Also known as: evict · evicts · evicted · evicting · evictions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property. Actual eviction involves physical expulsion. Constructive eviction occurs when a landlord renders premises unfit for the contemplated use, compelling the tenant to leave.
Elena Estrada leased warehouse space from Emerald Enterprises and took possession. A third party then obtained a court judgment establishing superior title and physically removed Elena from the premises. Elena may recover damages or terminate the lease because the eviction deprived her of the use the parties contemplated.
Evelyn Ellison leased an entire floor of an office building from Eclipse Manufacturing. City inspectors condemned and closed off one wing due to structural defects traceable to the landlord. Evelyn may continue the lease for the un-evicted portion while obtaining rent abatement and damages for the lost space.
Elliot Edmonds faced an eviction action for nonpayment after his landlord failed to repair code violations. State law prevented him from raising the landlord's breach of the habitability duty as a defense. The court proceeded with eviction without considering the condition of the premises.
In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation. The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item. After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent. On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately. On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge district court was convened. It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding. The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date. A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseEthan Evans owned a mobile home in a park owned by Enigma Technologies. The park owner sought to terminate the tenancy to change the land use. State law restricted the permissible grounds for termination and required specific procedures before any eviction could occur.
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California. In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses. A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction. The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases. The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
View caseEdith Eberhardt faced eviction from her apartment after complaining about building conditions. She alleged the landlord's action was racially motivated and sought to enjoin the proceeding under state civil rights statutes. The court examined whether the eviction violated those protections.
In 1963, the Mulkeys filed an action in California superior court against Reitman and other property owners under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. They alleged that the owners had refused to rent them an apartment solely because of their race and sought an injunction and damages. After the filing of the complaint, California voters approved Proposition 14 in the November 1964 statewide election, which added section 26 to Article I of the California Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the new provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid. The trial court granted the motion, and the Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court. In December 1964, the Prendergasts filed a separate suit in superior court against Snyder to enjoin their eviction from an apartment. They alleged that the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice and would violate sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Snyder filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to terminate the month-to-month tenancy even if his action was based on racial considerations. The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice after concluding that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing the validity of Proposition 14. Snyder appealed to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court heard the two cases together. In the Mulkey appeal it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In the Prendergast appeal it affirmed the dismissal of the cross-complaint. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments because the cases presented an important issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the adoption of Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes addressing racial discrimination in housing. The Unruh Act of 1959 prohibited certain discriminations in business establishments. The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 prohibited racial discriminations in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing more than four units and was enforceable by the State Fair Employment Practice Commission. Proposition 14 provided that neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses. The two cases arose after the passage of Proposition 14 and presented challenges to its effect on prior antidiscrimination legislation and on claims of racial discrimination in housing.
View caseEwan Eckhart stopped paying rent after his landlord ignored repeated housing code violations that made the apartment uninhabitable. When the landlord brought an eviction action for nonpayment, Ewan offered evidence of the violations. The court allowed the defense and denied eviction.
Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.
View caseThe tenant may terminate the lease and recover damages or, if the eviction affects only part of the premises, continue the lease for the remainder and obtain rent abatement plus damages.
In some jurisdictions the defense is allowed and may defeat the eviction. In others statutes bar the defense and force the tenant to pursue separate claims.
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Yes. A policy requiring firearms to remain unloaded and locked at all times, enforced by threat of eviction, operates as a ban on functional handguns in the home and cannot stand.
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A lawyer may withdraw when the client insists on action the lawyer finds repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement, even if the underlying eviction is lawful.
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…the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions ruled proof of such violations inadmissible when proffered as a defense to an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld this ruling. Saunders v. First National Realty Corp. , 245 A.2d 836 (1968). Because of the importance of…