felony-de-se

Respondent Francis Connelly approached Officer Patrick Anderson of the Denver Police Department on August 18, 1983, at approximately 2:40 p.m. and stated that he had killed someone and wanted to talk about it. Anderson immediately advised respondent of his Miranda rights. Respondent stated that he understood those rights but wanted to talk about the murder anyway. At this point, respondent stated that he had come all the way from Boston to confess to the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in Denver sometime during the month of November 1982. Respondent was then taken to police headquarters. A detective again advised him of his rights. After respondent answered that he understood them, he was asked to describe the murder in detail. Respondent gave a lengthy account including the location of the body, the date of the murder, the fact that he had used a blunt instrument in the killing, and that after killing the victim he had washed his knife in a nearby stream. After hearing this account, the detective arrested respondent for the murder of Mary Ann Junta. A search of the area where respondent said the body was located revealed the body of a young girl. The cause of death was determined to be a skull fracture. At a preliminary hearing, the psychiatrist who had examined respondent testified that at the time of the confession, respondent was clearly suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at least as of the time of his arrest. The psychiatrist testified that respondent's psychosis motivated his confession, that respondent was not capable of making a free and intelligent decision to confess, and that the confession was not voluntary. The trial court found that respondent's initial statement to Officer Anderson was involuntary and ordered that it be suppressed. The trial court also ruled that the subsequent statements made at the police station were tainted by the prior involuntary statement and ordered that they too be suppressed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether respondent's confession was obtained in a manner that violated the Due Process Clause.

Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder in a Florida state court in 1974 and sentenced to death. There was no suggestion at the time that he was incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced. In early 1982, while on death row, Ford began to exhibit bizarre behavior that grew more serious over time. After reading about a Ku Klux Klan rally, he developed an obsession with the Klan and delusions that he was the target of a conspiracy involving the Klan and prison guards, who he believed were holding 135 of his friends and family hostage in the prison and torturing his women relatives. He began referring to himself as Pope John Paul III and claimed to have fired prison officials and appointed new justices to the Florida Supreme Court. Ford's counsel arranged for examinations by two psychiatrists. Dr. Jamal Amin evaluated Ford over roughly 14 months using taped conversations, letters, interviews, and medical records and concluded that Ford suffered from a severe mental disease resembling paranoid schizophrenia with suicide potential. Dr. Harold Kaufman interviewed Ford in November 1983 and concluded that Ford had no understanding of why he was being executed, sincerely believed he would not be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves, and showed no signs of malingering. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 922.07, Ford's counsel invoked the state procedure for determining competency of a condemned inmate. The Governor appointed a panel of three psychiatrists who together interviewed Ford for approximately 30 minutes in the presence of eight other people. Each psychiatrist filed a separate two- or three-page report. Although the diagnoses differed, all three concluded that Ford had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him. On April 30, 1984, the Governor signed a death warrant without explanation or statement. Ford's attorneys unsuccessfully sought a hearing in state court. They then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, proffering the conflicting findings and subsequent challenges by other psychiatrists. The District Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.

In July 1993 Vincent W. Foster, Jr., then Deputy White House Counsel, met with attorney James Hamilton of the firm Swidler & Berlin to seek legal representation concerning possible congressional or other investigations of the 1993 dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office. During the two-hour meeting Hamilton took three pages of handwritten notes, one of the first entries of which was the word "Privileged." Nine days later Foster committed suicide. In December 1995 a federal grand jury at the request of the Office of the Independent Counsel issued subpoenas to Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin for Hamilton's handwritten notes of the meeting with Foster. Petitioners filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. After examining the notes in camera the District Court concluded they were protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege and denied enforcement. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. It recognized that most courts assume the privilege survives death but concluded that a balancing test should apply in the criminal context. The Court of Appeals also held that the notes were not protected by the work-product privilege. A dissenting judge would have affirmed the District Court's judgment protecting the notes under the attorney-client privilege. Petitioners sought review in the Supreme Court on both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998.