Also known as: electronic surveillances · electronically surveil · electronically surveilled · electronically surveilling · e-surveillance · electronic eavesdropping
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
Government monitoring of private communications or activities by means of electronic devices that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Ethan Evans rented a hotel suite and instructed staff not to enter while he conducted private calls. Officers arranged with the manager to install a concealed microphone in a vent without a warrant. The device captured conversations Ethan had taken steps to keep private. The recordings are subject to suppression because the surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Emanuel Escobar regularly used a shared office conference room for confidential strategy talks and closed the door each time. Police installed a listening device without a warrant and later charged Escobar based on the recordings. Escobar took no steps to shield the conversations from third parties who also used the room. He therefore cannot move to suppress the evidence obtained from the surveillance.
Elijah Edwards, a federal agent, authorized placement of a hidden recorder in a suspected conspirator's vehicle after consulting superiors. The target later sued claiming the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Edwards had not violated clearly established law at the time of the installation. Qualified immunity therefore shields him from personal liability.
Enzo Eastwood agreed with two others to intercept calls from a rival business using an illegal wiretap device. The group completed the installation and began monitoring. Eastwood claims he did not know the surveillance itself was unlawful. His conviction for conspiracy stands because the agreement to commit the surveillance supplies the required mens rea.
Elise Everly was present in a tavern when officers executed a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance of the premises. The warrant named only the owner and did not describe Everly. Officers recorded her conversations anyway. The recordings of Everly cannot be used against her because the warrant lacked particularity as to her.
Emily Ellis noticed a hidden camera while speaking on a phone she believed was private and immediately fled the location. Officers had not yet physically restrained her. The electronic surveillance alone did not constitute a seizure. Her subsequent statements therefore need not be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Electronic surveillance requires a warrant when it intrudes on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. The test examines both the individual's subjective steps to keep information private and whether society recognizes that expectation as objectively reasonable. Conversations knowingly exposed to third parties receive no protection.
Supporting sources
…concurring opinion of my Brother White, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels "national security" matters. Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they…
…States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable") (emphasis added). [^maj-19]: Gravel v. United States , 408 U. S. 606 (1972), points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume that some aides are assigned to act as…
…(1969), where the Court held that an individual's property interest in his own home was so great as to allow him to object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversations. On the other hand, even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to…
…U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979) (exclusion not required of evidence tainted by violation of an executive department's rules concerning electronic eavesdropping). A similar balancing approach is employed in our decisions limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy for Fifth Amendment violations, Oregon v. Hass , 420 U. S. 714 (1975); Harris…
…that Feola had fronted cocaine to Bo through McGuire and that when Bo failed to pay, Feola put pressure on McGuire. Meanwhile, electronic surveillance
Standing turns on whether the challenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the monitored conversations rather than on property ownership. A person who regularly uses a space and takes affirmative steps to preserve privacy may have standing even without title. Mere presence or a casual connection is insufficient.
Supporting sources
Qualified immunity protects officers unless they violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law at the time of the surveillance. The inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable officer would have understood that the particular electronic intrusion required a warrant. Novel factual settings may still support immunity.
Supporting sources
A locked or restricted room, consistent efforts to close doors and lower voices, and the absence of monitoring notices or open access all support a reasonable expectation. Shared spaces with frequent third-party entry and thin walls that allow sound to escape defeat the claim. The key is whether the individual took meaningful steps to exclude others.
Supporting sources