accepted waivers of jury trial and additional competency proceedings despite Durham's expressed desire for further hospitalization. Testimony included that of Durham's mother regarding his post-May 1951 behavior and a psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951 and opined on his mental condition around the time of the offense. The trial court found the defense of insanity not established under the prevailing standards. The appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.