A cause that produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Liability attaches only when this cause is both the factual and legal origin of the harm.
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Cases
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6
Parental Negligence and Child's Accident
Erika Echevarria left her loaded handgun on a low table where her twelve-year-old son could reach it. The boy took the gun to school and accidentally shot a classmate. Erika's failure to secure the weapon operated as the efficient cause of the injury because her negligent supervision directly enabled the shooting without any superseding event.
Drug Warning and Patient Harm
Edgar Evers received Phenergan by the IV-push method after his physician reviewed the existing label. The drug caused gangrene that required amputation. The manufacturer's omission of an adequate warning on that method functioned as the efficient cause because the injury would not have occurred if the label had contained the missing risk information.
Diana Levine, a professional musician, was treated for a migraine headache at a Vermont clinic on April 7, 2000. She received an intramuscular injection of Demerol and Phenergan that provided no relief, so she returned later that day and received a second injection of both drugs administered by the IV-push method. The injection entered an artery, either because the needle penetrated an artery directly or because of perivascular extravasation, and Levine developed gangrene that required amputation of her right hand and then her entire forearm.
Levine settled claims against the health center and clinician before bringing a product liability action against Wyeth in Vermont state court. She alleged that Phenergan's labeling was defective because it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method of intravenous administration instead of the higher-risk IV-push method. After a five-day jury trial, the jury found Wyeth negligent and that Phenergan was a defective product as a result of inadequate warnings and instructions, awarding total damages of $7,400,000 that the court reduced to account for the prior settlement.
Wyeth manufactures Phenergan, an antihistamine used to treat nausea that the FDA first approved in 1955. The injectable form can be administered intramuscularly or intravenously, either by the IV-push method of injecting the drug directly into a vein or by the IV-drip method of introducing it into a saline solution in a hanging intravenous bag. The drug is corrosive and causes irreversible gangrene if it enters a patient's artery.
The FDA-approved labeling warned of the danger of gangrene and amputation following inadvertent intra-arterial injection but did not contain a specific warning about the risks of IV-push administration. The trial record contained correspondence between Wyeth and the FDA about Phenergan's label spanning from the 1955 approval through a 1981 supplemental application that the FDA finally approved in 1998. In 1987 the FDA suggested different warnings about the risk of arterial exposure, and Wyeth submitted revised labeling in 1988, but the FDA did not respond and in 1996 instructed Wyeth to retain the verbiage in the current label regarding intra-arterial injection. The record also showed at least twenty incidents prior to Levine's injury in which a Phenergan injection resulted in gangrene and amputation.
The trial court denied Wyeth's motion for summary judgment asserting federal preemption. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide whether the FDA's approvals of Wyeth's drug label precluded Levine from bringing her claim.
Emmett Egan's derailed train released toxic chemicals near People Express Airlines' terminal. The spill forced a three-day shutdown that produced substantial lost profits. The derailment and resulting evacuation served as the efficient cause of the economic harm because the airline's losses flowed directly from the spill without independent intervening factors.
People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.(1985) 100 N.J. 246 [495 A.2d 107]
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited.
The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred.
The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred.
According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined.
Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
Elena Estrada carried a package containing fireworks onto a crowded train platform. Railroad employees negligently dislodged the package, causing an explosion that knocked over scales at the far end of the platform and injured Emma Erickson. The employees' mishandling of the package constituted the efficient cause of Erickson's injuries because the chain of events remained unbroken from the initial negligence.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
Helen Palsgraf purchased a ticket from the Long Island Railroad Company and stood on the platform of its station awaiting a train bound for Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the station, though it was destined for a different location. Two men hurried to board the moving train. One man successfully reached the platform of the car.
The second man, who carried a package approximately fifteen inches long wrapped in newspaper, jumped aboard but appeared unsteady and at risk of falling. A guard on the car held the door open and reached forward to assist the second man, while another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. During this assistance, the package was dislodged and fell onto the railroad tracks.
The package contained fireworks, although its appearance gave no indication of these contents. When the package fell, the fireworks exploded, and the resulting shock caused scales located at the opposite end of the platform to topple over. The falling scales struck Helen Palsgraf, resulting in her injuries.
She subsequently initiated a lawsuit against the Long Island Railroad Company seeking damages for those injuries. The case proceeded to trial, where a judgment was entered in her favor. The Appellate Division affirmed that judgment, after which the matter came before the Court of Appeals for review.
Elliot Edmonds sold refurbished printer cartridges bearing counterfeit Lexmark labels. Static Control Components lost sales when customers bought the mislabeled products. Edmonds's false labeling operated as the efficient cause of the lost sales because the deception directly diverted customers who would otherwise have purchased from Static Control.
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014)
Lexmark International, Inc. manufactures and sells laser printers along with the toner cartridges designed exclusively for those printers.
It introduced a Prebate program that offered customers a 20-percent discount on new cartridges if they agreed to return the empty cartridges to Lexmark once used. The program terms were communicated to consumers through notices printed on the toner-cartridge boxes.
Static Control Components, Inc. manufactures and sells components necessary for remanufacturers to refurbish used Lexmark toner cartridges. Static Control developed a microchip that could mimic the microchip in Lexmark Prebate cartridges, enabling remanufacturers to refurbish and resell those cartridges after replacing the original chip.
In 2002 Lexmark sued Static Control alleging violations of the Copyright Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Static Control counterclaimed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that Lexmark misled end-users into believing they are legally bound by the Prebate terms. Static Control further alleged that Lexmark sent letters to remanufacturers falsely advising that it was illegal to sell refurbished Prebate cartridges and to use Static Control products.
Static Control alleged that these statements caused it lost sales and damage to its business reputation. The district court granted Lexmark’s motion to dismiss the Lanham Act counterclaim on prudential standing grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed after applying the reasonable-interest test. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the appropriate analytical framework.
Eclipse Manufacturing failed to pay federal taxes, resulting in a lien on its equipment. Darue Engineering purchased the equipment at a tax sale without notice of the lien. The IRS's lien constituted the efficient cause of the title dispute because the government's interest arose directly from the unpaid taxes and remained attached through the sale.
Grable & Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005)
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized real property in Michigan belonging to Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy the company's federal tax delinquency.
The IRS provided notice of the seizure to Grable by certified mail, which Grable received before selling the property to Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Grable did not redeem the property within the 180-day statutory period following the sale. After that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed.
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in Michigan state court against Darue. Grable claimed that Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of the property in the exact manner required by federal statute. Grable asserted that the statute required personal service rather than service by certified mail.
Darue removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court declined to remand after finding that the claim posed a significant question of federal law and granted summary judgment to Darue. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question alone.
How does efficient cause differ from cause in fact?
Efficient cause requires both factual causation and legal proximity. Cause in fact asks whether the harm would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. Efficient cause further demands that the conduct be a substantial factor in a continuous sequence that produces the result without superseding events.
When does an intervening act break the chain of efficient causation?
An intervening act breaks the chain only when it is unforeseeable and independent of the original conduct. If the later event is a normal response to the initial negligence or is itself caused by that negligence, the original conduct remains the efficient cause of the harm.
326 U.S. at 101, 110–11
…corporation, in the federal court for the southern district of that State. The issues were whether negligence of defendant was a proximate cause of his injuries and whether negligence of plaintiff contributed. He claimed that, by hauling the car with the open door, defendant violated a duty to him. The defendant insisted that it…