Ex parte Young

In 1971 respondent John Jordan filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against petitioner Joel Edelman, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, and other state officials. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and challenged the administration of the federal-state Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled program. It alleged that applications were not processed within federal time limits and that benefits were authorized only from the month of approval rather than including prior eligibility months. Federal regulations required eligibility determinations within 30 days for aged and blind applicants and 45 or 60 days for disabled applicants, with assistance checks required to be received within those periods. Illinois officials operated under state regulations in the Categorical Assistance Manual that set a 30-day standard for aged and blind applicants but authorized grants only from the month of approval. Jordan alleged that his own application for disability benefits was not acted on for almost four months. The District Court later found that Illinois averaged 90 days for AABD applications and 60 days for AFDC applications. In its March 15, 1972 judgment the District Court declared the inconsistent Illinois provisions invalid. It issued a permanent injunction requiring compliance with federal time limits. The court also ordered the state officials to release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants who applied between July 1, 1968 and April 16, 1971 and were determined eligible, with specific provisions for mailing checks or certified letters to current and former recipients. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of violation and the injunction but modified the retroactive award to cover only benefits wrongfully withheld after the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1973. The plaintiff class consisted of Illinois residents who applied for AABD benefits and whose applications were not processed within the federal time standards. The complaint specifically requested a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to the entire class all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld.

In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes. Class III gaming includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries. Such gaming is lawful only when conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State. The Act imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of such a compact. It authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty. The Seminole Tribe of Florida requested that the State of Florida enter into negotiations for a compact governing class III gaming on the Tribe's lands. When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe filed suit in September 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the State and its Governor, Lawton Chiles. The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. It alleged that respondents had refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation contained in § 2710(d)(3). The State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against the State and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did not permit a suit against the Governor to enforce the statutory duty. The Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and whether the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits against a State's Governor for such relief.

Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role. Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels. Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.

In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.