Also known as: games of chance · game of skill contrast
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A contest whose outcome is determined primarily by luck rather than skill of the participants. The classification turns on which element dominates the result.
Greta Goldstein wins $50,000 in a state-run lottery. She assigns her right to receive the prize payments to Glacier Energy as security for a loan. Under the UCC the assignment creates a security interest in an account because the payments qualify as winnings in a game of chance.
Gary Goldman operates an illegal numbers game from a storefront. Federal agents seize the cash and the booth itself. The court must decide whether the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine given the connection between the property and the game of chance.
The appellant was convicted by a jury on two counts of an indictment charging him with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Count One charged that Austin, by force and violence and by intimidation, took from the person and presence of a bank teller approximately $10,000.00. Count Two charged that in committing the offense he assaulted the teller and put her in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit, a pistol. The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the lesser offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is included in the offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), so that a defendant may not be convicted and punished for both. The statute defines the basic robbery offense in subsection (a) and provides an enhanced penalty in subsection (d) for committing any offense defined in subsections (a), (b), and (c) by assaulting a person or putting a life in jeopardy with a dangerous weapon or device. The Government argued that the two counts state separate and distinct offenses for which the defendant may be convicted and punished. It relied on the principle that a single transaction may give rise to a violation of more than one statute as in Blockburger v. United States and Gore v. United States. The court noted that the question is one of legislative intent. The court cited Prince v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be validly sentenced on both a count charging entry into a bank with intent to rob and a count charging robbery. The Government sought to distinguish Prince on the ground that the two offenses there involved were proscribed by separate subsections of the statute, while here both offenses are embraced within a single subsection, namely (d). The court rejected this distinction. The plain meaning of the language in (d) is that the use of a dangerous weapon must occur in the course of the commission of one of the offenses defined in the earlier subsections. Subsection (d) does not define a separate and distinct offense but provides for an increased penalty. This interpretation was confirmed by the legislative history of the statute. The original bank robbery statute was enacted in 1934. It contained what is now subsection (a) and a subsection (b) which is now (d). House reports from 1934 and 1935 treated the use of a dangerous weapon as an aggravation of the offense of taking by force and violence or by intimidation. The statute was amended in 1948 to its present form. The Reviser's Note stated that the section consolidates the earlier statutes without change of substance. The court concluded that Congress at no time intended to provide for cumulative penalties for the single offense of bank robbery. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to vacate the conviction and sentence on Count One of the indictment.
View caseGenevieve Gardner serves on a civil jury. During voir dire she denies any gambling activity. After the verdict the losing party seeks to introduce evidence that Gardner regularly plays games of chance. The court applies the no-impeachment rule to bar the inquiry into deliberations.
Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by Randy Shauers struck him from behind. Warger claims he was stopped at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger suddenly pulled out in front of him. The accident resulted in serious injuries to Warger that ultimately required the amputation of his left leg. Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court. During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy voir dire of the prospective jurors. Warger's counsel asked whether any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and suffering or for future medical expenses. Counsel also asked whether there was any juror who thought they could not be a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case. Prospective juror Regina Whipple, who was later selected as the jury foreperson, answered no to each of these questions. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Shauers. Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted Warger's counsel to express concern over juror Whipple's conduct. The complaining juror subsequently signed an affidavit claiming that Whipple had spoken during deliberations about a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and a man died, and had related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life. Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial. The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that the only evidence that supported Warger's motion, the complaining juror's affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseGerald Gibson is convicted after jurors play cards in the deliberation room. Post-verdict affidavits reveal that one juror made racially charged statements while the group treated the outcome like a game of chance. The trial court must determine whether the statements overcome the usual bar on juror testimony.
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
View caseGustavo Gutierrez's tribe seeks to operate a new casino offering games of chance. The state refuses to negotiate a compact. The tribe sues in federal court and the state raises sovereign immunity as a bar to the action.
In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes. Class III gaming includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries. Such gaming is lawful only when conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State. The Act imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of such a compact. It authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty. The Seminole Tribe of Florida requested that the State of Florida enter into negotiations for a compact governing class III gaming on the Tribe's lands. When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe filed suit in September 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the State and its Governor, Lawton Chiles. The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. It alleged that respondents had refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation contained in § 2710(d)(3). The State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against the State and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did not permit a suit against the Governor to enforce the statutory duty. The Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and whether the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits against a State's Governor for such relief.
View caseGuillermo Guzman owns a store that sells tickets for a weekly game of chance. State law prohibits the sale on Sundays. Guzman claims the restriction violates equal protection because other retail sales remain lawful on that day.
The appellants are seven employees of a large discount department store located on a highway in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. They were indicted for the Sunday sale of a three-ring loose-leaf binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler and staples, and a toy submarine in violation of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 521. Each appellant was convicted after trial and fined five dollars and costs. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in 1959. The statutes at issue generally prohibit the Sunday sale of merchandise throughout the State, with exceptions for the retail sale of tobacco products, confectioneries, milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs and medicines, and newspapers and periodicals. In Anne Arundel County the exceptions were expanded by amendment to include foodstuffs, automobile and boating accessories, flowers, toilet goods, hospital supplies, and souvenirs, and to permit operation by retail establishments employing no more than one person other than the owner. Additional sections of the Maryland Code regulate sports, amusements, dancing, the sale of alcoholic beverages, and numerous other activities on Sunday, with many county-specific and time-specific exceptions. The appellants were indicted only under § 521, but the full body of Maryland Sunday laws was examined to evaluate their constitutional claims. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). The statutes trace their lineage to a 1692 Maryland enactment that prohibited work or bodily labor on the Lord's Day with exceptions for works of necessity and charity. The present versions contain numerous exemptions for recreational and commercial activities that have been added or modified over time.
View caseBlack's defines a game of chance as one whose outcome is determined by luck rather than skill. The test focuses on which element dominates the result rather than whether some skill is present.
UCC section 9-102(a)(2) expressly includes winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a state or authorized person. The right to payment qualifies as an account whether or not it has been earned by performance.
Section 9-309(14) provides an automatic perfection rule for a sale by an individual of an account that is a right to payment of winnings in a lottery or other game of chance.
…11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K. B. 1785). There, Lord Mansfield excluded juror testimony that the jury had decided the case through a game of chance. The Mansfield rule, as it came to be known, prohibited jurors, after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their subjective mental processes or about objective events that…