Disability Payments

Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He qualified for child’s insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his father died. In 1970 he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal Act, the statute required the Secretary to terminate his benefits. Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary’s action. The District Court held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment because all child’s insurance beneficiaries are not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who marry other social security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently. The court held this distinction irrational. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. Noting that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, this Court remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of that program. The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners. In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child’s benefit to include those who were under a disability which began before age 18. In 1958, Congress adopted an amendment providing that marriage would not terminate a child’s disability benefit if the child married a person who was also entitled to benefits under the Act.

The Department of Labor applied its “true doubt” rule in two separate benefits claims adjudications under the Black Lung Benefits Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Under that rule, when the evidence submitted by the claimant and the party opposing the award is of equal weight, the claimant prevails because the rule shifts the risk of nonpersuasion to the opponent. In the first case, Andrew Ondecko, who had worked as a coal miner for 31 years, applied for disability benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act after developing pneumoconiosis. The Administrative Law Judge found that Ondecko had the disease, was totally disabled by it, and that it resulted from his coal mine employment, relying on the true doubt rule for the first two findings and on a regulatory presumption for the third. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the award, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision. In the second case, Michael Santoro suffered a work-related back and neck injury while employed by Maher Terminals. He was soon diagnosed with nerve cancer and died shortly thereafter. His widow filed a claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act alleging that the injury caused his disability and death. The Administrative Law Judge found the evidence on both sides equally probative and awarded benefits under the true doubt rule, a decision the Benefits Review Board affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the validity of the true doubt rule under section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Stephen C. Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek married on November 15, 1970. Paula worked as a teacher both before and after the marriage, with maximum social security contributions deducted from her salary each year. Her earnings substantially exceeded Stephen's and constituted the couple's principal source of support, as shown by her 1970 earnings of $9,808 against his $3,100, her 1971 earnings of $10,686 against his $2,188, and her 1972 earnings of $6,836.35 before her death. On June 5, 1972, Paula died in childbirth, leaving Stephen with sole responsibility for their infant son, Jason Paul. Stephen applied at the Social Security office in New Brunswick, New Jersey, for survivors' benefits for himself and his son. His son received benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), initially at $206.90 per month until September 1972 and then at $248.30 per month. Stephen was told he was ineligible for benefits on his own behalf because such benefits were available only to women. Stephen filed suit in February 1973 in the District of New Jersey on behalf of himself and all similarly situated widowers, seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional to the extent it treated men and women differently, an injunction against denial of benefits on the basis of sex, and payment of past benefits from June 1972. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. A three-judge court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment in Stephen's favor, issuing an order providing the requested relief. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.

Isaac Boggs began working for South Central Bell in 1949 and remained employed until his retirement in 1985. He was married to Dorothy Boggs from 1949 until her death in 1979, and the couple had three sons. After Dorothy died, Isaac married Sandra Boggs in 1980, and they remained married until Isaac's death in 1989. Upon retirement, Isaac received a lump-sum distribution of $151,628.94 from the Bell System Savings Plan, which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account worth $180,778.05 at his death. He also received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership Plan and a monthly annuity of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retirement Program. Dorothy's will bequeathed one-third of her estate to Isaac outright along with a lifetime usufruct in the remaining two-thirds, with naked ownership passing to the sons. A 1980 Louisiana judgment of possession ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest in Isaac's Savings Plan account valued at $21,194.29. After Isaac's death, Sandra began receiving a survivor annuity and other benefits. The sons filed suit in Louisiana state court claiming a portion of the retirement benefits under Dorothy's will and Louisiana community property law. Sandra then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting that ERISA preempts the sons' claims. The District Court granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.