Also known as: estoppel · estoppels · estopped · estoppel doctrine
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
2 senses
An equitable principle that prevents a landowner from denying the existence of a servitude burdening the land. The principle applies when the owner permitted use of the land under circumstances making substantial change in position reasonably foreseeable and the user did in fact substantially change position in reasonable reliance on the permission.
An equitable principle that prevents a landowner from denying the existence of a servitude burdening the land. The principle applies when the owner permitted use of the land under circumstances making substantial change in position reasonably foreseeable and the user did in fact substantially change position in reasonable reliance on the permission.
Dominic Drake permitted his neighbor Darrell Duncan to construct a driveway across a corner of Drake's lot to reach a public road. Duncan spent substantial sums grading the land and installing paving. When Drake later attempted to revoke permission and block the driveway, a court recognized the servitude because Duncan's investment occurred in reasonable reliance on the permission.
A doctrine that bars relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact that has been determined by a valid and final judgment. The doctrine applies when a nonparty assumed control over prior litigation in which it held a direct financial interest.
Derek Douglas was acquitted of robbing one victim when identity was the sole contested issue at trial. The state then sought to prosecute Douglas for robbing a second victim during the same incident. The court dismissed the second prosecution because the prior acquittal had necessarily determined that Douglas was not the perpetrator.
A doctrine that bars relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact that has been determined by a valid and final judgment. The doctrine applies when a nonparty assumed control over prior litigation in which it held a direct financial interest.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Dominic Drake, a regional sales agent for Dakota Industries, assured a customer that the company would honor a special pricing arrangement. The customer reconfigured its facilities in reliance. Dakota Industries later refused the terms, but the court held the company bound because the agent's position inherently created the risk of such commitments to third parties.
Diana Delgado conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed to Dominic Drake even though she held no interest at the time. Delgado later inherited the parcel. The court held that title passed automatically to Drake because Delgado was estopped from denying she possessed the interest she had purported to convey.
Dominion Capital developed a shopping center and conveyed one outparcel to Derek Douglas under a deed referencing the coordinated retail plan shown on recorded plats. The developer later attempted to use an adjacent parcel inconsistently with the plan. The court enforced the servitude against the developer because the general plan and deed language created reciprocal obligations enforceable by estoppel.
A servitude arises when the owner permits use under circumstances making substantial change in position reasonably foreseeable and the user actually makes that change in reasonable reliance. The doctrine prevents injustice that would otherwise occur if the owner could later revoke permission after the user has invested substantially.
Estoppel by deed automatically passes after-acquired title to a grantee when a grantor later obtains an interest the grantor had purported to convey. Servitude by estoppel instead prevents denial of an easement or covenant when a user has substantially changed position in reliance on permitted use.
Dominion Capital financed and directed the defense strategy in a prior suit brought by one of its subsidiaries against a supplier. After the supplier lost on an issue of contract interpretation, it sued Dominion Capital directly. The court applied collateral estoppel because Dominion Capital had assumed practical control over the earlier litigation in which it held a direct financial interest.
Yes. When a nonparty assumes practical control over litigation in which it holds a direct financial interest, the determination of an issue actually and necessarily decided becomes conclusive in later suits involving that nonparty.
…rights to a federal forum "because state administrative agency determinations do not create res judicata or collateral estoppel effects. The exhaustion of state administrative remedies postpones rather than precludes the assertion of federal jurisdiction." Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in…