Also known as: duties of support · support obligation · obligation of support
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide financial support for a child, spouse, or former spouse. The obligation includes any unsatisfied duty and may be enforced through court orders in dissolution, separation, or interstate proceedings after considering relevant factors such as financial resources.
Deborah Dunn and her husband are divorcing in a proceeding under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The court determines that Deborah owes a duty of support to their minor child. After reviewing the child's financial resources and the custodial parent's income, the court orders Deborah to pay a reasonable monthly amount for the child's support without considering any marital misconduct.
Diana Delgado lives in one state and seeks enforcement of an existing support order against her former spouse who now resides elsewhere. The receiving tribunal applies the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act definition and recognizes the unsatisfied obligation to provide support for their child as a duty of support that remains enforceable across state lines.
Dorothy Daniels obtained a New York child support order when her child was young. After the obligor moves to North Carolina and the order is registered there, the North Carolina court applies New York law to determine that the duty of support continues until age twenty-one rather than the North Carolina age of eighteen.
Doris Duffy files a support action in California against her former husband who resides in New York. The court evaluates whether the nonresident has sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction in a proceeding to enforce the duty of support for their children.
Ezra Kulko married Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during a three-day stopover in California while en route from a military base in Texas to Korea. Both parties were New York domiciliaries who returned to New York after the marriage and Ezra's service. Their children Darwin and Ilsa were born in New York in 1961 and 1962. The family lived together in New York City until their separation in March 1972. Following the separation, Sharon moved to San Francisco, California. In September 1972, Sharon flew to New York to sign a separation agreement providing that the children would spend school years with their father and vacations with their mother in exchange for $3,000 annual child support payments during her custody periods. Sharon obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the agreement and returned to California, where she remarried. The children resided with their father during the school year until December 1973, when Ilsa remained in California after her father bought her a one-way ticket. In January 1976 Darwin flew to California using a ticket sent by his mother. Less than one month after Darwin's arrival, Sharon commenced an action in California Superior Court to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, modify it to award her full custody, and increase the father's child-support obligations. Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service on the ground that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court sustained the rulings in a 4-2 decision before Ezra appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
View caseDeanna Davenport owes substantial unpaid child support and seeks a marriage license. State law conditions issuance of the license on a judicial finding that she has made satisfactory progress toward satisfying the existing duty of support to her children from a prior relationship.
In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen. From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments. As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1). Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry. After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement. Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.
View caseDelilah Duran seeks modification of child support after her former spouse Sheldon has a child with a new partner. The court determines whether the additional support obligation qualifies Sheldon as a serial family payer when calculating the amount owed under the duty of support to Delilah's child.
Sharon Brown and Sheldon Brown married in 1984 and had one child, who is still a minor. They were divorced in 1987, and Sheldon was required to pay 17% of his gross income for child support pursuant to the general percentage standards in § HSS 80. Sheldon remarried and has three minor children from his second marriage. His second marriage is still intact. Sheldon brought a motion under sec. 767.32, Stats., to modify his child support due to the fact that he has minor children in his second family. He requested that the court utilize § HSS 80.04(1), the "serial family payer" provisions of the percentage standards in resetting his child support obligation for his first child. The family court commissioner determined that the "serial family payer" provisions did not apply and refused to modify the existing support order. Sheldon appealed to the circuit court, which ruled that the "serial family payer" provisions applied to Sheldon. It therefore reduced his child support obligation from 17% to 12.1%. Sharon appeals that order.
View caseIt is an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including any unsatisfied obligation. Courts may enforce it through orders requiring payment of reasonable amounts after considering financial resources and other factors.
Supporting sources
The law of the issuing jurisdiction controls the nature and duration of the child support obligation, including the age of emancipation. A support order registered in another state remains subject to the issuing state's rules on when the duty ends.
Supporting sources
…means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the absence of demonstrated harm, we hold…