Also known as: diminished responsibilities · diminished capacity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine in criminal law that permits evidence of a defendant's abnormal mental condition to show the absence of the specific mental state required for a charged offense or degree of offense. The doctrine applies even when the condition does not rise to the level of legal insanity and may reduce first-degree murder to second-degree murder or manslaughter when premeditation or deliberation cannot be proved.
Alexander, an elderly farmer, was charged with first-degree murder. At trial he introduced expert testimony that his dementia prevented formation of the premeditation required for first-degree murder. The jury convicted him only of second-degree murder.
Dominic Drake was charged with first-degree murder after shooting a neighbor. At trial he introduced expert testimony that his PTSD prevented formation of the premeditation required for first-degree murder. The jury convicted him only of second-degree murder.
In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car. This prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the officer. The officer died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands. The gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap. Clark was charged with first-degree murder under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1105(A)(3) for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty. In March 2001, Clark was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment. Two years later the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried. Clark waived his right to a jury, and the case was heard by the court. At trial, Clark did not contest that he shot the officer or that the officer died. He relied on his own undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident to deny that he had the specific intent to shoot an officer or knowledge that he was doing so. The prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a police officer. The prosecutor also offered testimony indicating that Clark had previously stated he wanted to shoot police and had lured the victim to the scene to kill him. In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness. He sought to introduce it for two purposes. First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity. This put the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the crime he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that he did not know the criminal act was wrong. Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea. Ruling that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea, the trial court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott. That decision refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent. It held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mens rea element of a crime. As to his insanity, Clark presented lay testimony describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting. This included testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with aliens trying to kill him and that bullets were the only way to stop them. A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about aliens when he killed the officer. The psychiatrist concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and was thus insane at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, the State’s psychiatrist gave his opinion that Clark’s paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct before and after the shooting. The judge then issued a first-degree murder verdict. The judge found that Clark had not established that his schizophrenia distorted his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong. Clark moved to vacate the judgment and life sentence. He argued that Arizona’s insanity test and its Mott rule each violate due process. The trial court denied the motion. Affirming, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the State’s insanity scheme was consistent with due process. The court read Mott as barring the trial court’s consideration of evidence of Clark’s mental illness and capacity directly on the element of mens rea. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied further review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseDorothy Daniels killed her husband during a manic episode caused by untreated bipolar disorder. Expert testimony established she could not premeditate the killing. The court instructed the jury on second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder.
Brandon Joseph Williams, an Army veteran, was convicted by a jury of murdering Veta Karla Conrad, known as Karla. The jury assessed punishment at sixty-seven years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. Williams timely appealed to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.). Karla and her daughter Sarah were living with Williams at the residence of his mother, Belinda Sue Williams, in Lake Jackson, Texas. Karla and Sarah shared Sue's bedroom while Sue slept on the living room couch and Williams had his own bedroom. On the night of the shooting, Williams, who had been using synthetic marijuana and methamphetamine, woke Sue and said he heard something outside. He told her to take Karla and Sarah into the bathroom, but Sue refused to avoid scaring them. Williams went through the kitchen and out the backdoor. Sue rose and saw him standing in the breezeway by the garage. He appeared startled, fell backwards, then raised and pointed his gun at her while advancing and yelling for her to get on the ground. Sue backed up, turned on a lamp, identified herself as his mother, and knelt on one knee. A single bullet from Williams's gun struck Karla, who had entered the room behind Sue. Sue tackled Williams, causing the gun to fly out of his hand, and held him down until police arrived after Sarah called 911. Approximately twelve hours after the shooting and after emergency medical treatment, Williams gave a recorded statement to investigators. In the statement he described seeing a figure, directing it to put its hands up and identify itself, and firing one round. He acknowledged shooting someone and described delusions and fighting with the devil. Williams tested positive for amphetamines and cannabis; the attending emergency room physician noted his heart rate, blood pressure, and respiratory rate were so elevated from the drugs that an abnormally high level of benzodiazepines was required. At trial Sue testified that she believed Williams had been suffering from PTSD or a flashback, though she had been unaware of his recent drug use in the house.
View caseDevon Drake, age seventeen, was charged with first-degree murder. At trial he introduced expert testimony that his severe cognitive deficits prevented formation of the premeditation required for first-degree murder. The jury convicted him only of second-degree murder.
