Also known as:freedoms of movement · right to travel · mobility rights
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A fundamental constitutional protection that guarantees individuals the ability to travel freely from one state to another. The protection includes the right of new residents to receive the same treatment as longer-term residents with respect to basic public benefits. Durational residency requirements that penalize recent interstate movement by denying or reducing welfare eligibility violate equal protection and trigger strict scrutiny.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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Welfare Denial After Recent Move
Francois Fortier moved from State X to State Y and applied for cash assistance two months later. State Y denied the application under a statute requiring twelve months of residency for new arrivals. The denial penalized Fortier solely for exercising his right to relocate, so the court invalidated the residency rule and ordered equal treatment with long-term residents.
Reduced Benefits for New Arrivals
Farid Farahani relocated from State X to State Y after a disaster and sought family cash assistance. State Y limited his payments to the lower amount available in State X for the first year. The court struck down the cap because it treated new residents differently from established ones solely on the basis of recent interstate movement.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Cases
Hornbooks
Study Supplements
Vehicle Stop and Search Limits
Fiona Foster was pulled over on a rural highway at night. Officers conducted a protective search of the passenger compartment after observing a knife on the floor. The court examined whether the encounter curtailed Foster's freedom of movement enough to convert the stop into custody requiring additional safeguards.
Michigan v. Long463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
State Custody and Liberty Interests
Felix Franco was placed in state-supervised foster care after reports of household danger. When later injuries occurred, the court considered whether the state's prior restraint on Franco's freedom of movement created an affirmative duty to protect his safety under the Due Process Clause.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services489 U.S. 189 (1989)
Firearm Possession After Relocation
Faith Fitzgerald moved to a new city and sought to keep a handgun in her home for self-defense. Local officials refused to register the firearm under an ordinance that effectively barred possession by recent arrivals. The court assessed whether the restriction burdened her fundamental liberty interests tied to interstate movement.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois561 U.S. 742 (2010)
Terry Stop and Movement Restraint
Felicity French was approached by officers who observed suspicious behavior near a store. The officers briefly detained her and patted her down for weapons. The court evaluated whether the initial restraint on French's freedom of movement was justified by reasonable suspicion rather than amounting to a full arrest.
Terry v. Ohio392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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What level of scrutiny applies to durational residency requirements for welfare benefits?+
Strict scrutiny applies because such requirements penalize the fundamental right to interstate travel. The state must show that the classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest. Fiscal concerns and the desire to deter indigent migration are not compelling interests.
Supporting sources
Does the right to travel protect new residents from receiving lower welfare benefits than long-term residents?+
Yes. The right includes the entitlement of newly arrived residents to equal treatment regarding basic public assistance. Laws that peg benefits to the level available in a former state or impose waiting periods violate equal protection.
Supporting sources
Can a state justify a welfare residency rule by claiming it protects the public treasury?+
No. Protecting the treasury by discouraging entry of persons who might need assistance is not a constitutionally permissible objective. The rule therefore fails strict scrutiny.
Supporting sources
416 U.S. 1 (1974)Property
…or any person.” 278 U. S., at 122. The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: that it interferes with a person’s right to travel; that it interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a State; that it bars people who are uncongenial to the present residents; that it expresses the social preferences of the…