Also known as: effective assistances · effective assistance of counsel
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional guarantee that a criminal defendant receives representation by counsel whose performance meets an objective standard of reasonableness. The guarantee is violated only when counsel's deficient conduct so undermines the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result.
Edith Eberhardt faced extortion charges arising from her negotiations with a local business. Her lawyer failed to request an instruction distinguishing lawful hard bargaining from criminal extortion. The jury convicted her after receiving no guidance on that central distinction. The omission left the adversarial testing incomplete and undermined confidence in the verdict.
Eugene Ellsworth told his lawyer he intended to testify falsely at trial. The lawyer refused to present the testimony, urged Ellsworth to tell the truth, and warned that he would disclose the perjury if necessary. Ellsworth was convicted on other evidence. The lawyer's actions preserved the integrity of the proceeding and did not violate the right to effective assistance.
Elijah Edwards was charged with diverting hospital medication. His appointed lawyer spent almost no time reviewing electronic tracking data before waiving a suppression hearing and advising a bench trial. Edwards was convicted. The lawyer's near-total failure to investigate key evidence left the prosecution's case untested and undermined the reliability of the outcome.
In 2001 Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee was engaging in suspicious activity involving repeated short trips in a blue sedan. Officers set up surveillance in the parking lot, observed the described sequence of events, detained the employee upon his return, and discovered four clear plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine. The officers then arrested the two men in the car, one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz. The officers placed all three suspects in a police cruiser. During the short drive to the police station the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats. The officers submitted the seized substances to the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which was required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request. Analysts at the laboratory performed the tests on November 28, 2001, and prepared three certificates of analysis that reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance was found to contain cocaine. Each certificate was sworn before a notary public by the analysts, as required under Massachusetts law, and reprinted the statutory provision making the certificates prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic analyzed. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. At trial the prosecution introduced the bags seized from the codefendant and from the cruiser along with the three certificates. Petitioner objected to admission of the certificates, asserting that Crawford v. Washington required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates pursuant to the state statute. The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, relying on a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court that had held forensic analysts are not subject to confrontation. The Supreme Judicial Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseErika Echevarria was charged with sabotaging plant equipment. Her public defender advised rejecting a favorable plea offer without explaining the sentencing exposure she faced at trial. She was convicted and received a lengthy sentence. The failure to communicate essential information about the plea deprived her of meaningful assistance at a critical stage.
In 1984, Teofilo Medina, Jr., stole a gun from a pawnshop in Santa Ana, California. Over the following weeks, he committed multiple armed robberies of gas stations, a drive-in dairy, and a market, during which he murdered three employees and shot at two passersby. He was apprehended less than a month after the crime spree began and charged with three counts of first-degree murder and other offenses. Before trial, Medina's counsel moved for a competency hearing under California Penal Code section 1368, expressing uncertainty about Medina's ability to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted the motion, and a six-day hearing was held before a jury. During the hearing, the jury heard conflicting testimony from multiple psychiatrists and psychologists regarding Medina's mental condition, including diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and depression, as well as observations of his verbal and physical outbursts, such as overturning the counsel table. The trial court instructed the jury that Medina was presumed mentally competent and bore the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence under California Penal Code section 1369(f). The jury found Medina competent to stand trial. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, petitioner was found guilty of all three counts of first-degree murder and lesser offenses. A sanity hearing was held, and the jury found that petitioner was sane at the time of the offenses. At the penalty phase, the jury found that the murders were premeditated and deliberate and returned a verdict of death. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Medina later filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which appointed a referee for an evidentiary hearing; the referee found Medina had been competent, and the court adopted those findings. Medina then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which was denied, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the state statute allocating the burden of proof on competency to the defendant.
View caseEnzo Eastwood was prosecuted for smuggling after customs officers found contraband in shipping containers. His lawyer made no effort to obtain manifests listing other crew members with access and declined to cross-examine the officers. Eastwood was convicted on untested evidence of control. The total inaction left the prosecution's case free from meaningful adversarial challenge.
On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Georgia, returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery. The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault. According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American. With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that neither Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The issue was certified for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts on the issue.
View caseEdgar Evers, an indigent defendant, was forced to proceed without counsel at arraignment and trial on felony charges. He was convicted after a proceeding in which no defense was presented. The complete absence of representation at every critical stage violated the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance.
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
View caseA defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance created a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Courts presume counsel acted competently and ask whether the errors so undermined the adversarial process that the result cannot be relied upon as just.
Supporting sources
Yes. Because plea bargaining is a critical stage, counsel must communicate plea offers and provide reasonable advice about sentencing exposure. Failure to do so can constitute deficient performance if the defendant shows he would have accepted the offer and the court would have imposed it.
Supporting sources
Counsel may refuse when the testimony would be perjurious. The lawyer must first attempt to dissuade the client, consider withdrawal, and, if necessary, disclose the perjury to the court as a reasonable remedial measure.
Supporting sources
No. Even serious errors satisfy only the deficiency prong. The defendant must also prove prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different or that confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Supporting sources