A wagering scheme in which participants stake value on the outcome of a contest or event with uncertain results.
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Common Examples
6
State Sports Betting Authorization
Gina Griffin, a state gaming official, sought to license sportsbooks for casino wagering on professional games. Federal authorities invoked a statute barring state authorization of such schemes. The court invalidated the federal bar because it directed state legislative choices rather than regulating private bettors directly.
Permit Condition on Casino Expansion
Guillermo Guzman applied to expand his casino property. The city conditioned approval on dedicating land for a public park. The court required the city to show the gambling-related traffic impact was roughly proportional to the demanded dedication.
Florence Dolan, Petitioner v. City of Tigard, Respondent512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304
Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing and electric supply store located on a 1.67-acre parcel of land in the business district of the city of Tigard, Oregon. The store is on a parcel that includes a 9,700-square-foot building, and Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern corner of the lot within the 100-year floodplain.
In the early 1970's, the city developed a comprehensive plan for managing surface water drainage in the Fanno Basin serving the area where the property is located. The comprehensive plan also contained provisions for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway system throughout the city, one of which was to follow along Fanno Creek.
In 1988, petitioner applied for a permit to expand her store and pave the parking lot. The city planning commission granted the permit but required petitioner to dedicate a portion of her property for the construction of a public greenway along Fanno Creek and an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the greenway for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway. The dedication required encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or roughly 10% of the property.
Petitioner requested a variance from the city's dedication requirements. The planning commission denied the variance, and the city council affirmed the denial. Petitioner then filed suit in Oregon state court claiming an uncompensated taking.
The Oregon trial court upheld the city's requirements. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Oregon Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The question presented was what standard of review applies to a claim that a city's exaction of a dedication of private property as a condition of a building permit constitutes an uncompensated taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Gloria Green placed repeated calls from a public booth to relay betting information. Agents attached a listening device to the booth exterior without a warrant. The court held that Green retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the gambling conversations.
Katz v. United States389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California. He faced an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal statute. At trial the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations. FBI agents had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions thus presented. Based upon previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents correctly predicted he would use the booth for several minutes at approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence.
They preserved the petitioner's end of conversations concerning placing bets and receiving wagering information. On the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them. The telephone booth was made partly of glass. The petitioner was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside.
The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the booth and took great care to overhear only the petitioner's conversations.
Greta Goldstein was prosecuted under a federal statute for possessing gambling devices near a school. The statute lacked any jurisdictional element tying the activity to interstate commerce. The court struck down the law as exceeding Congress's commerce power.
United States v. Lopez514 U.S. 549 (1995)
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Gary Goldman stood outside a known gambling parlor and appeared to be casing the entrance. An officer patted him down and found betting slips. The court upheld the stop because the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the observed conduct.
Terry v. Ohio392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
On October 31, 1963, Cleveland police detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran assigned to downtown Cleveland for 30 years, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue.
McFadden took up a post of observation 300 to 400 feet away. He watched as the two men walked back and forth along Huron Road, pausing repeatedly to look in the window of a store before conferring with each other. This pattern repeated roughly a dozen times over ten to twelve minutes.
A third man, Katz, joined them briefly before departing, after which Terry and Chilton followed the same path. By this time McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious that the men were casing the store for a robbery and feared they might be armed.
McFadden approached the three men in front of Zucker's store, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. When they mumbled responses, he grabbed Terry, spun him around, patted down the outer clothing of his overcoat, and felt a pistol in the left breast pocket.
He removed a .38-caliber revolver from Terry's pocket and ordered the men into the store, where he similarly frisked Chilton and discovered another revolver while finding no weapons on Katz. Terry and Chilton were arrested and charged with carrying concealed weapons.
Prior to trial they moved to suppress the revolvers as the product of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion after hearing McFadden's testimony, finding that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendants were acting suspiciously and that the frisk was necessary for his protection. After the denial, Terry and Chilton waived jury trial, were convicted, and sentenced to one to three years in the penitentiary. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Gordon Gray purchased coastal land intending to develop a casino resort. Later state regulations prohibited all gambling uses. The court held that the claim was ripe because the regulations barred the only economically viable use of the parcel.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island533 U.S. 606 (2001)
Anthony Palazzolo, a lifelong resident of Westerly, Rhode Island, formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) with associates in 1959 to purchase three undeveloped adjoining parcels along Atlantic Avenue bordering Winnapaug Pond to the north and the beach to the south. SGI subdivided the property into 80 lots in the 1960s and developed most into single-family homes, but left the petitioner's 20-acre parcel undeveloped. Most of the property consists of salt marsh subject to tidal flooding requiring substantial fill for structures.
In 1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate coastal development. In 1978, the CRMC promulgated regulations designating much of the property as protected coastal wetlands where filling is prohibited without a special exception. That same year SGI's corporate charter was revoked for unpaid taxes, transferring title to Palazzolo as sole shareholder.
In 1983, Palazzolo applied to the CRMC to construct a bulkhead and fill the entire wetlands for a beach club, but the application was denied as vague and inadequate with significant environmental impacts. In 1985, he submitted a more specific proposal to fill 11 acres for a beach club including parking for 50 cars with trailers, dumpsters, port-a-johns, picnic tables, and barbecue pits, which the CRMC also rejected for failing to serve a compelling public purpose.
Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court seeking $3,150,000 in damages based on the value of a 74-lot residential subdivision, alleging the regulations deprived him of all economically beneficial use. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against him, finding the parcel retained $200,000 in development value on an upland portion. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on multiple grounds, including lack of ripeness and that Palazzolo lacked standing to challenge pre-acquisition regulations.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision.
Does the anti-commandeering doctrine bar Congress from prohibiting states from authorizing sports gambling?
Yes. A federal statute that forbids states from authorizing or licensing sports gambling schemes targets state legislative action rather than regulating private conduct and therefore violates the anti-commandeering principle.
What constitutes valid consideration when a party forgoes gambling?
Forbearance from gambling at the request of a promisor supplies legal detriment sufficient to support a promise even without economic loss to the promisee.
When does a federal gambling prohibition operate as valid preemption rather than commandeering?
A federal gambling rule operates as valid preemption only when it directly regulates private conduct and displaces inconsistent state rules. A statute that merely orders states not to authorize gambling is not preemption.
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
…could regulate, without more, the "mere possession" of firearms. See id. , at 339, n. 4; see also United States v. Five Gambling Devices , 346 U. S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion) ("The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires…