Also known as:excessive fine clause · Eighth Amendment excessive fines · excessive fines
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A provision of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution that bars the government from imposing monetary penalties grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Disproportionate Fraud Fine
Erika Echevarria, a low-level bank teller, was convicted of a small fraud causing modest losses. The court imposed a fine exceeding ten times her annual income under a statute that also mandated indefinite confinement for nonpayment. The fine's size relative to the offense and her circumstances triggered review under the Excessive Fines Clause.
Punitive Damages Award
Ewan Eckhart was held liable in a civil suit for misleading statements about a product. The jury awarded punitive damages many times larger than the compensatory award and the defendant's actual gain. The size of the award raised an issue whether it functioned as an excessive fine subject to constitutional limits.
Jesse Williams, a heavy smoker of Marlboro cigarettes, died from smoking-related causes. His widow, representing his estate as respondent, brought a state-court action for negligence and deceit against Philip Morris, the manufacturer.
The jury found that Williams's death was caused by smoking, that he smoked in significant part because Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe it was safe, and that Philip Morris was negligent and had engaged in deceit. It awarded approximately $821,000 in compensatory damages, consisting of about $21,000 economic and $800,000 noneconomic, together with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge found the punitive award excessive and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Philip Morris's arguments and restored the original $79.5 million jury award. After the Supreme Court remanded in light of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Oregon Court of Appeals adhered to its original views, and the Oregon Supreme Court granted review.
In closing argument the plaintiff's attorney told the jury to consider how many other Oregon smokers Philip Morris's conduct had harmed. The argument referenced ten deaths per hundred smokers and Philip Morris's one-third market share. Philip Morris requested an instruction stating that the jury could consider harm to others in determining the reasonable relationship between the award and harm to Williams. The request added that the jury could not punish the defendant for the impact of its misconduct on nonparties who might bring their own lawsuits. The trial court rejected the proposed instruction and instead told the jury that punitive damages punish and deter misconduct and are not intended to compensate anyone.
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected Philip Morris's claims that the Constitution prohibits punishing a defendant for harm to nonparties and that the roughly 100-to-1 ratio made the award grossly excessive. Philip Morris petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted limited to the questions of punishment for nonparty harm and the required relationship to the plaintiff's harm.
Emmett Egan was convicted under RICO for operating an obscenity enterprise. The court ordered forfeiture of his entire business empire valued at millions. The forfeiture's breadth prompted examination of whether the penalty was excessive in relation to the underlying offenses.
Alexander v. United States509 U.S. 444 (1993)
Ferris J. Alexander, Sr., had been in the adult entertainment business for more than thirty years. He sold pornographic magazines and sexual paraphernalia, showed sexually explicit movies, and sold and rented videotapes of a similar nature. He received shipments of these materials at a warehouse in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where they were wrapped in plastic, priced, and boxed. He then sold his products through some thirteen retail stores in several different Minnesota cities, generating millions of dollars in annual revenues.
In 1989, federal authorities filed a forty-one count indictment against Alexander and others. The indictment alleged operation of a racketeering enterprise in violation of RICO. It charged thirty-four obscenity counts and three RICO counts, with the racketeering counts being predicated on the obscenity charges. The indictment also charged numerous counts of tax evasion and related offenses.
Following a four-month jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Alexander was convicted of seventeen substantive obscenity offenses. These included twelve counts of transporting obscene material in interstate commerce and five counts of engaging in the business of selling obscene material. He was also convicted of three RICO offenses predicated on the obscenity convictions. The jury determined that four magazines and three videotapes were obscene under the Miller standards.
Alexander was sentenced to a total of six years in prison and fined one hundred thousand dollars. In addition, the District Court reconvened the same jury and conducted a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963. The Government sought forfeiture of the businesses and real estate representing Alexander's interest in the racketeering enterprise, property affording him influence over that enterprise, and assets and proceeds obtained from his racketeering offenses. The jury found that Alexander had an interest in ten pieces of commercial real estate and thirty-one current or former businesses. The District Court ordered him to forfeit his wholesale and retail businesses, all the assets of those businesses including more than thirteen thousand items of inventory, and almost nine million dollars in moneys acquired through racketeering activity.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Alexander's convictions and the forfeiture order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the forfeiture order violated the First or Eighth Amendments.
