/FIND-ingz uv FAKT and kun-KLOO-zhuns uv LAW/·phrase
Also known as:findings of fact · conclusions of law · findings and conclusions · FOF/COL · findings & conclusions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court's determination of the facts established by the evidence together with the legal rules applied to those facts when entering judgment after a nonjury trial or when granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction. The statement may be made orally on the record or in a written opinion or memorandum. It supplies the basis for appellate review and for entry of judgment under Rule 58.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Nonjury Trial on Contract Claim
Fatima Flores sued Fisher Foods in federal court for breach of a supply contract. After a bench trial the judge announced from the bench that the parties had formed a valid agreement, that Fisher Foods had failed to deliver conforming goods, and that Flores was entitled to damages measured by cover costs. The judge then entered judgment for Flores under Rule 58.
Denial of Preliminary Injunction
Felicia Fuentes moved for a preliminary injunction to halt Fairview Manufacturing from using disputed trade secrets. After a telephonic hearing the district judge issued a one-sentence order denying the motion. On appeal the court remanded because the order contained no findings on likelihood of success or irreparable harm.
Francesca Fowler lost a nonjury trademark case to Franklin Foundry. Twenty days after judgment she moved under Rule 59 to amend the findings to include overlooked evidence of consumer confusion. The court granted the motion in part, revised its credibility determinations, and entered an amended judgment.
Nuisance Trial With Advisory Jury
Felipe Figueroa sued Spur Industries after odors from its feedlot reached his nearby residential development. The court discharged the advisory jury, made detailed findings that the operation constituted a nuisance, balanced the equities, and ordered the facility relocated while awarding damages.
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
In 1956, Spur’s predecessors in interest developed feedlots about ½ mile south of Olive Avenue in an area between the confluence of the usually dry Agua Fria and New Rivers, some 14 to 15 miles west of the urban area of Phoenix. By April and May of 1959, the Northside Hay Mill was feeding between 6,000 and 7,000 head of cattle and Welborn approximately 1,500 head on a combined area of 35 acres. In 1960, Spur purchased the property and expanded the feedlot operation from approximately thirty-five acres to one hundred fourteen acres by 1962, eventually maintaining between twenty thousand and thirty thousand head of cattle at the time of trial.
Del E. Webb Development Co. began planning Sun City, a retirement community, in May 1959 after purchasing twenty thousand acres of farmland for fifteen million dollars. Construction of a golf course started that September. Homes were first offered in January 1960. The first residents moved in during 1960. By the time of trial, Sun City had a population of approximately fourteen thousand people, and the development had extended south to within five hundred feet of Spur's feedlot north of Olive Avenue.
Residents of Sun City began complaining about odors and flies from the feedlot, which produced over a million pounds of wet manure per day, and Webb encountered sales resistance starting around 1963 in the southwestern portion of the development. Webb attempted to buy the feedlot from Spur but the parties could not agree on a price. Webb then filed suit alleging that the feedlot was a public nuisance because flies and odors drifted over the southern portion of Sun City, rendering in excess of one thousand three hundred lots unfit for residential development.
The trial court, after proceedings that included an advisory jury later discharged and special actions in the Arizona Supreme Court, found the feedlot to be a nuisance, permanently enjoined its operation, and awarded damages to Webb. Spur appealed from the injunction and the damages award, while Webb cross-appealed from the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees. During the appeal process, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to the final determination.
Forrest Falconer moved to dismiss a complaint alleging an antitrust conspiracy. The district court granted the motion in a short order that contained no findings of fact. The order was proper because Rule 52 does not require findings when a court rules on a motion under Rule 12.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities.
William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc.
The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories.
This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
Faye Fuller obtained a large jury verdict against Fairfield Bank. On appeal the Second Circuit applied New York's excessiveness standard to reduce the award. The Supreme Court held that the state standard could be applied without violating the Seventh Amendment because the trial court retained authority to make its own findings.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.518 U.S. 415, 429–431 (1996)
William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer who had taken over 5,000 slide transparencies while reporting in Central America, agreed in 1990 to supply 300 of his original color transparencies to The Center for Humanities, Inc., for use in an educational videotape titled Conflict in Central America. After the project concluded, the Center could not locate or return the transparencies, prompting Gasperini to pursue legal remedies for their loss.
Gasperini, a California citizen, sued the Center, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. The Center conceded liability, so the case proceeded to trial solely on damages.
At the three-day jury trial, Gasperini's expert testified that the industry standard valued each lost transparency at $1,500 as the average license fee over the photographer's copyright term. Gasperini testified that his photography earnings from 1984 through 1993 totaled just over $10,000 and that he planned to publish a book of his best Central American photographs. The jury returned a verdict of $450,000, or $1,500 for each of the 300 slides.
The Center moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, invoking both the federal standard and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5501(c). The District Court denied the motion without comment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment after applying the New York deviates-materially standard itself.
The Second Circuit surveyed Appellate Division decisions on similar awards and concluded that the verdict materially deviated from reasonable compensation because many slides were generic and Gasperini had limited earnings. It ordered a new trial unless Gasperini accepted a reduction to $100,000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the proper standard.
When must a federal court state findings of fact and conclusions of law?
A federal court must state findings and conclusions after a nonjury trial or when granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction. The requirement does not apply to rulings on motions under Rules 12 or 56.
Supporting sources
May a party challenge the sufficiency of findings even if it never requested them before judgment?
Yes. A party may question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings on appeal whether or not it requested findings or objected to their sparsity before judgment.
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What is the remedy when a district court denies a preliminary injunction without any findings?
The appellate court ordinarily remands so the district court can state the required findings and conclusions. The absence of findings prevents meaningful review of the injunction factors.
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Does Rule 52 require findings when the court rules on a motion for summary judgment?
No. Rule 52(a)(3) expressly exempts rulings on motions under Rule 56 from the requirement to state findings or conclusions.
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May a court amend its findings after judgment under Rule 59?
Yes. On a timely motion the court may open the judgment, take additional testimony, amend its findings, or make new ones and direct entry of a new judgment.
Supporting sources
424 U.S. 319 (1976)
…and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer…