Also known as: reversionary estate · estate in reversionary interest · reversion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A future interest in land that remains in the grantor after conveying a lesser estate such as a life estate or term of years. It arises by operation of law when the grantor does not dispose of the entire interest originally held.
Erika Echevarria leased her warehouse to Empire Logistics under a deed that included an affirmative covenant to maintain the loading docks. Empire performed the repairs itself rather than requiring Erika to act from her retained future interest. The covenant burden ran with the leasehold because performance was more reasonable for the possessor than for the holder of the future interest.
Emerald Enterprises merged into Eclipse Manufacturing. All contracts and real property interests held by Emerald passed directly to Eclipse. No future interest remained with Emerald because the merger statute transferred every asset without creating any retained estate in the disappearing entity.
Eduardo Enriquez held an estate in fee tail in a family farm. Upon his death the land passed to his specified issue under the deed. The future interest that would have returned to the original grantor never arose because the limitation directed the property to the lineal descendants instead.
Enzo Eastwood's LLC merged with another entity. The surviving company received title to all real estate owned by the disappearing LLC. No estate in reversion was preserved for the merged entity because the uniform act vested every property interest directly in the survivor.
Eileen Epstein created a fee tail limited to a single lifetime. At the tenant's death the land passed to the designated issue in fee simple. The reversion that would otherwise have returned to Eileen never took effect because the gift form directed the property to the specified heirs.
Emma Erickson received a legislative grant of coastal acreage. When a later statute attempted to reclaim the land, the court examined whether any future interest had been retained by the state. The original conveyance had transferred the entire estate, leaving no reversionary interest that could support the reclamation claim.
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state. The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act. The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill. The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made. The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia. In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant. After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration. The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned. The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.
View caseAn estate in reversion remains in the grantor by operation of law when the grantor conveys a lesser estate without disposing of the entire interest. A remainder is a future interest created in a third party that follows the prior estate. The distinction matters because only a reversion arises automatically in the transferor.
No. Modern statutes abolish the doctrine as both a rule of law and a rule of construction. Language such as remainder to my heirs at law or next of kin does not presumptively retain a future interest in the transferor. The remainder interest passes to the designated class instead.
Supporting sources
A power of termination arises when a grantor conveys a fee simple subject to condition subsequent and expressly reserves the right to reenter upon breach. An estate in reversion arises automatically when the grantor conveys a life estate or term of years without further disposition. The two future interests are created by different deed language and carry different transferability rules.
Supporting sources
…in Berman extended beyond that to encompass the purpose of developing that area to create conditions that would prevent a reversion to blight in the future. See 348 U. S., at 34-35 ("It was not enough, [the experts] believed, to remove existing buildings that were insanitary or unsightly. It was important to redesign…