Esme Ellington was convicted by a nonunanimous jury and fined a substantial sum for a regulatory violation. The conviction's procedural flaw intersected with the fine's magnitude, requiring assessment of whether the monetary sanction itself violated excessiveness standards.
Ramos v. Louisiana140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)
Evangelisto Ramos was charged with a serious criminal offense and tried in a Louisiana state court. At trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty by a vote of ten to two. Under Louisiana law at the time, non-unanimous verdicts were permitted in criminal cases, and only Louisiana and Oregon allowed such verdicts among the states.
Ramos's conviction was upheld under the authority of Apodaca v. Oregon, in which the Supreme Court had held that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in federal criminal trials but permits non-unanimous verdicts in state trials. Subsequently, Louisiana voters approved a constitutional amendment requiring unanimous jury verdicts for criminal convictions. Ramos then challenged his conviction on direct review, arguing that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, mandates unanimous verdicts in state criminal trials for serious offenses.
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos's argument, relying on the precedent established in Apodaca. The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider whether Apodaca should be overruled. On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Eduardo Enriquez, a juvenile, was convicted of homicide and ordered to pay a massive fine in addition to a life sentence. The fine's amount relative to his age, culpability, and the offense required evaluation for gross disproportionality.
Miller v. Alabama567 U.S. 460 (2012)
In November 1999, fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson and two other boys decided to rob a video store in Arkansas.
En route, Jackson learned that one of the boys carried a sawed-off shotgun. Jackson initially stayed outside the store but later entered while the robbery was underway. When the clerk, Laurie Troup, refused to hand over money and threatened to call the police, one of Jackson's co-defendants shot and killed her. The three boys fled without taking any money.
Arkansas prosecutors exercised their discretion to charge Jackson as an adult with capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. A jury convicted him of both offenses. The trial court imposed the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Jackson did not challenge the sentence on direct appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
In 2003, fourteen-year-old Evan Miller and a friend, Colby Smith, spent an evening drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana with Miller's neighbor, Cole Cannon, at Cannon's trailer in Alabama. After Cannon passed out, Miller stole his wallet. Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat. Smith struck Cannon with a baseball bat, and Miller then repeatedly hit Cannon with the bat. The boys set two fires in the trailer before leaving. Cannon died from his injuries and smoke inhalation. Miller had previously been in and out of foster care, regularly used drugs and alcohol, and had attempted suicide four times.
Alabama law initially required that Miller be charged as a juvenile, but the district attorney sought and obtained removal of the case to adult court. A jury convicted Miller of murder in the course of arson. The trial court imposed the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Following this Court's decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, Jackson filed a state habeas petition arguing that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Miller's direct appeal was likewise unsuccessful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.
Esther Eisenberg, a repeat nonviolent offender, received a fine far exceeding the statutory maximum for her latest minor property crime. The fine's severity compared to the offense and prior record called for proportionality analysis under the clause.
Solem v. Helm463 U.S. 277, 279, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)
In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Jerry Helm was convicted in South Dakota of third-degree burglary. In 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, in 1973 of grand larceny, and in 1975 of third-offense driving while intoxicated. All six offenses were nonviolent and alcohol contributed to each.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a no-account check for $100. He told the trial court he had been drinking in Sioux Falls, ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, and did not remember the incident, then pleaded guilty. Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute.
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision. After Helm served two years, he asked the Governor to commute the sentence so he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of a fixed term; the Governor denied the request in May 1981.
Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.
What standard determines whether a fine is excessive?
Courts apply a gross disproportionality standard that compares the fine's amount to the gravity of the offense, the defendant's culpability, the harm caused, and any statutory maximum.
Supporting sources
Does the clause apply to civil penalties?
Yes. The clause reaches monetary sanctions that are at least partly punitive, including civil penalties imposed in connection with criminal conduct when they function as punishment.
Supporting sources
What factors show gross disproportionality?
Relevant factors include the offense's seriousness, the defendant's gain or loss caused, the statutory maximum fine, the defendant's financial circumstances, and whether the penalty serves a legitimate remedial or punitive goal.
Supporting sources
Can inability to pay render a fine excessive?
Inability to pay alone does not make a fine excessive, but when combined with automatic indefinite confinement or other harsh consequences tied solely to nonpayment, the overall scheme can violate the clause.
Supporting sources
463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)
…Majority opinion Opinion of Justice Powell The EighthAmendment declares: “[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime. The principle…