Christopher Simmons was 17 years old and a junior in high school when he committed the murder of Shirley Crook in Missouri. Simmons planned the crime with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, discussing breaking into a home, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. On the night of the murder, Simmons and Benjamin entered Crook's home through an open window, bound her with duct tape, drove her to a state park, reinforced her bindings with electrical wire, wrapped her face in duct tape, and threw her from a railroad trestle into the Meramec River, where she drowned. Simmons was arrested the next day at his high school after bragging about the killing. Police read him his Miranda rights, and he waived his right to an attorney before confessing and agreeing to a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene. The State charged him with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder. Because Simmons was 17 at the time of the crime, he fell outside Missouri's juvenile court jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 211.021 and 211.031 and was tried as an adult. At trial the State introduced Simmons' confession, the videotaped reenactment, and testimony about his advance planning and later bragging. The defense called no guilt-phase witnesses. The jury convicted Simmons of first-degree murder. In the penalty phase the State presented victim-impact testimony from Crook's family and proved three aggravating factors. The defense presented testimony from Simmons' family and a juvenile justice officer about his lack of prior record and family relationships, and both sides addressed his age as a mitigating factor. The jury recommended death, and the trial judge imposed it. Simmons obtained new counsel and moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance because trial counsel had not presented evidence of his immaturity, impulsiveness, difficult home environment, substance abuse, and poor school performance. The trial court denied the motion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of postconviction relief. Federal habeas relief was also denied. After this Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Simmons filed a new state postconviction petition arguing that Atkins required the same categorical exemption for juvenile offenders. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, set aside the death sentence, and resentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseDarius Dixon was charged with assault with intent to kill. He offered psychiatric evidence that his schizophrenia prevented formation of the specific intent to kill. The jury returned a verdict on the lesser offense of simple assault.
On the evening of June 4, 1968, five white United States Marine Lieutenants in formal dress uniforms and a woman named Barbara Kelly entered a hamburger shop in Washington, D.C., around 2:40 a.m. after a night out. They ordered food at the take-out counter and noticed three Black men—appellants Alexander and Murdock and Cornelius Frazier—sitting at the other end of the counter. According to prosecution witnesses, a staring contest between Lieutenant Kramer and Alexander led to Alexander tapping Kramer on the shoulder, asking him to step outside, and making a threat. After a racial epithet from Lieutenant King, Alexander drew a .38 caliber revolver. Murdock then reentered and drew his own revolver, after which shots were fired, killing Lieutenants King and Lesnick and wounding Kramer and Kelly. Alexander, Murdock, and Frazier fled in Alexander's car, with Murdock firing additional shots from the window. They were stopped by police within a few blocks, and two revolvers were recovered from the car floorboard. Defense witnesses Frazier and Murdock testified that the Marines were drunk and aggressive, and Murdock claimed he fired in self-defense fearing for his life. At a joint jury trial in February 1969, both were convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon and four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; Murdock was also convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. Murdock's trial was bifurcated; after the guilt phase, a separate hearing on criminal responsibility was held in November 1969 before the same jury, which found him criminally responsible. Alexander received consecutive sentences totaling five to twenty-three years, and Murdock twenty years to life. Both appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard argument on December 21, 1970, and issued its decision on April 21, 1972.
View caseDiana Delgado, a juvenile, was charged with first-degree murder. At trial she introduced expert testimony that her borderline personality disorder prevented formation of the premeditation required for first-degree murder. The jury convicted her only of second-degree murder.
In November 1999, fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson and two other boys decided to rob a video store in Arkansas. En route, Jackson learned that one of the boys carried a sawed-off shotgun. Jackson initially stayed outside the store but later entered while the robbery was underway. When the clerk, Laurie Troup, refused to hand over money and threatened to call the police, one of Jackson's co-defendants shot and killed her. The three boys fled without taking any money. Arkansas prosecutors exercised their discretion to charge Jackson as an adult with capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. A jury convicted him of both offenses. The trial court imposed the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Jackson did not challenge the sentence on direct appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. In 2003, fourteen-year-old Evan Miller and a friend, Colby Smith, spent an evening drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana with Miller's neighbor, Cole Cannon, at Cannon's trailer in Alabama. After Cannon passed out, Miller stole his wallet. Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat. Smith struck Cannon with a baseball bat, and Miller then repeatedly hit Cannon with the bat. The boys set two fires in the trailer before leaving. Cannon died from his injuries and smoke inhalation. Miller had previously been in and out of foster care, regularly used drugs and alcohol, and had attempted suicide four times. Alabama law initially required that Miller be charged as a juvenile, but the district attorney sought and obtained removal of the case to adult court. A jury convicted Miller of murder in the course of arson. The trial court imposed the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Following this Court's decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, Jackson filed a state habeas petition arguing that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Miller's direct appeal was likewise unsuccessful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.
View caseDiminished responsibility allows evidence of mental impairment to negate a required specific mental state such as premeditation even when the defendant remains legally sane. Insanity provides a complete acquittal when the defendant lacked capacity to know right from wrong or to control conduct. The two doctrines therefore address different stages of the culpability inquiry.
The doctrine appears most often in homicide prosecutions where the defendant seeks to reduce first-degree murder to second-degree murder or manslaughter by showing inability to premeditate or deliberate.
Some jurisdictions limit or exclude capacity evidence while still permitting evidence that the defendant in fact lacked the required mental state. A total ban on mental-health evidence relevant to mens rea raises constitutional questions under due-process and compulsory-process principles.
No. The doctrine typically yields conviction of a lesser-included offense that lacks the specific intent negated by the mental condition rather than outright acquittal.
…charged. See Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13; Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 827, 834–835 (1977); cf. Powell v. Texas , 392 U.S. 514, 535–536 (1968) (plurality opinion) (the “doctrines of actus reus ,…