An amount of money that a party must pay to a court clerk to commence a civil action or other proceeding. Statutes and court rules commonly authorize assessment of filing fees along with related litigation expenses such as attorney fees and genetic testing costs. Courts may direct payment of awarded fees directly to counsel and permit counsel to enforce the award in the attorney's own name.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Parentage Action Fee Assessment
Felicity French files a parentage action against the alleged father. The court adjudicates parentage and orders the father to pay Felicity's filing fees along with genetic testing costs and reasonable attorney fees. The court directs that the attorney fees be paid directly to Felicity's lawyer, who then enforces the order in her own name after the father refuses payment.
Divorce Residency Challenge
Francois Fortier moves to dismiss his wife's divorce petition on the ground that she failed to satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. The wife responds that enforcement of the residency rule combined with the filing fee requirement would unconstitutionally delay her access to court. The court rejects the challenge and requires payment of the filing fee to proceed.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage.
Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing.
Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal.
Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
Foxfire Biotech files a class action complaint in federal court against Allstate. Allstate moves to dismiss arguing that New York procedural limits on class actions control. The court holds that the federal rules govern and that the filing fee requirement does not convert the class mechanism into a substantive damages limitation.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.559 U.S. 393 (USSC 2010)
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A., provided medical care to Sonia E. Galvez for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. As partial payment for that care, Galvez assigned to Shady Grove her rights to insurance benefits under a policy issued in New York by Allstate Insurance Co. Shady Grove tendered a claim for the assigned benefits to Allstate, which under New York law had 30 days to pay the claim or deny it. Allstate apparently paid, but not on time, and it refused to pay the statutory interest that accrued on the overdue benefits at two percent per month.
Shady Grove filed this diversity suit in the Eastern District of New York to recover the unpaid statutory interest. Alleging that Allstate routinely refuses to pay interest on overdue benefits, Shady Grove sought relief on behalf of itself and a class of all others to whom Allstate owes interest. The individual claim was worth roughly $500, which fell far short of the amount-in-controversy requirement for individual suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 901(b), which precludes a suit to recover a penalty from proceeding as a class action, applies in diversity suits in federal court despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Concluding that statutory interest is a penalty under New York law, it held that § 901(b) prohibited the proposed class action.
Felix Franco, a prisoner with no assets, files a civil rights action and seeks in forma pauperis status. The court assesses an initial partial filing fee of twenty percent of his account balance and orders monthly payments of twenty percent of future deposits until the full filing fee is paid.
Marriage License Fee Barrier
Faith Fitzgerald seeks to marry but cannot pay the required filing fee because of indigency. She challenges the fee as an unconstitutional barrier to the fundamental right to marry. The court strikes down the fee requirement as applied to her under the Due Process Clause.
Zablocki v. Redhail434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978)
In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971.
After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen. From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments.
As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County.
County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1). Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry. After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement.
Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.
Francisco Frost challenges a state voter identification law that requires payment of a filing fee to obtain a photo ID. He argues the fee imposes a severe burden on the right to vote for low-income citizens. The court upholds the requirement after finding the state's interests outweigh the burden.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board553 U.S. 181 (2008)
In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, referred to as the Voter ID Law or SEA 483. The statute requires citizens voting in person at primary and general elections to present a government-issued photo identification card. It does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail. There is an exception for persons living and voting in a state-licensed facility such as a nursing home.
Voters who lack compliant photo identification may cast a provisional ballot. The ballot will be counted only if they execute an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within ten days following the election. A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days following the election. The state offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their residence and identity.
Promptly after the enactment of SEA 483 in 2005, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the state officials responsible for its enforcement. A second suit seeking the same relief was brought on behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing groups of elderly, disabled, poor, and minority voters. The cases were consolidated, and the State of Indiana intervened to defend the validity of the statute.
After discovery, District Judge Barker prepared a comprehensive 70-page opinion explaining her decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. She found that petitioners had not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result of SEA 483 or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements. She rejected as utterly incredible and unreliable an expert's report that up to 989,000 registered voters in Indiana did not possess either a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification. She estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver's license or identification card.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Four judges voted to grant a petition for rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Can a court order a filing fee paid directly to the prevailing party's attorney?
Yes. In parentage proceedings the court may assess filing fees and direct that awarded attorney fees be paid directly to counsel. The attorney may then enforce the order in the attorney's own name.
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Does a filing fee requirement ever violate constitutional rights?
Yes. A filing fee that completely bars an indigent party from obtaining a divorce can violate due process when the state monopolizes the dissolution process. Courts have struck down such fees when no alternative means of access exists.
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Must prisoners always pay the full filing fee even if indigent?
Yes. A prisoner who proceeds in forma pauperis must still pay the full filing fee through an initial partial payment followed by monthly installments of twenty percent of account deposits until the fee is satisfied.
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When is a document considered filed if the filing fee is not tendered?
Communication of a record to the filing office without tender of the required filing fee does not constitute filing under the UCC. The filing office may refuse the record for that reason.
Supporting sources
434 U.S. 374 (1978)
…protected liberty. In Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U. S. 371, the Court held that the State's legitimate purposes in collecting filing fees for divorce actions were insufficient under the Due Process Clause to deprive the indigent of access to the courts where that access was necessary to dissolve the marital relationship. In…