Also known as: right to marry
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A fundamental constitutional liberty interest that protects an individual's choice of marital partner from state interference unsupported by sufficiently important interests closely tailored to those ends.
Farah Fox and Fernando Farrell, an interracial couple, moved to a new state and applied for family tax credits available to married households. Officials denied the credits solely because the marriage crossed racial lines. The denial imposed a direct burden on their marital choice that triggered strict scrutiny and could not stand without a purpose detached from racial discrimination.
Freya Freeman owed arrears from a prior relationship. A statute required her to obtain court permission before marrying her fiancé until the debt was paid in full. The requirement created a substantial obstacle to entering the marital relationship that demanded a close fit to the state's collection goals.
Fabian Flynn's will left property to his son only if the son married within a specified religious group. The son challenged the condition after marrying outside the group. The restriction directly limited the son's freedom to select a spouse and could not be enforced as written.
David Shapira, M. D., died April 13, 1973, a resident of this county. This is an action for a declaratory judgment and the construction of the will of David Shapira, M. D. By agreement of the parties, the case has been submitted upon the pleadings and the exhibit. The portions of the will in controversy provide that the residue goes to the testator's three beloved children, Buth Shapira Aharoni, Daniel Jacob Shapira, and Mark Benjamin Simon Shapira in equal shares with qualifications. The will states that Daniel Jacob Shapira should receive his share of the bequest only if he is married at the time of the testator's death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish. In the event that at the time of the testator's death he is not married to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish, then his share should be kept by the executor for a period of not longer than seven years. If Daniel Jacob gets married within the seven year period to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish, the executor is instructed to turn over his share to him. In the event that Daniel Jacob is unmarried within the seven years after the testator's death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish, or if he is married to a non Jewish girl, then his share should go to the State of Israel, absolutely. The provision for the testator's other son Mark is conditioned substantially similarly. Daniel Jacob Shapira, the plaintiff, is twenty-one years of age, unmarried and a student at Youngstown State University. The plaintiff alleges that the condition upon his inheritance is unconstitutional, contrary to public policy and unenforceable because of its unreasonableness, and that he should be given his bequest free of the restriction.
View caseFrancesca Fowler sought to marry her long-term partner while terminally ill. State officials argued that the marriage right did not extend to end-of-life decisions. The claim rested on distinct liberty interests that courts evaluate separately from marital choice.
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseFrancois Fortier and his same-sex partner obtained a valid out-of-state marriage. Upon relocating, state agencies refused to recognize the marriage for spousal benefits. The refusal treated the marriage as second-class and violated the requirement of equal recognition.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
View caseA city ordinance capped the number of unrelated persons who could live together in a single dwelling. Freya Freeman wished to reside with her adult child and grandchild after marrying. The limit intruded on protected family living arrangements tied to marital and parental bonds.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseYes. Once a state recognizes civil marriage, it must extend the same incidents and recognition to same-sex marriages that it grants to opposite-sex marriages.
No. Such a requirement significantly interferes with the fundamental right and must be narrowly tailored to the state's collection interests. A flat bar or permission scheme that prevents marriage fails that test.
Yes. Racial restrictions on whom one may marry are subject to the most rigid scrutiny and cannot survive without a purpose wholly independent of invidious discrimination.
Prison rules restricting marriage must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. A blanket prohibition lacking such a connection is invalid even under deferential review.
…Wade , 410 U. S. 113, 152-154 (woman's right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia , 388 U. S. 1, 12 (freedom to marry person of another race); Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird , 405 U. S. 438 (right to use contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U. S. 510, 534-535…