Also known as: nuisance doctrine · nuisance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A tort doctrine that imposes liability for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. The invasion must be intentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under negligence or strict liability rules to support recovery.
Devon Drake owns a waterfront home across a narrow inlet from a ship-repair yard operated by Dominion Capital. The yard performs open-air sandblasting and welding that sends metallic dust onto Drake's decks and produces loud noise that disrupts his sleep. Drake sues for private nuisance. The operations constitute a nontrespassory invasion of Drake's interest in using and enjoying his land, satisfying the doctrine's core requirement.
Denise Donovan purchased coastal acreage intending to build a home. A new state regulation prohibits all construction to protect dunes, leaving the parcel with no economically beneficial use. Donovan challenges the regulation as a taking. Because the prohibited use would have constituted a private nuisance under background principles existing when she acquired the land, the doctrine prevents the regulation from triggering compensation.
Deborah Dunn owns Grand Central Terminal. New York City's landmark law prevents substantial alterations that would destroy its historic character. Dunn claims the restrictions amount to a taking. The doctrine of nuisance supplies the background principle that limits the owner's right to use the property in ways that harm the surrounding community, supporting the regulation's validity.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseDarius Dixon and neighbors sue Atlantic Cement for dust, smoke, and vibration that interfere with their homes. The plant's operations are found to create a nuisance. The court awards permanent damages rather than an injunction, applying the doctrine to balance the substantial harm against the plant's utility and the community's interest in continued operation.
The defendant Atlantic Cement Company operates a large cement plant near Albany. Neighboring land owners brought actions for injunction and damages by alleging injury to property from dirt, smoke and vibration emanating from the plant. A nuisance has been found after trial, temporary damages have been allowed; but an injunction has been denied. The court at Special Term also found the amount of permanent damage attributable to each plaintiff. The total of permanent damages to all plaintiffs thus found was $185,000. Respondent’s investment in the plant is in excess of $45,000,000. There are over 300 people employed there. The total damage to plaintiffs’ properties is, however, relatively small in comparison with the value of defendant’s operation and with the consequences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek. The orders at Special Term and at the Appellate Division denied the injunction. The plant commenced production in 1962.
View caseDoris Duffy owns land zoned for industrial development. A village ordinance limits the property to residential use to prevent nuisance-like impacts on nearby homes. Duffy challenges the zoning as a taking. The doctrine of nuisance justifies the restriction because the prohibited industrial activities would unreasonably interfere with neighbors' use and enjoyment of their land.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseDeanna Davenport owns a home in an area targeted for redevelopment. The city condemns the property to transfer it to private developers for a new office complex. Davenport argues the taking lacks public purpose. The doctrine of nuisance informs the analysis by showing that certain property uses harming the community can be regulated or acquired without violating constitutional limits.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseThe plaintiff must show a nontrespassory invasion of the interest in private use and enjoyment of land that is either intentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under negligence or strict liability rules. Legal causation and substantial harm are also required.
Supporting sources
A regulation that eliminates all economically beneficial use of land requires compensation unless the prohibited use was already barred by background principles of nuisance or property law at the time of acquisition. The doctrine supplies the exception that prevents a total regulatory wipeout from constituting a taking.
Supporting sources
A court may award permanent damages rather than an injunction when the defendant's activity has substantial utility, the harm is not easily abated, and an injunction would cause disproportionate hardship or public detriment. The doctrine permits this balancing to avoid extortionate results.
Supporting sources